Chinese Organised Crime, the Shadow Economy & the Chinese Communist Party in the UK
Study of CCP-Linked Individuals in the UK Suggests Systemic Involvement in the Shadow Economy and, in Some Cases, Crime; New Evidence Suggests Beijing asked the 14K Triad to Suppress Dissidents Here
UK-China Transparency
Over the coming week, UK-China Transparency (UKCT) will publish evidence of systematic linkages between the United Front influence network of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese shadow economy in the UK, including crime, money laundering, fraud, and illegal migrant labour.
UKCT has begun to publish case studies of figures who are connected to crime or the Chinese shadow economy in the UK and are (or have been) concretely involved in the CCP’s United Front work or other state-linked activity, including by running influence operations, intimidating dissidents, campaigning in support of the CCP’s position on territorial and political disputes, including Hong Kong, befriending politicians and training candidates for parliament.
The National Crime Agency’s (NCA) 2025 Strategic Assessment states that “offenders linked to China currently pose the biggest non-British SOC [serious organised crime] threat to the UK.” Security agencies have labelled the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as “the biggest state-based threat to the country’s economic security” and the country’s intelligence services as carrying out “large scale espionage”. The PRC has been referred to as one of the “three most flagrant transnational repression perpetrators in the UK” by a Parliamentary Committee.
But the state threat and the criminal threat have not been connected publicly – until now. According to the Wilson Report, a new study sponsored by the Home Office, government departments and police forces are also beginning to wake up to this combined threat. The study refers to the “involvement of [Chinese organised crime groups] with the Chinese State in the UK” and “evidence of [Chinese organised crime group] activity being specifically directed by the PRC”.
The recent National Security Act trial at the Old Bailey, in which two men were found guilty of spying for China and evidence of connections between underworld actors and the CCP was presented, has added further to the urgency of this issue. Evidence from the trial suggested that the CCP asked the 14K triad to assist in transnational repression in the UK. Evidence of Chinese organised crime groups cooperating with Irish paramilitary organisations is also multiplying.
A global pattern
For the CCP to build connections with figures linked to crime and the irregular economy in the UK reflects a global pattern of which there is growing awareness – from Paraguay to British Columbia, Italy to the Philippines. Research has begun to expose Chinese crime figures working as proxies for political interference in various countries. There is growing evidence of what British academic and China expert Dr Martin Thorley recently termed “systemic geocriminality” connected to the Chinese state.
This trend reflects the fact that shadow economies offer a backdoor into society. Potential underworld proxies are not only accustomed to secrecy, but already adept at exploiting relationships with officials and politicians, as well as being in possession of often substantial resources, logistics networks, personnel and capabilities. It is for related reasons that there are countless historical instances of intelligence agencies from many countries using such proxies for recruitment and support, including for political interference and espionage operations.
“There are many good guys amongst them [triads].”
Comment attributed to Deng Xiaoping, 1984
For the CCP, the building of connections with crime figures appears to be fundamentally tied in to its goal of the “reunification” of China, which requires building support amongst the diaspora for policies regarding Hong Kong, Taiwan and elsewhere; and to the goal of “national rejuvenation”, which involves improving China’s ability to project power worldwide, including in southeast Asia where Chinese-speaking crime groups have deep roots. Ties to crime figures are likely to be useful in effecting transnational repression against those in the diaspora who are opposed to the CCP and its agenda, and for aiding political influence operations in strategic locations. UKCT will publish concrete evidence that physical violence against anti-CCP protestors in the UK has involved a criminal element.
Hong Kong’s triads, secret societies, and associated networks are well established worldwide, based amongst Chinese diasporic groups linked to southern China and Chinese populations in southeast Asia. They have long been present in the UK. Since the 1990s, Chinese organised crime in the UK has been transformed by the arrival of Chinese-speaking migrants from Vietnam and Malaysia, as well as a wave of migrants from the Chinese mainland, many hailing from the province of Fujian, which is home to important Taiwan-related military and political institutions and major organised crime syndicates, some with proven political networks.
“In the mid-2000s, two sets of personnel competed for the executive committee positions of [a UK Fujianese association]. There were threats and physical confrontations between the two factions. On the evening of the election, both sides have their gang members all geared up in London Chinatown for the election to take place. Twenty minutes before the election, someone from the Chinese Embassy called the [association] telling them that the Chinese Embassy is sending a Fujianese PhD student in an Embassy vehicle to the meeting. The same evening, both sides celebrated the ”election” of a new Chairman in the form of the PhD student.”
‘Supporting Hongkongers to settle in the UK’, joint policy paper by UK-based organisations, 2021
The UK’s vulnerability
It has been estimated there may be as many as 200,000 undocumented Chinese migrants in the UK; the Home Office deported or otherwise removed more than 40,000 people to China between 2004 and 2016. As well as working amongst these undocumented communities, there is evidence of crime groups systematically recruiting and exploiting Chinese students in the UK, who number roughly 150,000, as underlined in the Wilson Report. Chinese organised crime is a blight on these communities especially, as well as on the wider public.
It is concerning that police forces lack critical capabilities required to deal with Chinese organised crime, as also underlined in the Wilson Report. One of the main issues facing police and other government agencies appears to be linguistic. Cantonese, the different forms of Hakka, Hokkien, and Eastern Min are not dialects of Mandarin, but distinct language groups in their own right. Securing trustworthy interpreters and translators has been a major challenge for law enforcement, and there is little evidence to date that investment in technological solutions has been made. Initial reporting from the recent National Security Act trial at the Old Bailey suggests most of the suspects arrested as part of the case, Chinese nationals, were released without charge due to the fact that data from their devices could not be translated in time for the deadline by which they had to be charged – these individuals subsequently left the country and will not face justice. Lack of access to Chinese social media apps is also an important issue.
“I may as well tell you a story from my own experience. When a state leader visited a foreign country, an organization that is similar to the triads you mentioned dispatched 800 of its members to guard our state leader against any danger.”
Tao Siju 陶駟駒, Chinese Ministry of State Security, 1993
Concrete case studies
The research being by UKCT will detail several case studies of individuals involved in or linked to the shadow economy and the Chinese state, including the following.
This week, UKCT will publish evidence that Christine Lee 李贞驹, named as a CCP interference agent by MI5, was involved in a multimillion-pound bogus immigration scheme involving at least 600 illegal workers supplied to Chinese restaurants. This was around the same time, in 2008, that Lee launched her career as a political activist and built ties with the British and Chinese governments. The scheme relied on fictions and was described as a “charade” and as an “abuse” of the law in the Court of Appeal. Christine Lee & Co, the firm which administered the scheme, described it as “sensible, legal & reasonable” apparently without disclosing that Christine Lee’s father and her friend were the directors of the Irish company on behalf of which the firm claimed to have devised the scheme.
An individual, Lihao Lin 林礼豪, who ran a ‘secret police station’ in the UK and is connected to the United Front Work Department. Mr Lin has been implicated in the operation of a brothel and is known to have met Scottish political figures. He is also the sponsor of a Chinese student group in Scotland, and according to an academic paper is alleged by one former student to have acted as a vector for “gangsters” to interact with students. UKCT has already published research about Mr Lin, which can be read here.
A prominent individual, Jiajin He a.k.a. Anthony Kar King Ho 何家金 , who has a serious criminal record, set up an ongoing CCP influence operation in the UK. Mr Ho has been involved in running money services companies for decades, the most important of which have been subject to regulatory or legal sanctions within the UK. Over the past two decades, hundreds of millions of pounds, including criminal proceeds, have left the country via these companies, one of which now reportedly cooperates formally with the Chinese state-owned Bank of China. Mr Ho is understood to have met or built relationships with at least two political figures, and appointed several public figures, including a former commander of the Met Police’s Specialist Crime Unit who later joined GCHQ and a former MP with reported security connections, to the board of one of his companies. For over a decade after his first offences, and whilst continuing to be investigated, he was nonetheless a police informer connected to a specialised Metropolitan Police team that was shut down in the wake of Mr Ho’s most serious conviction. UKCT raises further questions about improper conduct within that team and suggests it shut in part because of the relationship with Mr Ho. UKCT will publish more information about this case in the coming weeks. Mr Ho told UKCT he disputes elements of UKCT’s reporting and that “References to investigations where no charges were brought, or to associations presented without context, should not be used to imply wrongdoing.”
A highly prominent multimillionaire, To Ming Lam 林道明, whose businesses have been fined hundreds of thousands of pounds for employing illegal migrants in recent years, is alleged to have been a UK-based leader of a Chinese triad, though this would not be evidence of criminal conduct. Lam’s business interests include famous Chinese restaurants such as Royal China and a large site, Bang Bang Oriental Foodhall, in Colindale, London. Lam has campaigned in support of the CCP’s “reunification” agenda in the UK and is close to Chinese diplomats. He runs the European branch of a Hong Kong official organisation closely linked to the Hong Kong Economic & Trade Office in London. Through this relationship, Lam was pictured repeatedly with one of those convicted in the recent National Security Act trial. The other man convicted was a long-running member of another organisation Lam leads and sponsors. Evidence presented during the trial includes text messages between this second individual and a former senior Hong Kong police official, in which the former official refers to Lam as having been a 14K triad leader. The correspondence also suggests that the 14K had been asked by Beijing to undermine Hong Kong democracy activists in the UK. There is no evidence Lam did so or was otherwise involved in the crimes which the two men were found guilty of. UKCT will publish more information about Lam in the coming weeks.
An individual, ‘Mr D’, who was blacklisted by the European Central Bank and ran a highly controversial investor visa programme in an EU country. Mr D is behind an ongoing CCP influence operation in the UK. Mr D’s whereabouts are unknown. Legal proceedings related to his activity in Ireland are ongoing. UKCT will publish more information about Mr D in the coming week.
Feng Zhang 张锋 and Chi Tan Huynh were involved in a brawl in central London during which anti-CCP protestors were badly injured. Zhang, filmed repeatedly punching a Hong Kong democracy protestor in the head in London’s Chinatown in 2021, is a “patriot” with long-running connections to United Front work in the UK, having been pictured with Xi Jinping during the Chinese leader’s visit to the country. Huynh, filmed tussling with democracy protestors and later arguing with police, was convicted of conspiracy to facilitate the illegal entry of foreign nationals into the UK in 2018. A British far-left organisation which supported the event which led to the brawl is linked to Neville Roy Singham, an American billionaire who has spent hundreds of millions funding pro-CCP activity around the world, with hundreds of thousands of pounds sent to a British company. UKCT will publish more information about Zhang, Huynh, and Singham’s UK footprint in the coming weeks.
Many of these individuals and the organisations or enterprises with which they are associated are (or have been) based in London’s Chinatown. Just up the road from Whitehall and Westminster, Chinatown has long been celebrated as a cultural asset for the nation’s capital. It has always had connections to Britain’s underworld, however, and although the bombings and machete attacks of the last century are now a distant memory, Chinatown is still populated in part by prostitutes, irregular migrants paid below minimum wage, and major casinos, some linked on occasion in the past to money laundering.
Too often, such characters been treated by politicians, police, and dignitaries as British Chinese communities’ legitimate representatives, possibly simply because of the proximity of their position in London to Whitehall, Westminster and Fleet Street. The acceptance of such characters as legitimate representatives does those communities great discredit. The promotion of these characters by the Chinese embassy in London, which has treated several of them as “Overseas Chinese leaders”, is similarly insulting. Most British Chinese people have nothing whatsoever to do with these dubious groups.
The case studies outlined here are indicative of networks whose business ecosystems are interwoven with labour exploitation, questionable business practices, serious crime, and CCP influence. That this ecosystem has thrived so near to Westminster is a national security scandal that urgently requires a response.
A note on Chinese organised crime at the street-level
There is no suggestion that any of the individuals mentioned above are involved in these activities, unless stated otherwise elsewhere in UKCT’s forthcoming reporting. In general, Chinese organised crime in the UK has in recent years included:
The smuggling of tobacco and other licit goods.
Drugs cultivation and smuggling, including of synthetic opioids.
Extortion, mostly from British Chinese communities.
Loan sharking.
Prostitution.
Illegal gambling operations.
Money laundering, including via physical and online casinos, and cryptocurrencies.
Human trafficking.
Illegal labour exploitation (in various industries).
Some of these crimes are sometimes partly or mostly committed or coordinated from overseas. UK-China Transparency would be happy to share the Wilson Report with anyone interested prior to its academic publication.
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