Europe is Catastrophically Weak

A Grand Realignment is Happening and Nobody Seems to Know 

 

 

Before we start, please note that we use the terms ‘EU,’ Europe,’ and ‘Eurozone’ interchangeably throughout the article. While some countries, like England, aren’t technically part of the EU, we’re using these terms out of convenience for a region that is connected historically, economically, and via hard infrastructure.

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Europe has been the predominant global power for almost 2,000 years in any way that you can quantify global power. Whether it is money, cultural influence, colonization, or geopolitical relevance, Europe has held the title to each since Ancient Rome. While other entities like China or the ancient Persians have rivalled and, in some cases, beaten Europe in a few of these qualities, no other nation has come close to competing in all of them.

We open with this so that the severity of the following statement isn’t taken lightly.

Europe is dying.

In all the above categories (and more), the European decline has been swift, measurable, and painful. To understand this decline, we must first define it. In the realm of political science, there are generally two ways to measure a change in a standard of living: relative change and absolute change. Relative change is how your nation compares to other nations. This is typically done by comparing two countries’ GDP, GINI indices, purchasing power, economic mobility, or safety. Absolute change is how a nation compares to itself over time; how its GDP, GINI index, and safety compare to its historical norms. In both relative and absolute values, Europe is measurably and rapidly declining. We encourage you to keep these metrics in mind as you navigate this article.

Basic Economics

In 2008, the EU and U.S. economies were virtually equal in size at roughly $14.7 trillion. By 2024–2026, U.S. nominal GDP expanded past $28 trillion, whereas the EU economy remained stagnant at roughly $18–$19 trillion (relative decline). Measured per capita, the economic gap between the U.S. and the EU grew from 15% in 2002 to over 30% today.

In 1990, the countries that make up the European Union generated roughly 26% to 28% of global nominal GDP. As of 2026, that share has fallen to approximately 14% to 15%. This is primarily due not to European decline per se, but instead rapid economic expansion in China and the United States (relative decline).

Likewise, European currencies are falling dramatically. While this is true for many countries, including the United States, it’s important to note that Euro currencies are also falling relative to the dollar. In other words, even if the dollar wasn’t collapsing, Euro currencies would still decrease in value (absolute decline).

Without one central reserve currency, investment is exceedingly difficult. Although the EU Single Market allows for the free movement of goods, trade doesn’t work like it does in single-entity countries. Service markets, professional licensing, corporate tax structures, and labor laws are fragmented across 27 distinct national frameworks. Expanding an enterprise across Europe requires navigating 27 different legal systems, preventing European businesses from reaching scale as efficiently as companies operating in single-jurisdiction markets like the U.S. or China.

This fragmentation also affects investment. Investing into bonds backed by the Swedish krona, for example, will yield significantly different results than the English pound or the euro. When one currency is devalued, investors simply sell their assets in that currency and place them into another one. This instability wreaks havoc on long-term planning and currency valuations and prevents any one currency from gaining any sort of stability. This is one of many reasons that the euro was created, but not every country has opted into it. While there are many reasons that certain countries have chosen not to adopt the new currency, they all generally boil down to not being willing to accept the lack of autonomy that comes with sacrificing one’s domestic currency. Norwegians, for example, are unwilling to surrender their significant economic success from oil and gas to the behavior of poorly managed states (and rightfully so). The lack of uniformity in Europe ensures that competing currencies will always stagnate growth.

Manufacturing Failures

Currency competition has always plagued the continent, but it hasn’t always resulted in economic stagnation. What is compounding these woes today is that Europe as a whole has chosen not to invest in pro-growth policies. Instead, they have buried themselves under crushing amounts of red tape, fractured economic zones, and nonsensical policies.

Steam and coal power were the first true technological marvels that changed the planet, and they were invented and perfected in Europe. By harnessing these technologies, Europe was able to turn itself into the global superpower we know it to be today. Since then, however, the continent has missed out on the three largest sources of investment and capital in human history: personal computing and software, cloud hyper scaling, and modern mobile platforms. No European country has a domestic equivalent to companies like Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, or Nvidia, meaning that a massive amount of global capital will never flow to these countries.

This is not a result of luck or bad timing. Heavy regulatory frameworks ensure that Europe is never able to industrialize or achieve scale like the United States or China. Environmental regulations such as the Industrial Emissions Directive, Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation, and Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism all force massive compliance and administrative costs on EU members. Of course, these regulations have little to no effect on greenhouse gas emissions, but they do triple the cost of imports into the EU and lower the price-competitiveness of their exports -all for nothing.

As a result, labor productivity growth in the Eurozone has averaged roughly 0.6%–0.8% annually over the past two decades, compared to 1.5%–2.0% in the U.S. The landmark 2024 Draghi Commission report highlighted that lower productivity accounts for over 70% of the per-capita GDP gap between the EU and the U.S.

In mid-2026, BMW announced plans to eliminate roughly 8,000 positions in Germany (about 10% of its domestic workforce) following a profit warning and a drop of over 60% in its core automotive operating profits.

The United States’ success relies heavily on its private equity market. There is no other global institution that provides both high research and development successes with a high return on investment. Despite its success, European finance has chosen not to follow suit. Financing remains almost entirely bank-dependent, which means there is a significant limitation on funds available to be invested. For the funds that are available, there is no appetite for risk. Likewise, the absence of a unified “Capital Markets Union” across EU member states means European savings primarily sit in low-yield bank deposits instead of investing in new, innovative technologies.

The lack of appetite for risk extends towards every EU member state. Following the 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent 2012 Eurozone debt crisis, European nations enacted fiscal austerity policies enforced by strict debt-to-GDP rules. While the U.S. engaged in sustained deficit spending and stimulus to recover quickly, Europe suffered a decade of public and private underinvestment in infrastructure, energy grids, and defense.

Perhaps, in the long term, this decision will come back to bite the U.S. and perhaps may leave Europe better off in the long run. Only time will tell, but in the meantime, it has allowed EU stagnation to fester.

Energy Failures

Perhaps no other discrepancy so encapsulates the gap between Europe and the rest of the world like energy usage. For some reason, Europeans view themselves as the leader of the free world and that they must lead by example by sabotaging themselves on the altar of climate justice. Predictably, no one is following their example.

Energy costs across the EU are roughly twice as high as they are in the United States, and more than twice as high as China. The U.S. pays roughly 16 cents per kilowatt hour, but the EU average is 30 cents. Some countries like Ireland and Germany pay 40 cents.

The cost increases, as expected, are not due to luck, but to policy. In the ‘80s, many Euro countries decided that it was easier to pipe in Russian gas than it was to build domestic energy generation. This was true, for a time. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, EU leaders decided to cut off the branch they were sitting on and ban Russian gas with no alternatives. Now, they import the same number of molecules of gas, but at a significant premium as it is shipped by sea rather than by pipeline.

Because Russian gas is so cheap and plentiful, Europe never developed a domestic, integrated grid with affordable generation capabilities (Notably, France’s robust nuclear fleet is excluded from this, as is Norway’s hydropower program). Now, they are trying to play catch up. Unfortunately, renewables don’t work very well in Europe. The northern part of the continent has some of the worst solar incidence ratings in the world and, as we know, renewables suffer from intermittency.

70% of Europe’s gross energy consumption still comes from fossil fuels. While 70% of their electricity comes from renewables, that number hides a key detail. The vast majority of EU renewables are nuclear and hydropower. If one’s majority of energy comes from fossil fuels, and electricity comes from hydro and nuclear, it would be prudent to protect these industries at all costs, right?

Under the EU Emissions Trading System, fossil-fuel power generators and heavy manufacturers must purchase carbon allowances for every ton of CO₂ emitted. Permit prices range from €60 to €80 per ton. These costs are simply passed on to consumers, raising prices despite remaining fully reliant on fossil fuels.

After the Fukushima disaster, Germany (well known for its high tsunami incidence) decided to dismantle all of its nuclear generators. At its peak, Germany’s fleet of 17 nuclear reactors generated over 30% of the country’s clean, dispatchable electricity. Today, it produces 0%. Curiously, Germany is fine taking nuclear-produced electricity from France. In fact, Germany, once a net exporter of energy, is now a net importer, and in so doing has raised prices for all of the countries nearby who used to benefit from German efficiency. Worse, the nation was forced to restart coal plants just to keep the grid functioning. Cutting a carbon-free, functioning technology while paying the highest price of energy in the developed world just to restart coal plants while increasing prices for your neighbors is perhaps the most European playbook one can imagine. This has real downstream effects; harken back a few pages ago where I mentioned BMW profit declines. One of the largest input costs for BMW’s manufacturing is the cost of energy. As this skyrockets, BMW’s output falls correspondingly.

Given this style of governance, the European energy crisis of 2021 should come as no surprise. It’s not just Germany, however. The Aurora transmission line, a 400-kilovolt line created to connect Sweden to Finland, has unlocked a glaring flaw in the European model. Northern Sweden historically enjoyed some of the lowest electricity prices in Europe, driven by a vast surplus of cheap hydropower. This cheap and consistent energy was seen as a critical competitive advantage for major domestic industrial projects, but connecting two unequal parties means they inevitably blend together. This line allows excess power to flow into Finland to bring down Finnish prices. However, Swedish businesses and consumers claim that exporting power essentially imports higher Finnish prices into Sweden. Shortly after the line became operational, market data showed instances where electricity prices in Northern Sweden surged as Finland pulled extra generation across the border. As suspected, this price increase now cuts into Sweden’s competitiveness in manufacturing.

France’s multi-billion dollar oil conglomerate TotalEnergies is being sued under the nation’s Duty of Vigilance Law (very duplicative of the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, CSDDD). This law requires them to take climate risk into their accounting method, but the goal of the plaintiffs is really to stop the oil company from producing oil. While the law is intended to, say, reduce the risk of oil spills or workplace accidents, it is being abused to quite literally shut down the very thing the company is designed to do. Specifically, TotalEnergies is being sued to cut production so that they fall in line with France’s commitments to climate goals. The plaintiffs have also requested a 37% reduction in oil and 25% in gas by 2030, which not only will skyrocket prices, but also likely shut down the company altogether.

The EU’s impotence at domestic energy production truly is shocking. After banning the import of Russian gas by pipeline, they have now opted to accept it via tanker. Same gas, just much more expensive. Prior to the Ukraine war, the EU took 15 billion cubic feet per day of Russian gas. Today, it takes 2 billion, and that number is increasing. Last year, France and Spain increased their imports of Russian LNG by 18% and 27%, respectively. The EU quite literally has no other option but to accept the very Russian gas it once sanctioned (at a premium of course). EU gas reserves sit just above 50%, the lowest level recorded since 2011, just before the EU energy crisis.

 

 

Given Europe’s crippling need for Russian oil and gas, one would think it prudent to not attack Russian energy infrastructure. Except nobody in the EU, apparently. Despite underwriting Ukraine in this war, they have allowed Ukraine to repeatedly attack Russian energy infrastructure that itself relies upon, including the Novorossiysk port which had historically handled over 30% of Russia’s oil exports. Kazakhstan is the number two provider of all EU oil, just behind the U.S. Curiously, the vast majority of Kazakh barrels originate in Russia, and Russian companies own significant stakes in these Kazakh pipelines. Allowing Ukraine to attack Russian energy is quite literally the definition of biting the hand that feeds you.

Lo and behold, Reuters reports: “Russia is set to stop oil exports from ‌Kazakhstan to Germany via the Druzhba pipeline starting from May 1, three industry sources said on Tuesday. The sources, who spoke to Reuters on condition of anonymity, said that an adjusted oil exporting schedule has been sent to Kazakhstan ​and Germany…

Kazakhstan’s oil ​exports to Germany via Russia’s Druzhba pipeline totaled 2.146 million metric tons, or around 43,000 barrels per ​day, in 2025, an increase of 44% from 2024, and 730,000 tons in the first quarter of 2026. A complete halt would remove about 17% of the up to 12 million metric tons of oil a year processed by Germany’s ​PCK refinery - one of the country’s largest - in the northeastern town of Schwedt, fuel from which ​powers 9 out of 10 cars in the Berlin and Brandenburg region.”

The Maritime Executive reports: Over the last four years, Europe alone has spent over $230 billion on Russian oil and gas imports, which complicates the bloc’s effort to end all Russian energy imports. The current Middle East crisis further entangles Europe to Russian LNG. Looking into Q1 2026 data, Urgewald said that Europe remains the indispensable market for Russia’s Yamal LNG project. This is a structured market relationship, with some contracts running into the 2040s. Europe is not simply a buyer - it is the logistical backbone of the Yamal LNG project, added Urgewald.

For the first quarter of this year, EU imported 69 cargoes out of 71 that Yamal LNG shipped globally. This translates to 97% of Yamal LNG deliveries for the period, equivalent to 5.07 million tons. China received just two cargoes in January and none in February and March.

For the deliveries, the EU made $3.33 billion in payments to Russia for the period. This is a significantly high energy bill, inflated by the global spike in gas prices due to the Hormuz blockade. The benchmark price for natural gas in Europe rose by 51% in March compared to January and February prices. The average TTF index price in January and February was $41 per MWh but rose in March to reach $61 per MWh.

The way these stories repeat is genuinely comical. Russia is currently constructing two more LNG export terminals in the Baltic Sea and Murmansk. To prevent their construction, western and Japanese engineers refused to provide highly technical parts, including advanced compressors. Did this stop construction? Of course not. Now, Russian manufacturer Kazankompressormash has decided to begin manufacturing its own compressors. When the war is over, there is a zero percent chance they return to western or Japanese manufacturers. At the same time, China is preparing an LNG import terminal to receive imports from Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project. Surely a coincidence.

This complete Russian dependence goes far beyond gas. To quote the energy Substack writers at Doomberg, “Despite Germany’s attempt at energy self-immolation, the 27 member states of the EU still generate roughly a quarter of their electricity using nuclear reactors. If one excludes France, more than 40% of the reactors in operation were designed and supplied by the Soviet/Russian nuclear sector. These include two in Bulgaria, six in the Czech Republic, two in Finland, four in Hungary, and five in Slovakia. As the legal successor to the companies that originally established those facilities, Rosatom provides lifetime services, upgrades, and fuel for these reactors. Additionally, Rosatom is the main contractor building two new large reactors for Hungary (the so-called Paks II project).

As for France—the largest nuclear electricity producer in the EU by a wide margin—the ties between its nuclear sector and Russia’s run deep and wide. Just weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine, France’s leading nuclear reactor and uranium fuel arm, Framatome, signed a long-term Strategic Cooperation Agreement with Rosatom to expand joint work on fuel fabrication and instrumentation and control technologies. Despite the war, French operators have continued to import uranium in various processed forms linked to Rosatom, often via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Public pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding, French leaders have maintained the strategic nature of this relationship, presumably because they have few palatable alternatives.

By the way, it was Russia who kept supplying gas to the EU after Qatar’s LNG facilities were knocked offline by Iran earlier this year. Europe’s complete fecklessness and impotence to stop Russia from doing just about anything it wants while continuously suckling their gas (which is the main engine of their war machine) truly underscores how weak the EU has become.

Neville Chamberlain waving Hitler’s peace accord pales in comparison to the letter-waving happening across the EU today. Watching Europe completely destroy itself over a tiny modicum of carbon emissions while China and Russia invest billions into the same industry leaves no doubt as to what the next 50+ years will look like.

Geopolitical Failures

Perhaps the greatest measure of global and domestic power is the ability to coerce others without firing a shot or engaging in economic warfare. We call this soft power, and Europe seemingly has none of it.

The impotence of the Eurozone is also a surprise to Europe itself as they continually bluff much more cohesive and powerful nations, only to be called on their bluff. After the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Europe placed strict bans on doing business with Russian entities. French Minister Bruno Le Maire stated that the EU would wage “an all-out economic and financial war on Russia,” adding that “we will cause the collapse of the Russian economy.” Even President Biden said we would “turn the ruble into rubble.”

That did not happen. In fact, the opposite happened. Russia enacted strict export conversion controls on the ruble, causing the currency to hit its all time high of trading 55 to the dollar. In 2021, prior to the invasion, the ruble traded 70 to a dollar. Today, it trades at about 84 to the dollar. The EU has levied an unbelievable 23 rounds of sanctions on Russia. Every time they do, Europe becomes weaker, and Russia becomes stronger. To watch your sanctions backfire not once, not twice, but 23 times and to continue doing it is truly special. In the 21^st round of sanctions, the EU brilliantly decided to include 14 Chinese companies in its sanctions package. Unsurprisingly to everyone except Europeans, China immediately sanctioned 14 EU companies in return, including Germany’s massive defense corporation Rheinmetall that relies exceedingly on Chinese materials.

To add insult to injury, many European businesses opted to leave Russia with the expectation that doing so would crash their economy. Again, not only did this not happen, but Russia instead capitalized on it. Numerous companies, ranging from coffee shops to clothing brands, left the country but conveniently left their assets behind. Russia simply seized those assets and turned them into domestic industry. Danone, a French dairy company, was placed under state ownership and sold to local investors under the new Russian title H&N. Carlsberg, the famous Danish brewing company, was seized and turned into Baltika Breweries. Inditex, the Spanish fashion conglomerate that owns Zara, was rebranded as MAAG, now under Russian ownership. L’Occitane, the famous French cosmetics company, was also seized. They didn’t even bother changing the name, however, but simply changed it to Cyrillic lettering.

It’s easy to write these seizures off as inconsequential, but the takeovers also occurred for very serious industries as well. Major French car manufacturer Renault held a 68% controlling stake in Russia’s largest automaker, AvtoVAZ, along with a major factory in Moscow. The state acquired Renault’s AvtoVAZ stake for a symbolic 1 ruble. The Moscow manufacturing plant was handed to the Moscow city government, which reopened it to produce Moskvitch cars and assemble vehicles using imported components from China’s JAC Motors. Both VW and Mercedes-Benz abandoned manufacturing plants which were easily retrofitted by Russian company AGR automotive group. France’s Schneider Electric transferred its Russian business to local management via a buyout. The company was rebranded as Systeme Electric.

Even worse, Russia gained control of significant energy industries. German Uniper’s Russian power generation division, Unipro, was placed under mandatory temporary state control by Rosimushchestvo. This gave the Russian state direct operational control over one of the largest thermal power plants in the world, Surgut-2. Finland’s state-controlled utility had its Russian subsidiary seized by presidential decree. Moscow replaced the executive management team and reorganized the business under the local entity Forward Energy. Joint venture stakes held by Wintershall DEA and OMV in Russian gas fields (such as the Yuzhno-Russkoye field) were formally stripped via decree, transferring their holdings to newly created Russian joint-stock companies.

These geopolitical blunders don’t stop with Russia. Nexperia is a Dutch company that specializes in semiconductors for vehicles. By specializes, I mean provides 10% of the global supply and 40% of the automotive industry’s supply of diodes. Without them, modern cars simply cannot function. In 2019, the company was purchased by a Chinese entrepreneur and placed under Chinese control. Interestingly, the Netherlands have a law allowing the state to forcibly seize any industry for security purposes. They decided to do just that in 2025 and seized Nexperia by forcibly ousting the Chinese CEO and replacing him with a state-controlled Dutch interim chief. Sounds like strongman behavior, right? Except that it appears they forgot one tiny detail.

The factory where Nexperia’s diodes are made lies in Dongguan, China, and the Chinese were not very happy about the Dutch takeover. Instead of rolling over and negotiating, China did the most predictable thing on Earth and blocked all Nexperian exports to the Netherlands. Not only that, but the Chinese forcibly seized the factory where these diodes are made altogether. One would think that the Dutch would have learned their lesson and begun producing these diodes domestically, but instead, they are now scaling operations in the Philippines and Malaysia to replace the Chinese output. China gets a tremendous deal out of all of this – they got a free factory, complete with skilled workers and institutional knowledge and are now competing with Nexperia to produce the exact same product they were already making. I’m sure the reader can surmise which country will likely win this arms race.

If Russia can seize European assets, then Europeans should be able to seize Russian assets, but even this is proving to be a challenge. The EU has contemplated using the Flemish-owned financial transaction firm Euroclear, which currently maintains a whopping 194 billion euros in frozen Russian assets, to bail out Ukraine and continue funding the war effort. Even this idea has had cold water thrown on it, as any perceived threat to the impartiality of the system would cause investors to go elsewhere, thus crashing the system and losing value. Belgium is currently unwilling to risk this even as European assets are seized all throughout Russia.

Let’s make one thing clear: Europe gained nothing from these ‘transactions’ and has outright lost everything. Their currency has devalued more than Russia’s has, and their economy is significantly worse off.

Domestic Collapse

The woes of politics in Europe are familiar to anyone who has tracked the comically short tenure and politically tumultuous cavitation of European leaders across the continent. From the record-setting reign of Liz Truss, to the ouster of Macron, Orban, and others, to the seemingly heroic rise of Meloni and Sanchez, the instability of European leaders will likely plague history textbooks for quite some time. There is much going on behind the scenes, however, that the general public seems not to know about.

In 2024, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally outperformed all expectations in the EU parliament. Expecting French voters to reject this ideology (for some inexplicable reason), Macron called an immediate domestic election in which, again, the National Rally appeared to do very well. Macron, in behavior akin to a third-world warlord, manipulated parliamentary candidacies so that, despite winning the most votes of any party, Le Pen’s party received only the third-highest share of seats in the French parliament. Curiously, Le Pen was arrested shortly after the election by EU officials who accused her of mishandling public funds. This truly is deplorable behavior one would expect from the Soviets, and yet nobody today seems to care.

Kaja Kallas, former Prime Minister of Estonia, advocated for nuclear war with Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. She was fervent and militant in her opposition to doing any business with Russia whatsoever and led the EU in their sanctions approach still in place today. Only a year later, it was revealed that her husband owned an Estonian logistics company that was continuing to do business with Russia to the tune of tens of millions of euros. Following this turmoil, Kallas resigned from her position in disgrace.

Just kidding, she was actually promoted to the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (EU), the third highest position in the entire organization.

The largest concern originally preventing the EU from being formed was the loss of autonomy. To combat this, the EU promised veto power to all of its nations. Fast forward thirty-three years and that right is being stripped away. Now considering their twenty-third round of sanctions, the EU needs full member buy-in once again. This time, Greece is revolting as they rely significantly on, you guessed it, the international LNG shipping trade. Instead of abiding by its members’ wishes when the EU was created, Brussels is creating what is called qualified majority voting (QMV) in lieu of unanimity. As long as states, representing 65% of the EU population, vote for any measure, it will be considered approved. Greece, with 2.5% of the EU population, would be wise to leave the EU altogether, which would likely cause a cascade of exits and for the institution to ultimately fail.

Likewise, immigration continues to wreck European demographics. Out of the EU’s ~450 million residents, approximately 29 million people (6.4%) hold citizenship from a non-EU country. Non-German citizens accounted for 41% to 44% of total registered crime suspects in Germany, despite making up roughly 15% of the population. This includes 47% of violent crime suspects and 54% of theft suspects. In Sweden, individuals born to two foreign-born parents had a 3.5 times higher likelihood of being suspected of a crime, compared to native Swedes. Sweden also recorded elevated levels of gang-related shootings and bombings tied to organized networks in suburban centers. Non-Western immigrants and their descendants represent approximately 10.6% of the Danish population. However, official justice data shows they account for 29.6% of violent crime convictions and 32.4% of rape convictions. Foreign nationals represent approximately 8% of the population in France, but account for 25% of the overall national prison population. In major metropolitan centers like Paris, the Ministry of the Interior reported that foreign nationals accounted for up to 48% of registered street crimes.

The strain this puts on public services and housing is immense. In the first half of 2025 alone, 16 major German cities spent over €193 million converting commercial hotels into temporary shelters due to a total depletion of municipal social housing. Ireland’s International Protection Accommodation Services (IPAS) spent a record €1.2 billion on asylum accommodation in 2025. The total state spend for both Ukrainian refugees and international protection applicants reached €2.2 billion in 2024.

The University of Amsterdam conducted a landmark fiscal study analyzing Dutch public finance data over 25 years (1995–2019) and mapped the net lifetime cost of different migrant groups. While high-skilled Western labor migrants make a net positive lifetime contribution of roughly +€125,000 to +€200,000, asylum migrants incur a net average lifetime cost of -€475,000 per person.

For asylum seekers originating from North Africa and the Middle East, the net lifetime burden averaged -€625,000 per person, reflecting lower average rates of formal labor market participation, lower tax brackets, and higher lifetime utilization of state healthcare, social security, and housing support.

To say that this is unsustainable is an understatement. If continued, the only outcome for such disparate demographic replacement and abuse of systems is collapse.

Moving Forward

In the famous words of Tucker Carlson, Europe is the light of the world. They are our forefathers, our brothers, and our kin. We share a special bond with our family across the sea, and to see that light diminished would be to see our own light diminished. Rather than accepting a complacent descent into obscurity, we strongly encourage our European brothers to fight against the dying of the light.

This article was scathing; this we know. The purpose is not to denigrate, but rather to set the stage for a new Renaissance. Only by fully acknowledging the state of the continent can one truly begin to plan and execute a new paradigm.