Israel on the Map (Part 1)

Why Israel matters, Regardless of what anybody wants 

Sisera Slayer 

 

 

The year was 1457 BCE. Thutmose III of Egypt clashed with a coalition of local Canaanite kings—likely serving as a proxy for the Mitanni of northeastern Syria. The site of this clash? Megiddo, in what is modern-day northern Israel. And the objective was as consequential then as the fight over the Strait of Hormuz is today: control over one of the most vital trade routes in the Ancient Mediterranean.

Egypt was victorious, and jealously guarded this prize up until a series of regional catastrophes (most notably a centuries-long mega-drought) made power projection by anyone impossible.

Oil was important back then, too. Olive oil, to be precise: a source of both calories and fuel. Other important strategic resources that passed through Megiddo were timber from Lebanon and the metals that fueled the Bronze Age. Tin from Central Asia; copper from Cyprus, Anatolia, the Zagros mountains, and Canaan itself. Luxury goods also passed through the route, in the form of locally-produced wine, myrrh and frankincense from Southern Arabia, and the vibrant purple textiles produced by the Canaanites on the coast.

Although the goods passing through this route sometimes changed as technology evolved, its centrality to the economy of the region remained. Which is why periods of political autonomy for the locals remained short-lived, enabled by rare instances of broad imperial decline. The longest autonomous stretch occurred in the aftermath of the Bronze Age collapse, between the 13th and 8th centuries BCE. This is when the kingdoms of Israel and Judah emerged. The next stretch was much shorter, and occurred a few centuries later; a function of the Seleucid Empire’s woes. A century or so of Hasmonean independence.

Between that and the establishment of the State of Israel in the 20th century, the only other example—and an arguable one at that—was the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Because, unfortunately for the People of Israel, they were promised a land that was coveted by every major power in the Near East and Mediterranean. Not just in the Bronze Age, but for the entire span of recorded history. And when you look at a map, it’s not hard to understand why.

The Inevitable Chokepoint

Every geographical feature of the Levant ensured that the Land of Israel would become a funnel for global trade. Deserts to its east and southwest; mountains to its north. Hill country on its eastern flank (perfect for defensibility without being quite as obstructive as mountains), and direct access to the Mediterranean with natural deep water ports. All while being the only land bridge between the three continents of the Old World.

Since the rise of Islam, this land has generally been controlled by whatever regional Islamic empire happened to be ascendant. And this control granted these empires an extremely profitable monopoly on trade goods coming from further east: both from China overland and from South and Southeast Asia by ocean.

This trade monopoly served as the main pull factor in the Crusades, though there were also significant push factors related to demographics, religion, and intra-elite competition. (Which I covered briefly in this article.) And when the Crusades failed, the search for an alternative route—by way of sailing around Africa—ultimately led to the Western European colonization of Africa, India, and Southeast Asia.

And indeed, this reduced (but did not eliminate) the geographic importance of the Land of Israel for several centuries, as European maritime trade through the Cape of Good Hope became both viable and profitable. But it was still a workaround, rather than the optimal solution.

Which is why the West never stopped coveting this vital strip of land. Even as Christian fervor declined in the wake of the West’s great secularization, the Land of Israel became ever more important in the late 19th century. The result of its proximity to two of the most important trade chokepoints in the world: the Suez Canal and the Strait of Aqaba.

This is also why the Islamic world will never stop coveting it, either. But now there’s an additional factor at play: the decline of Pax Americana and its implications for maritime chokepoints, on full display in the Strait of Aqaba during the Gaza War. In the 21st century, overland trade routes are making a comeback. And, in turn, making the Land of Israel even more attractive for aspiring regional powers.

In other words, the Land of Israel would be a center of conflict even if it were under the control of an Arab-majority state. And not because the jockeying players in the Middle East (and beyond) give much of a shit about the people living on it. In fact, the Land of Israel under local imperial rule has historically been marginal and impoverished. Because regional powers have had nothing to gain by cultivating the productive capacity or human capital of a territory that is useful chiefly as a highway for moving important trade goods from point A to point B.

Quite the opposite: keeping the people of this territory impoverished and marginal has prevented the kind of independent spirit that gave the Romans so much trouble.

This also means that the resentment by local powers of a strong, independent-minded state in the Land of Israel was wholly inevitable. The fact that it’s a Jewish state just adds insult to injury. A very grave insult, to be sure, and one that makes even a tenuous state of equilibrium all the harder to achieve.

Western Outpost?

In 1986, then-Senator Joe Biden famously said:

“If there were not an Israel, we would have to invent one.”

This sentiment highlights an inexorable fact of Israel’s existence that the Israeli right, and many pragmatic left-leaning Western leaders, are not very happy about: Israel is the ideal client state to have on this exact strip of land. Being the patron of a beleaguered, resource-strapped regional minority that relies on imports of food, raw materials, and weapons (at least, for much of its early history) is almost as good as controlling it yourself. And perhaps even better, because it eschews many of the tradeoffs involved with controlling far-flung foreign territories.

For example, you get to push a “peace process” which is good PR on the home front, but without any of the urgency of actually resolving the conflict. And why would you resolve it, when it’s useful for leverage over your client? (Something I will explore in more depth in a future article.)

So, in one sense, Israel really is an extension of Western hegemonic power. If only because it disrupts one of the key historical sources of Islamic hegemonic power. And most of the ruling elite in the West are fully aware of this.

Oil is a potent source of leverage, of course, but a limited one. Especially in a post-fracking world, where countries like the United States have become massive oil powers in their own right. Strategic chokepoints, meanwhile, have a habit of enduring, because geography is an eternal constraint.

None of this is by design, per se. It was not clear, at the dawn of the Jewish state, that it would become a node in the American, or broadly Western, influence network. It could’ve just as easily been folded into the Russian sphere (and, in fact, it was the hope of this that led Stalin to vote for its creation). But it’s not exactly surprising that it’s shaken out like this, either.

Double-Edged Sword

The conclusion of all this is, on the one hand, rather depressing: Israel will never be “left alone”. It will always be a source of resentment and tension, and always draw a covetous gaze. This is amplified by its existence as a Jewish-majority state, but not ultimately caused by it. The dividends of controlling this territory—whether directly or through vassals—are simply too enormous for anything else.

On the other hand, it means that Israel has far more leverage than its enemies or allies (and patrons) are entirely comfortable with. This comes with pros, such as reducing the likelihood of true sanctions and other sweeping diplomatic measures. It also comes with cons, like an incentive to maintain leverage over Israel vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue, and to constrain its economic and military power as much as possible.

There’s one “pro” in particular that is often overlooked, however, because it’s counterintuitive: the Land of Israel’s geographic centrality makes a Palestinian state from the river to the sea a non-starter for the vast majority of global powers.

And this will be the topic of Part 2.