Crossroads

The Battle for Influence in the Red Sea is Reaching a Boiling Point

Atlas  

 

 

For the past two years, the Red Sea has largely been viewed through a single lens. Missile and drone attacks by the Houthis have transformed one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors into a conflict zone. As a result, hundreds of vessels have been forced to take the long detour around the Cape of Good Hope. Yet, the Houthis are merely the most visible symptom of a much broader geopolitical transformation. 

History shows that control over the Red Sea has rarely been about the sea itself. For centuries, it has been about controlling the connection between Europe, Asia, and Africa. The Romans depended on this route for trade with India, and the Ottoman Empire sought to secure it against European expansion. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Britain transformed the route into the maritime artery of its empire. Via Egypt and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Suez Canal became the lifeline connecting London with India.

Even today, the Red Sea remains of vital importance. Roughly 12% of global trade passes through this corridor. Container shipping, oil exports, and consumer goods moving between Europe and Asia depend on it every day. Whoever is able to influence the stability (or instability) of this waterway gains influence that extends far beyond the region itself.

It is precisely this strategic importance that has turned the Red Sea into one of the world's newest geopolitical battlegrounds, where a power struggle has been unfolding along both shores of the Red Sea, stretching from Yemen to Sudan and from Saudi Arabia to the Horn of Africa. Increasingly, the future of this waterway is being shaped by competing regional ambitions, proxy wars, and the race to secure ports, logistics hubs, and political influence.

For years, the Gulf states largely worked together to secure this strategic position. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) cooperated closely during their military intervention in Yemen, invested throughout East Africa, and sought to curb Iranian influence along the Red Sea. Last week, Saudi and UAE officials reaffirmed these ties, sharing similar social media posts affirming their close historical ties and ‘wise leadership’. Chairman of the UAE National Media Authority, Abdulla bin Mohamed Alhamed, wrote on X:

“Emirati-Saudi relations are an extension of a shared history and deep-rooted fraternal ties between two brotherly ​peoples, united by a single destiny.”

A few minutes later, Saudi Minister of Media Salman Al-Dosary, posted something similar:

“The relationship between the Kingdom and the Emirates is a relationship between ​two peoples united by a shared history and heritage, and wise leadership in both countries.”

The coordinated messaging is striking given the tensions that have emerged between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in recent years. Behind the public displays of unity, the two countries have increasingly found themselves competing over regional influence, suggesting that the relationship is far more complex than their statements imply.

 

 

The first cracks in the partnership became visible as early as 2019. The UAE significantly reduced its military presence in Yemen while simultaneously increasing its support for the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC). As a result, the STC gradually gained control over large parts of southern Yemen. Tensions escalated further on December 2, 2025.

On that day, the UAE-backed STC launched a large-scale offensive into the oil-rich Hadhramaut region. Within a short period, it captured large parts of the area until Saudi-backed forces managed to reverse the advance. This made it clear that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi no longer shared the same strategic vision for Yemen.

The civil war in Sudan has since deepened this divide even further. Former allies now support opposing sides, turning Sudan into the center of a broader geopolitical rivalry that increasingly extends across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. What began in 2023 as a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has evolved into one of the world’s largest proxy wars. Rather than ending quickly, the conflict has attracted a growing network of foreign sponsors providing weapons, financing, and diplomatic support.

Saudi Arabia has gradually emerged as one of the SAF’s principal diplomatic backers, alongside Egypt and Turkey. The UAE, by contrast, has long been accused of providing substantial support to the RSF, although Abu Dhabi continues to deny these allegations. As a result, Sudan is no longer merely a domestic conflict, but an arena in which Gulf powers compete for influence.

Geography helps us to explain why. Sudan lies at the crossroads of North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Red Sea. Instability in the country threatens maritime security, migration flows, regional trade, and access to one of the world’s most important shipping corridors. For Riyadh, a permanently fragmented Sudan could mean accepting chronic instability directly across the Red Sea from Jeddah, Mecca, and Medina.

For the UAE, however, Sudan remains one of the few Red Sea states that has yet to fall within Abu Dhabi's sphere of influence. That helps explain its support for the RSF, as securing influence over Port Sudan would complete much of the Emirati maritime network stretching from the Gulf of Aden to the Suez Canal.

 

 

This competition extends far beyond Sudan itself. One of the defining features of Emirati foreign policy over the past decade has been the construction of a network of strategic ports along the Indian Ocean and the western coast of the Red Sea.

The flagship of this strategy is the state-owned port operator DP World. By investing more than $11 billion in port infrastructure, the company has expanded its global capacity to more than 100 million TEU, giving it control over roughly 10% of global container capacity. Through these investments, the UAE has steadily expanded its maritime footprint by acquiring commercial ports while simultaneously building security relationships with local governments.

 

 

Berbera in Somaliland has become one of the UAE’s flagship projects. The modern commercial port is supported by rapidly expanding logistics infrastructure. Bosaso in Puntland strengthens the Emirati position along the Gulf of Aden, while Assab in Eritrea served as a key military logistics hub during the Yemen War. Although some projects have faced setbacks, most notably the long-running dispute over the Doraleh Container Terminal in Djibouti, the broader strategy has remained remarkably consistent: maritime infrastructure serves as the foundation of geopolitical influence.

Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, views the region through a different strategic lens. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 is transforming the kingdom’s western coastline into one of its most important economic growth corridors. Projects such as NEOM, Oxagon, the Red Sea tourism developments, the Yanbu industrial complex, and the continued expansion of Jeddah all depend on a stable maritime environment. For Saudi Arabia, the Red Sea is therefore no longer merely a security concern but an economic lifeline tied to hundreds of billions of dollars in investment.

 

 

These differing priorities help explain why Riyadh has become increasingly concerned about the UAE’s policies in the Horn of Africa. In response, Saudi Arabia has intensified its diplomatic engagement with Egypt, Eritrea, and Djibouti, while also seeking to prevent neighboring countries from being used as transit routes for weapons destined for Sudan. Rather than competing through port acquisitions, the Saudi’s are increasingly focused on building a broader coalition of states that share an interest in maintaining stability along the western shore of the Red Sea. This ultimately gave rise to the coalition between the Saudi’s, Turkey, Egypt, and other smaller countries in the region. 

 

 

Ethiopia, part of the UAE–Israel–Ethiopia axis, adds another layer of complexity to this geopolitical chessboard. With a population of more than 130 million, it is Africa’s second-most populous country. Yet, it has been landlocked since Eritrea gained independence in 1993. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly made his position clear, most notably during a speech before parliament in 2023:

“The Red Sea and the Nile will determine Ethiopia. They are interlinked with Ethiopia and will be the fundamentals that will either bring Ethiopia's development or bring about its demise. With the growing population, access to the sea is a matter of existence for Ethiopia, not a luxury. Ethiopia's claim of access to the sea can be discussed, including the options, but it cannot be disregarded."

A year later, those ambitions began to translate into policy. In 2024 Ethiopia signed the controversial memorandum of understanding with Somaliland. Under that agreement, Ethiopia would gain access to the coast in exchange for the possibility of diplomatic recognition of Somaliland. The deal immediately heightened tensions with Somalia while simultaneously fuelling concerns in Eritrea that Ethiopia ultimately seeks to regain access to Assab, the port it lost more than three decades ago.

These maritime ambitions are closely intertwined with the broader regional power struggle. In recent years, Ethiopia has significantly deepened its economic ties with the UAE, while relations with Sudan’s military leadership have deteriorated sharply. Khartoum has accused Addis Ababa of facilitating Emirati military support for the RSF, an allegation both governments deny.

At the same time, Ethiopia has grown increasingly suspicious of the closer military cooperation between Sudan, Eritrea, and Egypt. Ongoing tensions surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, combined with Ethiopia’s internal conflicts, continue to fuel regional instability. As a result, the Horn of Africa is increasingly evolving into a geopolitical chessboard where domestic conflicts, maritime ambitions, and external rivalries continually reinforce one another.

 

 

Iran remains a key player in this evolving strategic landscape, but its approach differs fundamentally from that of the Gulf states. Rather than controlling ports, Tehran focuses on maritime chokepoints. Through the Houthis, it has shown that inexpensive drones, anti-ship missiles, and maritime harassment can disrupt global trade without the need for a conventional navy.

Through this strategy of controlled escalation, Iran continuously tests the limits of Saudi deterrence. Earlier this month, the first direct Iranian flight in more than a decade landed in Houthi-controlled Sana’a, openly breaking the Saudi-led blockade. Shortly afterward, the Houthis renewed their threats against Saudi airports, ports, and commercial shipping. Riyadh responded by bombing the runway at Sana’a International Airport in an attempt to prevent further Iranian flights. Once again, the episode underscored how fragile the ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis remains in practice.

Following these events, several sources have suggested that the aircraft was carrying Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders and military advisers tasked with rearming the Houthis:

"The IRGC commanders travelled there to support Houthi operations and provide training on new ​missile systems," one of the sources said, adding that Iran also sent gold on the aircraft to fund Houthi activities.”

If these reports are accurate, the implications extend well beyond Yemen itself. Rebuilding the Houthis' military capabilities would not only strengthen one of Iran's most important regional proxy forces, but also expand Iran's ability to threaten global maritime trade. Iran already exerts considerable influence over the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption passes each day. By strengthening the Houthis, Tehran also projects pressure onto the Bab el-Mandeb, giving it leverage over the southern entrance to the Red Sea.

Together, these two maritime chokepoints form the gateways to the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal, providing Iran with an unprecedented ability to disrupt global energy supplies and international shipping.

While Iran weaponizes the Bab el-Mandeb through Houthi proxies to disrupt global trade, its arch enemy Israel has been drawn directly into this theater. Ever since Houthi attacks began threatening shipping lanes to the Israeli port of Eilat following the October 2023 Hamas attacks, protecting these waters has become a vital Israeli security interest.

To counter this mounting Iranian pressure, Israel has expanded its own footprint in the region. Most notably, its recognition of Somaliland. This was not just a diplomatic gesture. Somaliland is bolstered by Emirati infrastructure at the Port of Berbera near the Bab el-Mandeb. This provides Israel with strategic depth at a crucial maritime crossroads. This dynamic pulls the Horn of Africa firmly into the broader Middle Eastern rivalry, setting up a direct strategic collision between Iran and Israel across the Red Sea.

 

 

The result is not the emergence of formal alliances, but of competing geopolitical networks. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Somalia, Eritrea, and the Sudanese Armed Forces broadly align to preserve the regional status quo, while the UAE, supported by Israel, has built a flexible network spanning Ethiopia, Somaliland, Puntland, the RSF, and a growing portfolio of strategic ports.

Whether Saudi Arabia and the UAE can turn their recent diplomatic rapprochement into a coordinated regional strategy remains one of the key questions for the years ahead.

The Red Sea is no longer simply a shipping lane threatened by the Houthis. It has become one of the world’s principal geopolitical arenas, where developments in Sudan, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Somalia increasingly shape security across the Middle East and global trade.

Ultimately, the question is no longer whether the Red Sea matters, but who will shape its future.