Saturday, October 24, 2026

 Why We Cannot Treat Islam As ‘Just Another’ Religion

A Religion that Claims Authority over Law and Politics should meet a Higher Test before it Receives Public Privilege

Gillian Dymond 

 


 

 

‘Islam is my faith,’ says Shabana Mahmood, our home secretary, in a video clip from British Muslim TV which circulated widely on the internet a year or so ago. ‘Like a lot of practising Muslims, my faith is the most important thing in my life. It is the absolute driver of everything that I do.’

Fair enough, you might say. Committed followers of other religions no doubt feel an equally strong spiritual calling, and there is no reason why this should jeopardise their loyalty to this country. Judaism, for instance, a non-proselytising religion to the point of actively discouraging all but the most deeply convinced converts, has lived peacefully alongside Christianity in Britain since the 17th century without challenging our laws and constitution, and while contributing significantly to the nation. True, there was a time when Catholicism, with its allegiance to the Pope and its association with hostile foreign power, could not safely be admitted to Parliament, but any threat from that direction is long gone: indeed, this previously suspect religion is now beginning to fill the spiritual void left by the laughing stock which was once the Church of England.

But Islam? This is a religion born as an adjunct to conflict. Whereas early Christians, long before their faith had acquired political status, were prepared to die for their personal and spiritual commitment to Jesus Christ, the first followers of Mohammed rampaged through the civilised world, killing and enslaving whole populations of Christians, Jews and Persians as they imposed their power.

Even discounting the fact that religious conflict in Britain has hitherto been within the bounds of Christianity, there is something about Islam which sets it apart from the equally alien faiths of the Hindus and Sikhs: not simply its claim to be the final, incontrovertible word of God, but its apparent inability to draw a line between God and Caesar in public life.

So it was enlightening to discover Elaine Ellinger’s website, Perspectives on Islam, where she discusses the fact that Islam is not actually a religion as we understand it: that is to say, a belief system ‘confined to worship, personal faith or man’s relationship with God’ - but a ‘deen’: an Arabic word which scholars have routinely, and misleadingly, mistranslated.

This is the definition of a ‘deen’ (42.40 in) which is taught to children in Islamic schools, including many of those supported by Western governments:

‘Deen, in fact, denotes a system of beliefs, a code of life. It does not merely signify the spiritual fulfilment of the individual. It means all matters pertaining to a way of life, for it encompasses religion, law, trade, commerce, morality, politics, justice, foods, drinks, clothing - in fact, all aspects of life relating to people’s thought or actions. This is the most fundamental point that should be grasped in trying to understand Islam, because in this comprehensive sense religion’ (ie, deen) ‘is a Muslim’s life.’ (Grade 12 textbook for Muslim children)

Effectively, the ‘deen’ is sharia, and sharia is the ‘deen’. Grade 8 children are taught that ‘Sharee’ah literally means a clear path that we must follow as we toil on towards the Creator whom we will eventually meet. In its fullest sense, Sharee’ah virtually is the “deen”, which is often inadequately translated as religion. “Deen” literally means “way of life”, “following” or “the way”’. (Grade 8 textbook)

Muslims subject to the deen of Islam view themselves as a nation without boundaries - the Ummah - and believe that their deen will ultimately rule throughout the world, as stated in Koran 61.9: ‘It is He (Allah) Who sent His Messenger with guidance and the deen of truth to manifest it over all deens, although those who associate others with Allah’ (ie, the infidels) ‘dislike it’.

To this end, the three communal duties of members of the Ummah are dawa (inviting others to submit to the deen); enjoining right and forbidding wrong (enforcing the Islamic norms of sharia wherever possible and, if unable to enforce them, abhorring those who refuse to put them into practice); and jihad on behalf of Islam (warfare and conquest, by mouth, by pen, by money and, once sufficient strength has been accumulated, by the sword).

Regarding jihad, we inheritors of Christian morality would expect religiously-minded people at least to engage in a fair fight. For committed Muslims, however, the priority may not be to fight fairly and openly, where the advancement of the deen is concerned, but to win at all costs - even if this involves deliberately abusing trust.

Reliance of the Traveller (a classical manual of Islamic law, certified by Al-Azhar University in Cairo, the premier centre for Sunni Islamic scholarship and education worldwide) sets out the approved rules for deception. Outright lying, it says, is permissible in war, in the settling of disagreements, and in the talk of husband with wife or wife with husband, as long as the goal is praiseworthy and cannot be achieved by telling the truth. Lying may even be obligatory, if it is the only means of fulfilling a mandatory Islamic duty. However, it is ‘religiously more precautionary’, if at all possible, simply to use words which give a misleading impression. (r8.2) The latter device is known as ‘tawriya’, and is discussed in detail here by Raymond Ibrahim.

With regard to warfare, as Elaine Ellinger points out in a particularly illuminating statement in her video, A Civilisational Reckoning (9.51 in): ‘For Western politicians, they don’t understand the concept of war unless it is declared by a nation state; but for Islam, the doctrine is that declaration’.

In short, Islam, as required by hundreds of exhortations in the Koran, exists in a perpetual state of warfare against the ‘infidel’: a war which it is the ‘communal duty’ of every good Muslim to wage to the extent that he or she is able; and in engaging in that warfare any necessary deception or obfuscation is permissible, in some cases even obligatory, in order to advantage Islam (‘the right’) and disadvantage everything outside of Islam (‘the wrong’).

What, then, are we to conclude, from our home secretary’s affirmation of her faith as ‘the absolute driver of everything that I do’? How is it possible not to suspect her priorities, and her candour, whenever the interests of her ‘absolute driver’ and the interests of the British people are at odds with each other?

What are we to think, for instance, when she proposes to invite yet more refugees from incompatible cultures into a country already experiencing the effects of religious division, and bursting at the seams with recent arrivals, legal and illegal: a country whose infrastructure is collapsing under the weight of numbers, whose welfare bill is set to overtake tax receipts, and whose native population are threatened with becoming a minority in their own homeland by 2060?

How can we fail to notice that the people she wishes to bring in will be heavily skewed towards members of the Ummah: yet more potential foot-soldiers for jihad, many of them indoctrinated from birth into a hatred of the West?

How, too, can we trust the growing number of Muslim MPs in Parliament - the latest one declaring her allegiance to the deen by sporting the standard Islamic female uniform of abaya and hijab? Is it realistic to expect them to act in the interests of the British people (‘the wrong’), rather than furthering the aims of Islam (‘the right’), as their communal duty dictates?

As Elaine Ellinger points out, the fact that it has managed to pass itself off as just another religion is Islam’s ‘ticket to ride’. Yet prayer and worship amount to only a tiny part of its vast ‘system of obedience’ which ‘codifies faith into law, and compels submission through fear’. Any genuine spiritual experience which such mystics as the (heretical) Sufis manage to wring from this system, she suggests, ‘is not because of Islam, but in spite of it’ (see here).

By claiming to be a religion, rather than openly declaring itself a competing system of law and governance, Islam has been able to gain state backing in its bid to assume ever greater power, and at present enjoys such privileges as: public funding for Islamic schools; charitable status for ‘zakat’ (the Islamic tax on Muslims, which funds not only what we would recognise as almsgiving, but jihad in all its manifestations); faith-based tax advantages; recognition of sharia arbitration; accommodation of sharia requirements in public schools, workplaces, prisons, and the marketplace; foreign funding of Islamic organisations; preferential treatment by government officials and ministers for self-appointed ‘community representatives’; etc.; etc.

‘Treating Islam as just another religion,’ says Ms Ellinger, ‘is the core mistake’. She suggests that, if they are to deal with the reality rather than the fiction, affected countries should establish a legal threshold whereby any religion wishing to qualify for public privilege would be required to meet the following standards:

1 Equality before the law

2 Freedom of speech

3 Freedom of conscience

4 Rejection of coercion and violence

5 Rejection of polygamy and slavery

6 The supremacy of civil over religious law

Such legislation would neither restrict private belief nor target any particular religion. However, it would remove official protection and accommodation from any ‘deen’ attempting to impose its own competing system of law and governance on the country.

Islam, it is clear, would fail on every count.

 

  

Thursday, October 22, 2026

 The Protest Machine : There’s Big Money in Being Angry

The Protesters go Home The Professionals Keep getting Paid

Christopher Arnell  

 


 

“For most Americans, protesting is something they do when they're angry. For an entire industry of professional activists, keeping people angry is how they make a living.”

While thousands of Americans were marching against Donald Trump this weekend, organizers of a No Kings rally in Kansas City had already scheduled what would happen afterward. The protest was set for 1 p.m. By 2, they planned to have participants knocking on doors, preparing phone banks, distributing voter information, and encouraging people to vote in November.

Apparently, saving democracy comes with a campaign schedule.

I’ve always been curious about how these demonstrations work. Something happens in Washington, a politician makes a controversial statement, or somebody gets arrested, and suddenly there are protests in dozens of American cities. Sometimes hundreds. The slogans are remarkably similar, the messaging is consistent, and the logistics seem to fall into place almost overnight.

Back in March, I spent considerable time researching this and wrote four essays examining what I called The Protest Machine. I followed the organizations involved, where activists learn their trade, the money supporting them, and the people who make a living keeping everything running.

Some of what I found was pretty revealing.

From College Campus to Career

My first essay, Protest U, examined how college campuses have become training grounds for political activists.

A surprising amount of political organizing begins on college campuses. Student organizations recruit supporters, coordinate demonstrations, work with outside advocacy groups, and teach young activists skills that translate rather nicely into professional employment.

In 1967, the University of Chicago published its famous Kalven Report, arguing that universities should provide an environment where competing ideas could be debated without the institution itself taking political sides. Students were supposed to learn how to think, rather than be instructed what to think.

That principle has taken quite a beating.

A 2023 survey by the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression found that roughly one in ten college students reported being disciplined or threatened with discipline by administrators over something they expressed. Whatever happened to universities being places where people could disagree?

Meanwhile, students interested in political activism can gain practical experience recruiting participants, organizing campaigns, and applying public pressure. Some eventually move into nonprofit internships, paid organizing positions, and political campaigns.

An activity that once competed with studying for exams can become a career, and there’s a surprisingly well-developed industry waiting to employ them.

The Business of Political Outrage

Consider the Center for Popular Democracy, a progressive advocacy organization whose work includes community organizing and political mobilization.

According to its 2024 IRS filing, the organization reported $40.9 million in revenue and $31.8 million in expenses. It employed approximately 125 people, and its co-executive directors received salaries approaching $200,000.

That’s a substantial operation, and it’s only one organization within a much larger network of foundations, nonprofit groups, donors, and advocacy organizations.

My second investigation, Cla$h App, examined how that financial infrastructure works.

One particularly interesting arrangement is called fiscal sponsorship. Instead of forming an independent nonprofit, a qualifying project can operate through an established organization that provides the legal structure, accounting, payroll, regulatory oversight, and administrative services.

The Tides Center, for example, says it supports more than 130 projects and has sponsored over 1,400 during its history. It generally charges projects 9% of their annual revenue for its services.

Imagine trying to launch a new advocacy campaign. You need money, employees, legal compliance, financial systems, and communications. Building all that from scratch takes time and considerable expense.

With fiscal sponsorship, much of the administrative machinery already exists. You still need funding and approval, but you don’t have to reinvent the organization.

Foundations can finance long-term advocacy, professional employees can maintain contact lists and organizing networks, and projects can operate within established institutions. You don’t have to pay thousands of people to carry signs when you can finance organizations that know how to recruit them.

In Protest Inc., my third investigation, I looked at the people who turned political activism into a profession, along with the salaries, budgets, and incentives that keep the industry running.

Now think about what happens when political activism becomes somebody’s livelihood.

An organization with employees, offices, programs, and an annual budget has an incentive to remain in operation. Its leadership needs to demonstrate results to donors and supporters. Demonstrations provide publicity, help recruit participants, and give organizations a way to demonstrate their influence.

If your livelihood depends on fighting a particular problem, what happens when that problem gets solved? Going out of business probably isn’t the first thing that comes to mind.

For the average protester, Saturday’s march may be an afternoon of political expression. For the professional organizer, it’s part of a full-time job, with another campaign already waiting.

Press Button. Receive Protest.

My fourth essay, Insta-Agitator, examined how quickly these networks can mobilize.

Following George Floyd’s death in 2020, researchers documented more than 7,750 Black Lives Matter-related demonstrations across over 2,440 locations between late May and August.

That’s an extraordinary amount of activity, but organizing becomes considerably easier when you’ve already spent years developing the infrastructure.

Modern advocacy groups maintain local chapters, email lists, volunteers, communications staff, social media accounts, and relationships with other organizations. When something happens, they have the means to reach supporters and organize events without starting from scratch.

As I wrote in March, spontaneity rarely has a printing budget.

The No Kings demonstrations this October offer another example of organized political mobilization. Their organizers have explicitly encouraged voter participation ahead of the midterms, and in Kansas City, the schedule moved directly from a rally into voter outreach.

The signs may say No Kings, but the organizers have a more practical objective than spending an afternoon shouting at Donald Trump. They’re trying to influence what happens on Election Day.

Next time you watch a nationwide demonstration, spend a few minutes looking at the organizations involved. Check their websites, leadership, financial filings, and political activities. You might discover that the most interesting people at a protest aren’t necessarily the ones carrying signs.

They’re the ones who’ll still be working when the cameras leave.

Want to Dig Deeper?

This article condenses four investigations I published in March 2026. Together, they examine how modern political activism is developed, financed, staffed, and mobilized.

1. Protest U: How Universities Train Our Kids to Hate America

How campus politics, academic incentives, and student activism can create pathways into professional political organizing.

 

 

Sunday, October 18, 2026

 The Responsibility of the Arab Palestinian Movement in the German Nazi Final Solution

Fransisco Gil-White 

 

 

 

  • It seems obvious to most that there is no connection between the Arab Palestinian movement and the German Nazi Final Solution: the WWII genocide of the European Jews.

  • This belief is crucial to the prestige of the Arab Palestinian movement.

  • It is a false belief.


A common and entirely reasonable argument to convey why Zionism—the movement to create and preserve a Jewish State—is necessary says that “the Holocaust,” meaning the mass murder of the European Jews by the German Nazi Final Solution, “created the need for some form of Jewish territorial-political entity.”1 Right. Because if the Jews do not have their own State, they cannot hope to protect themselves from genocide.

But this argument is one that the leftist ‘pro-Palestinian’ camp does not accept as sufficient to legitimate the State of Israel. If we were to present their views with the utmost charity, this would take the form of an analogy made, in his last interview, by the Polish Communist and Marxist intellectual Isaac Deutscher. It was

“an analogy between the Zionist-Palestinian conflict and a person who, jumping out of a burning house, by chance lands on a passer-by, breaking his shoulders and then gets into a row with him.”2

The key concept here is the passer-by.

Since the passer-by—a stand in for the Arab Palestinians—didn’t light the house (Europe) on fire, since he is merely a passer-by, how is it justice for him that the man fleeing the burning house (the Zionist Jews) should land on top of him and break him? Stated plainly, then:

  • ‘Pro-Palestinian’ argument: The Arab Palestinians should not be made to pay for the German Nazi Final Solution, the genocide of the European Jews known as the crime of the Shoah (or Holocaust), because the Arab Palestinian national movement was not responsible for that crime. Israeli Jews should therefore give the Arab Palestinians the disputed territories—which rightfully belong to them—for a Palestinian State.

Back in 1993, this argument became diplomatic reality with the official birth of the Oslo Peace Process, organized by the US bosses.

The Oslo process brought the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—internationally recognized as the legitimate representative of the Arab Palestinians—into the Jewish State to govern the Arab Muslims in the disputed territories of Judea & Samaria (‘West Bank’) and Gaza, with a view, later, to carving these territories outright from the Jewish State for a PLO State.

I supported all that in 1993 because, back then, the two fundamental premises of the above argument both seemed obviously true to me (since everybody around me affirmed them):

  1. the Arab Palestinian movement had no responsibility for the Shoah; and

  2. the Zionist Jews unfairly took Arab Palestinian land.

Plus, Big Media and an endless parade of academics assured me that the PLO, a terrorist organization dedicated to the violent destruction of Israel, had transformed itself and now believed in negotiating peace in exchange for territory. I believed it. I thought we were having a Hollywood moment. And when they said this would settle the Middle Eastern disputes and bring peace to all, I believed that too.

I sound like an idiot. In my defense, the ground was still trembling in 1993 from the Great Fall of the Soviet Union. It was The End of History, according to Francis Fukuyama. We would all live in free-market democracies forever and all humans would be at peace. By golly, I was only 23-years-old. And the thing happening on my TV was simply heart-stopping: on the White House lawn, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat was reaching across US President Bill Clinton’s self-satisfied puckered smile to shake the hand of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin! I thought: done deal.

I think I cried.

 


 

Ten years later (for reasons that I will explain in a future article) I began investigating the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and came across facts that completely shattered my confidence in the aformentioned two key premises, forcing a reassessment of how basic historical reality should be described.

My reassessment of the second mainstream premise—that the Zonist Jews supposedly stole Arab land—I will not discuss here (but you may consult my views on that in this link).

In this piece what I’ll do is focus on the explosive fact that completely changed my mind concerning the first fundamental premise, which I had so confidently imagined simply had to be true: that the Arab Palestinian movement had played no role in the WWII Shoah. Because: Why in the world would the Arab Palestinian movement have anything to do with the Nazi slaughter of the European Jews?

Right?

Imagine my surprise… I now learned, to the contrary, that the very founder of the Arab Palestinian movement, Hajj Amin al Husseini, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, had played the leading role in the German Nazi Final Solution.

What!? You read correctly.

  • So, did the Zionist Jews land on a passer-by?

The abbreviated story follows (books and articles with the relevant documentation can be found at the end of this piece).

The story, in short…

In the early 20th century, young Amin al Husseini was a prince hailing from the most important family in Jerusalem, very connected with the government of the Ottoman Empire, then lord of the Middle East. His grandfather, Mustafa, his father Sheikh Tahr al Husseini, and his brother Kamal had all occupied the office of Mufti of Jerusalem, and his cousin Musa Kasim Pasha was mayor of the same city.

At 19, young Amin was sent to Cairo to study Islamic philosophy but he didn’t finish and went instead to Mecca and Medina, which earned him the title of pilgrim or hajj. After this, Hajj Amin became an officer in the Ottoman Army, which fought on the side of the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires in a European war of conquest that we remember as World War I (1914-1918). When that formidable German-Muslim alliance was defeated, the Ottomans lost their Middle Eastern possessions, which now came under British and French control.

At the League of Nations (precursor to the United Nations), the British Empire successfully negotiated for receiving control, as an administrative ‘mandate,’ a formerly Ottoman territory where Jews—in defiance of the Roman and jihadi Muslim genocides they had suffered—had always continued to live, and which included the ancestral homeland of the Jewish people and their holy city of Jerusalem.

The British chose to give this territory the name ‘Palestine’ (a name that neither the Ottomans nor the local inhabitants used).

Now, to obtain the Palestine Mandate, the British Empire had formally promised to the League that they would help create, in this territory, a Jewish National Home where the Jewish people could be safe from the ongoing European persecutions.

 


 

 Husseini was not happy about that, and he expressed his emotion by launching the Arab Palestinian movement with massive terrorist attacks against Jewish civilians—Jews who’d already been living there from Ottoman times and long before: the Al Nebi Musa massacre. Husseini timed this attack carefully to coincide with the League’s 1920 San Remo Conference, where the British Mandate would be created, in hopes of sabotaging that decision by making it clear that no Jews would be peacefully received.

The Mandate was created anyway. But not—mind you—because the British bosses really disagreed with Husseini. The British protected Husseini from justice and soon after, in 1921, made him the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, endowing that office with greatly expanded powers from what the Mufti (sans ‘Grand’) of Jerusalem had enjoyed under the Ottomans. In the years to follow, leveraging his position as Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and with the help of the British, Husseini would organize other massive terrorist attacks—pogroms—against civilian Jews in British Mandate Palestine: in 1921, 1929, and 1936-39.

 


 

 When World War II broke out, Husseini traveled to Baghdad, where he organized the destruction of the very ancient Baghdadi Jewish community in a pogrom called the Farhud. Then he was off to Rome and finally to Berlin. Everywhere he was received with full honors, almost as if he were a head of State. The German Nazis had all the dignitaries out to receive him, including Adolf Hitler himself, who sat down with Husseini immediately to seal important agreements with him, among which was their joint commitment to work together to exterminate the Jews living in British Mandate Palestine.

The Nazis were very excited about Husseini. They were building alliances with Arab Muslim bosses everywhere, and had already sent Husseini weapons for his fourth—and greatest—terrorist attack against the Jews of British Mandate Palestine (the so-called ‘Arab Revolt’ of 1936-39). The Nazis believed the now-very-famous Husseini might become, after the war, and with their help, the next Islamic Caliph.

Moreover, the Nazis admired Husseini’s track record as a mass murderer of Jews in British Mandate Palestine and Iraq. Right away the Nazis decided they could put Husseini profitably to work.

Hitler made Husseini a top Nazi official with his own budget and bureaucracy: Buro des Grossmufti. Husseini thus became important:

  1. in Nazi propaganda directed at Muslims;

  2. as recruiter and trainer of entire divisions for Heinrich Himmler’s SS made up of Bosnian and Albanian Muslims; and

  3. as co-administrator—in partnership with Adolf Eichmann—of the industrialized death-camp system that murdered the European Jews.

(Don’t adjust your screen or rub your eyes. You read correctly: The Founding Father of the Arab Palestinian movement co-led, for the German Nazis, the extermination of the European Jews. Yes, yes: I am speaking of the Shoah or Holocaust.)

 

 

 After the war, the British and French allowed Husseini to escape to Cairo where King Farouk and then Gamal Abdel Nasser protected him. Lots of German Nazi fugitives also arrived there and got protection too.

In 1947, the United Nations voted to partition what remained of British Mandate Palestine, and to create there a laughably minuscule Jewish State plus a second Arab Palestinian State (the first was Jordan). But Husseini’s Arab Higher Committee—‘representing’ the Arab Palestinians, and in solidary unity with the rest of the Arab bosses—rejected the partition plan. Husseini rejected, in other words, the Palestinian State that the United Nations offered him.

 


 

 

Husseini and other Arab bosses publicly explained that they weren’t interested in any kind of Arab Palestinian State. What they wanted was to destroy any possibility of a Jewish State, because a Jewish State of any size was completely intolerable to them. The Secretary General of the Arab League, Azzam Pasha, unashamed for the fact that the German Nazi Final Solution had only just recently concluded, and, speaking for all the Arab League bosses, publicly announced that the Arabs would together launch, against the new State of Israel,

“a war of extermination and momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Tartar [Mongolian] massacre or the Crusader wars.”3

Or, he forgot to say, like the German Nazi Final Solution of his mentor, Hajj Amin al Husseini.

Husseini co-led the Jihadi War of 1948. This was the united Arab/Muslim “war of extermination” that Azzam Pasha had promised, and that—right after the European genocide—tried to kill all of the Jews who’d fled to the Middle East to create the State of Israel as a refuge. Husseini’s Arab Higher Committee was responsible for the first wave of terrorist, anti-Jewish attacks.

I do mean terrorist. The Arabs attacked civilians. And they took no prisoners. Any Israeli soldiers captured were slowly tortured to death (just like Jewish civilians were, recently, in the attacks of 7 October 2023), so it became general practice for Israeli soldiers to commit suicide by grenade if capture became imminent.4

The Jihadi War of 1948 did not become ‘Holocaust 2.0’ because the Israeli Jews (amazingly) won. For that reason, the Israeli Jews get to call it the Israeli War of Independence.

Husseini and his cronies cynically baptized the Israeli victory the ‘Nakba’ (‘Catastrophe’), because for these guys it is a catastrophe when they cannot properly exterminate millions of Jews. Media and academia have cooperated with the ‘Nakba’ narrative, as if the Israeli Jews had worked to impede the formation of a Palestinian State, when what really happened is that the Israelis fought a defensive war against Husseini and other Arab leaders who, rather than accept the second Palestinian State that the UN offered, preferred to try and exterminate the Israeli Jews.

 


 

Following the alleged ‘Nakba,’ in the 1950s Husseini created the terrorist group Al Fatah, handpicking Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas to lead it and see it through to the final mission: to kill all the Jews in Israel. Husseini used fugitive German Nazis in Cairo to give the core group of Fatah founders some German-Nazi training.

In 1964 Egyptian dictator Gamal Abdel Nasser created the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a confederation of Palestinian terrorist groups, but soon Husseini’s Al Fatah found itself in a position to swallow the PLO, as historian Howard Sachar explains:

“... in February 1967 the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] leader [Ahmed Shukeiry] was wounded in an assassination attempt. For the while, as a result, the organization was at least partially immobilized by factional intrigues.

Not so a rival, and even more radical Palestinian group in Syria, the Fatah (Arab Liberation Movement), organized several years earlier by veterans of the Mufti’s [Hajj Amin al Husseini’s] former Arab Higher Committee.

... From the outset... the Fatah’s reputation depended largely upon the success of its Moslem traditionalist approach of jihad against Israel, and upon conventional infiltration methods.”5

The year after the assassination attempt on PLO boss Ahmed Shukeiry, Husseini’s Al Fatah took over the PLO with Husseini’s explicit blessing. As historians Barry Rubin and Wolfgang Schwanitz summarize from information they obtained digging in the archives of Lebanese intelligence,

“On December 29, 1968, at a meeting in the ex-grand mufti’s home near Beirut [Lebanon], al-Husaini anointed Arafat as his successor. The movement would be directed by these two sequential leaders and their similar philosophy and methods for an astounding eighty-three years, from al-Husaini’s becoming grand mufti in 1921 to Arafat’s death in 2004. In December 1968, the thirty-nine-year-old Arafat, leader of the Fatah guerrilla group, was about to take over a PLO hitherto dominated by the Nazi collaborator [Gamal] Abd an-Nasir. But Arafat’s success would be all the more secure if he received the seventy-one-year-old al-Husaini’s endorsement. Al-Husaini gave it after lecturing Arafat for several hours on how he should go about destroying Israel and replacing it with a Palestinian Arab state. Within a few weeks Arafat controlled the movement as thoroughly as al-Husaini had ever done.”6

The PLO essentially and thoroughly became Al Fatah, as Sachar explains:

“By [1970]…the splinterization of the guerilla ranks largely dictated the altered nature of their offensive against Israel. Nominally, most of them belonged to an umbrella coordinating federation, the Palestine Liberation Organization. Yet this prewar, Egyptian-dominated group had been seriously crippled … and its leader, Ahmed Shukeiry, had been forced into retirement. Since then, the PLO had experienced less a revival than a total reincarnation of membership and purpose under the leadership of Yasser Arafat. Consisting ostensibly of representatives of all guerilla organizations, the PLO in its resurrected form was almost entirely Fatah-dominated, and Arafat himself served as president of its executive. In this capacity he was invited to attend meetings of the Arab League, and won extensive subsidies from the oil-rich governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf.”7

Though it now called all the shots, Al Fatah nevertheless kept the name: PLO. That’s why I always call it PLO/Fatah—because the PLO (what we now call the ‘Palestinian Authority’)—is really Al Fatah.

When this background is understood, history acquires a chilling description: US bosses brought into the Jewish State—the State created expressly to protect the Jews from Nazi genocides—the terrorist group created by Hajj Amin al Husseini, chief co-architect of the German Nazi genocide. And US bosses called this the Oslo ‘Peace’ Process!

WAR IS PEACE.

Why total silence on Husseini?

I came across all this many years ago, when, partly due to my general interest in ethnic conflict and racism, I developed a special curiosity to understand the Arab-Israeli conflict better. The documents to establish the main points of my narrative above were all in the University of Pennsylvania library, where I found them in 2003. And I had invested only two weeks of work. To the shock of the facts themselves, therefore, I added—in further shock—this question:

  • Why hadn’t anybody said anything to me about Husseini before?

My ignorance was dramatic. I was a freshly minted anthropology Ph.D. specializing in ethnic conflict and racism, and working at an ethnic-conflict think tank at the University of Pennsylvania that was especially focused on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and quite obsessed with the Oslo Peace Process itself.

Not to belabor the obvious, but the drama of my ignorance is heightened by the status of the Shoah as the most famous genocide of all time. Even before getting my Ph.D. I had read a lot about the Shoah.

Moroever, Husseini himself had been world famous still at the close of WWII, when various parliamentarians in the British House of Commons had angrily demanded to know why he wasn’t being tried in the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal for war crimes and crimes against humanity.8

And yet, before making it a personal mission to understand the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, I had never come across Husseini.

How come?

Some additional research answered that question. Right around 1968, which is when Al Fatah was taking over the PLO, all mention of Husseini ceased abruptly, and completely, in both media and academia. Because of this blackout, by the time US bosses organized the main push for the signature of the Oslo Accords—which push began at the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991—nobody remembered Husseini.

Western and Israeli citizenries did not understand, therefore, that US bosses were taking a group created to finish Hitler’s job and bringing it into the Jewish State.

What are the implications of all this?

One implication of this is that, if our meaning-making system—the Extended Fourth Estate, the institutions of media and academia—stop mentioning something, if they remove it entirely from the historical context they provide when explaining current events, then just a few years will suffice to erase it completely from the consciousness of the general public. This is a social-psychological phenomenon crucial to an understanding of the management of reality, and we discuss it here:

A second implication is this: we must establish—this is vital—whether the claim that PLO/Fatah abandoned its goal of destroying the Jewish State in genocide makes any sense.

One way to get your bearings on this question is to consider the birth of jihadi Iran, established in 1979 by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution. That Iranian jihadi State, recall, promises to exterminate the Israeli Jews and proudly puts its money where its mouth is, as demonstrated on 7 October 2023 and subsequently (and previously).

Well guess what? In the 1970s, when Jimmy Carter spearheaded the first diplomatic stirrings that would later mature as the Oslo Process, PLO/Fatah was already training Ayatollah Khomeini’s guerrillas in Lebanon, the same that would make Khomeini the Supreme Leader of Iran. And right after Khomeini took power, PLO/Fatah got busy helping create the new terrorist institutions for Khomeini’s jihadi Iran, the very institutions that oppress ordinary Iranians and export jihadi terror around the world.

A third implication is that we must urgently decide between the two obvious hypotheses that may explain what has happened here:

  1. Ignorance/incompetence hypothesis. US bosses didn’t understand what they were doing, because, by the early 1990s, they too were entirely in the dark concerning the history of PLO/Fatah (and the creation of Iran).

  2. Machiavellian hypothesis. US bosses knew exactly what they were doing, and quite deliberately inserted into strategic territory of the Jewish State a bunch of terrorists hell-bent on murdering all the Israeli Jews.

Upon documenting, in the year 2003, everything that I have summarized above about the history of the Arab Palestinian movement, I became instantly aware of the importance of a proper method to decide rigorously between the above two hypotheses. And I conducted a test.

It was like this: I published a short history of the Arab Palestinian movement with the documentation of Husseini’s crimes. Outcome: I was fired from the University of Pennsylvania. I consider this outcome consistent with the Machiavellian hypothesis.

 

 

 

 

Saturday, October 17, 2026

The Theology Behind Europe’s Rape Crisis 

IDI 

 


 

‘Oh my god, I’m a Muslim in one minute.’

The recorded words of Afghan migrant, Jan Jahanzeb, moments before he and another Afghan migrant, Israr Niazal, raped a 15-year-old English girl he had kidnapped.[1]

ISLAM’S RAPE PROBLEM

For the last 30 years, objective critical study of Islam has essentially been forbidden in Western academia. Most work is by those who haven’t studied Islamic law (Sharia), much less Arabic, and most of that produced, somewhat understandably, focusses on jihad and terrorism.

However, as Muslims continue to mass migrate to the West and once well-ordered Western societies witness exponential increases in sex crimes, it has become imperative to study and critically assess sexuality within Islam.

The common misconception in the West is that Islam as an institution is sexually conservative; even repressive. This impression flows from the requirements of Muslim women to wear the hijab/niqab/burqa and to stone adulterers; however, this is highly misleading: the institution of Islam is hyper-sexualised with rape and sexual slavery central to Islamic law.

Whilst it is true that the Quran requires Muslim women to draw cloaks around them, and that this has morphed into the requirement to don the hijab/niqab/burqa, the specific Quranic instruction requires this be done so that Muslim women ‘are recognised and not harmed’ (Surah Al-Azhab, 33:59).

Thus, the theological requirement to wear the hijab etc is not one of modesty per se but one of demarcation; it protects them from Muslim men and prevents them from ‘harm’.

Likewise, stoning adulterers applies to Muslim relationships. It is entirely lawful under Sharia for Muslim men to rape slaves.

THE ISLAMIC FRAMEWORK

To fully understand Islam’s rape problem, one must grasp six key Islamic concepts:

First, morality in Islam, particularly Sunni Islam, is entirely shaped by the Quran and the Hadith. That is to say, the direct word of their god and the sayings and doings of their prophet, Muhammad, shape the entire Islamic moral framework. What is set out therein is referred to as Sharia, or Islamic law, but this is, in many ways, a false distinction: Islam is Sharia and Sharia is Islam.

Second, as evidenced by the command to demarcate Muslim women, Islam principally delineates humanity into two castes of people: Muslims and non-Muslims.

Third, within this already highly discriminatory framework, Muslim women are treated differently again. Whilst women are discriminated against in a range of areas, from inheritance to their standing as witnesses, there is no concept of consent in inter-Muslim sexual relations.

Fourth, whilst there is an austere sexual environment for young Muslim men outside of wedlock, particularly for those who are poor, a major and divinely ordained outlet is the sexual slavery of non-Muslim women.

Fifth, prostitution is lawful in Islam under certain conditions. It is specifically provided for in the Quran and there is strong evidence to suggest the relevant verse has been relied on by the Muslim rape gangs in the United Kingdom.

Sixth, it is important to understand that Islam is a belief system that leans into carnal pleasures: Contrary to Judaism and Christianity, their heaven, or ‘paradise’, is simply the promise of lustful worldly desires.

MORALITY IN ISLAM

Morality in Islam is merely the rules set out by their scriptures. The word ‘morality’ in this context carries no deeper meaning. Whatever is termed ‘halal’ is fine and whatever is termed ‘haram’ is forbidden. It is, quite literally, no more complex than that. Mehdi Hasan, prior to refining his apologia, summed it up perfectly:

‘…in Islam what is halal is halal what is haram is haram. We do not bend our law, our morality… never… We know that keeping the moral high ground is key. Once we lose the moral high ground, we are no different from the rest of non-Muslims, from the rest of those who mean to live their lives as animals, bending any rule to fulfil any desire. Once we do that, we are lost!’[2]

Thus, a Muslim of good Islamic moral standing is one who follows the law i.e. Sharia, and in so doing does only that which is ‘halal’. There is no further consideration and, when a Muslim uses the word ‘moral(s)’, there must be a rebuttable presumption the word takes the meaning of ‘conduct in accordance with Sharia’.

MUSLIMS AND NON-MUSLIMS

Islam is, on a literal construction, the most discriminatory framework ever constructed with discrimination against non-Muslims a central Quranic theme. Selected passages say, inter alia:

  • Non-Muslims are the ‘clear enemy’ (Surah An-Nisa 4:101) – note this is identical terminology used for Satan (e.g. Surah Al-Baqarah 2:208; Surah Ya Sin 36:60)

  • Non-Muslims wish to lead Muslims astray (Surah 5:41)

  • Former Muslims who do not repent cannot be saved (Surah 9:66)

  • Muslims should not trust non-Muslims (Surah Al-Mumtahanah 60:1)

As is plain, Islam’s rigid theological doctrine imposes the ultimate ‘in-group – out-group’ moral framework. It is not a case of cherry-picking verses, it is a core irrebuttable theme. On a strict interpretation, there are no ‘human rights’ or even ‘universal rights’, there are simply rights for Muslims with non-Muslims protected only to the extent they have treaties with Muslims or, in the case of Christians, Jews and Sabaeans (now extinct), are subjugated and pay to the Muslims a yearly tax (the Jizya) (Surah At-Tawbah 9:29).

INTER-MUSLIM SEXUAL RELATIONS

Most will recognise that Muslim men may have four wives (Surah An-Nisa, 4:3) and most will also recognise that Muslim men may beat their wives (Surah An-Nisa, 4:34).

However, what is almost totally absent from discourse is the fact that Muslim men may, on a strict interpretation of Sharia, rape their wives:

‘Your women are fertile soil for you so go to your fertile soil* as you wish and send before and fear God and know that you will meet him and give good tidings to believers.’ (Surah Al-Baqarah, 2:223)

*the word is ‘tilth’ which is tilled soil i.e. soil conditioned for growing crops.

Thus, Sharia provides that sexual relations between a married Muslim man and Muslim woman are not conditional on consent and, if a wife rebels, for example, does not allow intercourse to occur, the husband, on a literal reading of Sura An-Nisa 4:34, has divine authority to beat her.

Many may struggle to accept the existence of such a moral framework but of all the MENAPT countries (Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan and Turkey), founded on Sharia as they are, only Tunisia expressly provides a criminal sanction for the act of spousal rape.

Additionally, Sharia provides that sexual maturity for girls is nine years of age. Although there is some further discourse about maturity of mind and body, the Quran makes plain a pre-pubescent girl can be married (Surah At-Talaq:1;64-65), there is a significant body of Hadith traced through Aishah (one of Muhammad’s many wives) that Muhammad had sex with her when she was nine (Sahih al-Bukhari:3896;5133;5134;5158; Sahih Muslim:1422a;1422b;1422d).

Many in the West simply cannot comprehend that the Islamic construct of morals permits a fully grown man to have sex with a nine-year-old child whether she wants to or not but that is simply the way it is. It is ‘halal’ and therefore it is moral. That is the Islamic moral universe. This framework is so antithetical to our Western morality, founded on Christianity as it is and refined by millennia of European philosophy, that most simply cannot comprehend this objective evil, let alone define and recognise it. It is so frightening that, to many, it is best ignored.

Which brings us to another ugly point. In Sharia, there is no word for ‘rape’. Instead, there is the concept of ‘Zina’ which roughly takes the meaning ‘unlawful sexual intercourse’.

There is a body of Sharia concerning Zina drawn from the Quran and Hadith but, for Muslim male-female relations, it is sufficient to say that unmarried individuals face 100 lashes (Surah An-Nur 24:2), an unmarried Muslim with a married Muslim could additionally face exile and married Muslims are to be stoned to death (Sahih Muslim:1697/1698a).

However, what does not fall within Zina is sexual intercourse with slaves – this is not unlawful within Sharia. In fact, it is morally right.

SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH NON MUSLIMS

Arguably the largest gap in modern discourse is the fact that slavery isn’t just a quaint relic of Islam, it is central to it. It is referenced throughout the Quran with the focus on sexual relations between Muslim men and their female slaves.

Muslims are, by theological doctrine, slaves to their god. It’s why so many are called ‘Abdul’, followed by one of the many names of their god, which translates to ‘slave of god’. Non-Muslims, on the other hand, are unclean (Sura At-Tawba, 9:28), forsaken by the god of Islam (Sura al-Mu’minum, 47:12), no better than cattle (Sura Al-Araaf 7:179) and are, in fact, the worst of creatures (Sura Al-Bayyana 98:6). They are subordinate to Muslims in every way and may be taken as slaves by Muslims.

Slavery in Islam is incredibly different from the understanding of slavery in the West. In the Western psyche, when images of slavery are conjured, they are commonly associated with the use of black men to pick cotton and black women as house help. The concept of slavery is very different in Islam, flowing as it does from killing all male combatants and enslaving their women and children which become ‘booty’. Central to it is sexual slavery where Muslim men may do as they please to non-Muslim female slaves.

For example, many in the United Kingdom will be familiar with the current discourse about cousin marriage in the Pakistani community. This flows from Surah An-Nisa (4:23) which provides a precise listing of the types of women forbidden to Muslim men and cousins are not on it; they are therefore ‘halal’. What doesn’t currently form part of that discussion is the next verse which, much more egregiously, prescribes that Muslim men may have sex with their slaves, even if those females are already married.

The consequence of that verse is that a Muslim man may rape his female slaves as often as he desires without fear of consequence from his god, even if that female slave is already married and even if that slave is as young as nine. This is reflected elsewhere in the Quran, for example, Surah al-Mu’minun, 23:1-6 and Surah Al-Ma’arij, 70:28-30 which both expressly provide Muslim men will be successful/free from punishment where they have sexual relations with their slaves.

In classical Islamic jurisprudence, slaves are generally only permissible through conquest. Islam apologists often state women and children are not to be killed in war and, whilst Hadith validate this argument (Sahih al-Bukhari:3014; Sahih Muslim:1744b), what they don’t tell you is their fate is worse than death: Women and children are to be taken as slaves (Sahih al-Bukhari:4024).

Of course, many will rightly point out that we in the West are not ‘at war’ with Islam and thus this element of Sharia is redundant. Whilst it is true that the West is not at war with Islam, it is also an inescapable fact that Islam is, by theological doctrine, at war with the West. Whilst a larger topic, it is sufficient to note the Quran gives global dominion to Islam (e.g. Surah Al-Baqarah 2:115;255; Surah An-Nisa 4:131; Surah At-Tawbah 9:33), multiple verses directly command Muslims to fight non-believers (e.g. Surah An-Nisa 4:76; Surah At-Tawbah 9:29;73) and Muhammad is quoted in Hadith as saying he was ‘…ordered to fight all of mankind until they say there is no god except god…’ (Sahih al-Bukhari:392).

Taken together, this branch of Sharia puts the West in what is referred to as the Dar al-Harb which roughly translates to the Abode of War. Although without a strict Quranic basis, this doctrine splits the world in two i.e. Dar al-Islam which is the Islamic world and Dar al-Harb. The latter is to be conquered, subjugated and forced into Dar al-Islam.

This approach to conquest and women isn’t just abstract theology; it plays out in the real world backed up by no less than 1,400 years of well-documented history. The most obvious modern example being the genocide of the Yazidis in Iraq by the Islamic State followed by the sexual slavery of their women and children. In that case, there have at least been some prosecutions in Germany for Crimes Against Humanity but far from enough.[3]

PROSTITUTION IN ISLAM

Perhaps the most troubling verse in the Quran is Surah An-Nur 24:33. This verse provides that a Muslim man may force his young slave girls into prostitution for money provided she doesn’t wish to remain chaste (and it logically follows if she isn’t chaste already then she cannot wish to remain so). If there is no money involved, it appears the qualification of chastity is removed and the Muslim man may simply force her into prostitution. It sets out a very precise test and there is clear evidence it has been deployed by Muslim men in the United Kingdom. In fact, this verse explains the entire typology of sexual slavery and enforced prostitution illustrated by the Muslim Rape Gangs (aka the Grooming Gangs).

ISLAM’S PARADISE

As is perhaps unsurprising for an ideology born in the desert, paradise in Islam includes luscious terrain, flowing rivers and, crucially, wine and maidens (Huris). The Quran is replete with references to marrying Muslim men to these ‘Huris’ (Surah Ad-Dukhaan 44:54; Surah At-tur 52:20), untouched by man or jinn (Islamic spirits) (Surah Ar-Rahman 55:56; Surah Ar-Rahmaan 55:74) who will have eyes like pearls as a reward for the Muslim men’s earthly deeds (Surah Al-Waaqiah 56:22-24; Surah As-Saaffaat 37:48).

What we in the West view as debauched desires form the basis of heaven in Islam. An objective cynic might observe that these revelations concerning sexual slavery and paradise tapped into the fact Muhammad’s male followers, it seems, were motivated to fight by the reward of sex, either in this world or the next. This is particularly the case when read against Surah al-Baqarah 2:216 which betrays the fact Muhammad’s male followers did not enjoy fighting and had to be compelled by their god to do so.

EUROPE’S RAPE PROBLEM

After the Second World War, for reasons that cannot be sensibly explained,[4] Muslims have been permitted to self-import en masse into western Europe. The last 30 years have seen an exponential increase with waves upon waves of male, fighting age illegal migrants from Muslim countries supplementing unsustainable levels of legal migration from the same.

These illegal migrants are often of little means and their education and morality, unsurprisingly, flows from religious education in their home jurisdiction. Their moral universe, which can only be objectively described as deeply supremacist, includes the following:-

  • they are now in the Dar Al-Harb;

  • their ultimate reward in paradise includes sex;

  • non-Muslims are slave material;

  • there is no concept of consent for having sex with slaves;

  • girls as young as nine are permissible; and

  • Sharia takes primacy over man-made laws i.e. the laws of the land.

It is even reasonable to conclude that raping European females is a driving factor for some migrants given Quranic exegesis gives Muhammad as personally authorising the rape of European women, seen as extra seductive, by his subordinate in return for jihad.[5]

This theological doctrine bears out in the evidence. Illustratively, it is not uncommon in court for these Muslim migrants to plead ignorance to the concept of consent as a mitigating factor.[6] In one recent case, a convicted Iranian rapist was sent for lessons in ‘understanding consent’.[7] In another, involving the gang rape of a young woman by an Iranian and two Egyptians, one migrant put it more bluntly, simply saying: ‘Rape to me is sex.’[8]

Thus, when considering the underlying ideology, the almost daily headlines of rape and sexual violence, particularly targeting of young girls, is wholly unsurprising. Most European nations feel it, from the 2015 New Year sex attacks in Cologne, Germany, to the almost daily headlines in the UK and wider Europe where Muslim men kidnap girls off the streets and rape them. It is similarly unsurprising that European countries with mass-migration have seen up to 500% increases in rapes since the early 2000s whilst countries like Poland, which has refused to take migrants, have experienced no material increase.

Moreover, this isn’t simply a problem for recent illegal immigrants. Taking the United Kingdom as an example, there are over 2,000 mosques and Pakistani communities, famous for practising cousin marriage, live in ethnic enclaves as evidenced by census data. You do not need to spend more than five minutes on Google or YouTube to discover Sharia views on consent and slavery are being taught in mosques across the UK and polling suggesting a third of British Muslims view the imposition of Sharia as desirable.[9]

-Video from Al-Furqan Islamic centre in Manchester of imam providing an exegesis of Surah An-Nisa 4:24

The logical conclusion of concentrating men with such a moral framework leads to controversies like the UK’s ‘Grooming Gangs’ scandal. Of course, ‘grooming gangs’ is a gross misnomer. They are, in reality, gangs of Muslims engaged in sexual slavery and enforced prostitution of non-Muslim girls, permitted as these acts manifestly are by a literal reading of Sharia.

The reality is there is no difference between the ideology these men follow and that of the Islamic State. Contrary to what many politicians would have you believe, Islamic State was simply what it said on the tin: An Islamic state. In other words, Muslims, following Islam in its raw, unfettered form. It is precisely the reason we see Muslims carrying out the same depraved acts i.e. rape, sexual slavery and enforced prostitution, in Europe as they have in the Middle East.

The difference, of course, is that where Western governments were all to keen to take action against the Islamic State, they remain unwilling to grasp the nettle and instead are busily engaged in downplaying the crimes they have visited on their people through mass migration. For example, alleging the perpetrators were involved with drugs and alcohol. Maybe the men did drink, maybe they didn’t. It doesn’t really matter. What matters is these men subsist within a moral framework that permits these acts. Branding victims with initials,[10] beating them,[11] and, in at least three cases, killing them.[12] This is notwithstanding the most depraved sexual activity with children that simply cannot be processed by most Western minds.[13]

And it is far from isolated. An analysis suggests that 1 in 16 Pakistani men Rotherham were suspects.[14] With a circle of knowledge this broad, these acts cannot be anything other than institutional. The scale of these atrocities would simply be impossible in a non-Muslim community. It should similarly come as no surprise that the wives of these men regard white girls as ‘filth’[15] and that the men have reportedly prayed in the next room after raping a victim.[16] What’s worse, Muslim sex slavers have been found to subsist in over 50 British towns and cities.[17]

Of course, apologists and those complicit in the crimes tend to revert to the slogan ‘it’s just bad men’, deliberately obfuscating the truth. But the evidence speaks for itself:

Afghan migrant Jan Jahanzeb was recorded as saying, moments before he and another Afghan migrant raped a girl he kidnapped: ‘Oh my god, I’m a Muslim in one minute.’[18]

In another case from 2024, a victim made the following statement:

‘I was only 11. You made me do a test to see if I was still a virgin or not. At that moment my abuse started. You made it sound like it was a crime to be a virgin. You made me feel ashamed of being a virgin. That same day you sent me off and forced me to commit a sexual act and my innocence was stolen. You started to pass me around as if I was a fresh piece of meat, man to man, city to city.’[19]

As is evident, the Muslim man tested whether his child victim was chaste. Having presumably been a virgin, the Muslim man appears to have then convinced her that she did not wish to be chaste and, apparently successful in this endeavour, immediately started prostituting her out.

It is the exact test for forced prostitution as set out by Quran 24:33.

In fact, the typology prescribed by Quran 24:33 neatly plays out in every rape gang. That is, as explained by Sir Trevor Phillips OBE, former chair of the United Kingdom’s Equality and Human Rights Commission:

‘The girls are first attracted by usually young men from within those communities. Flash cars, cigarettes, they give them drugs, all the rest of it... and I did… this film 10 years ago, and what the girls tell you, “This is my boyfriend” because they think that is what’s happening. Only later do they discover they’re hooked on drugs, they need the alcohol and all of that and then they’re passed around amongst older men.’[20]

In other words, a relationship forms between a Muslim man and a young girl. Once he has had sex with her [and she is self-evidently no longer chaste] and has control over her by vice or violence, he pimps her out to dozens of Muslim men. Exactly as verse 24:33. Exactly as Sharia permits. This behaviour is therefore ‘halal’ and morally virtuous.

That is the truth of the matter. The mass sexual slavery and enforced prostitution of little girls by gangs of Muslim men and the mass rape of women and girls across Europe by Muslim migrants is founded in the institution of Islam. A virulent, hyper-sexualised supremacist ideology that views non-Muslims as chattel for slavery and sexual abuse.

Until we confront the hideous truth that Islam has a rape problem, and confront it we must, the sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and mass rape of European women and girls will continue.

____________________

[1] Hardy, Jack. “Chilling Moment Afghan Asylum Seekers Drag 15-year-old Girl Into the Bushes Before Raping Her: Pair Jailed Over ‘horrific’ Attack.” Mail Online, December 8, 2025. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-15364309/Teenage-asylum-seekers-raped-15-year-old-schoolgirl-park-filmed-dragged-away-footage-horrifying-cause-riot.html.

[2] Hasan, Mehdi (Tom Marshall), “Mehdi Hasan Says Non-Muslims and Atheists Live Like Cattle,” December 19, 2018,

[3] See, for example, the German case of Taha al-J: 3 StR 230/22

[4] Unless you accept Islamic migration as a deliberate attempt to destroy Christian hegemony.

[5] The tafsir of Ibn Kathir for verse 9:49 which is explicit that the prospect of raping European females was permitted in return for jihad.

[6] See, for example, the sentencing remarks in R v Jahanzeb [2025] [3.5; 3.7], https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/R-v-Jahanzeb-and-Niazal.pdf.

[7] McDonald, Dan. 2026. “Migrant Crisis: Iranian Boy, 14, Avoids Jail after Being Convicted of Raping Schoolgirl as Victim’s Family Left ‘Furious.’” GB News. April 25, 2026. https://www.gbnews.com/news/migrant-crisis-iranian-avoids-jail-raping-schoolgirl-victim-family-furious.

[8] Dartford, Katy. 2026. “Asylum Seeker Accused of Filming Brighton Beach Rape Claims: ‘Rape Is Sex’ | LBC.” LBC. April 2, 2026. https://www.lbc.co.uk/article/asylum-seeker-brighton-rape-sex-5HjdXHQ_2.

[9] J.L. Partners and Henry Jackson Society, “British Muslim and General Public Attitudes Polling” 2024, https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/HJS-Deck-200324-Final.pdf.

[10] R v Dogar 27 June 2013, [54]. https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/sentencing-remarks-r-v-dogar-others.pdf.

[11] ibid, [53].

[12] See the cases of Lucy Lowe, Charlene Downes and Becky Watson. NB A fourth victim, Laura Wilson was murdered but not a sex related victim of the gangs– it was her sister. The murder of Becky Watson was denied and instead framed as a prank with no official findings otherwise).

[13] See for example, the sentencing remarks in R v Dogar 27 June 2013, [53-54]. https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/sentencing-remarks-r-v-dogar-others.pdf.

[14] Ashworth-Hayes, Sam. 2025. “The True Horror of the Rotherham Grooming Scandal.” The Telegraph. January 13, 2025. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/01/13/grooming-gang-victims-rotherham/.

[15] Alibhai-brown, Yasmin. 2017. “Wives of Men Jailed for Rape Blame the Victims Too.” Mail Online. Daily Mail. September 30, 2017. https://www.dailymail.com/news/article-4936754/Wives-men-jailed-rape-blame-victims-too.html.

[16] Moffett, Rebekah. 2022. “New Grooming Gang Report Avoids Discussing Islamic Connection.” Christian Concern. July 15, 2022. https://christianconcern.com/comment/new-grooming-gang-report-avoids-discussing-islamic-connection/.

[17] Chapman, Adam. 2025. “MAPPED: The 50 Towns and Cities in Britain Rocked by Grooming Gangs Abuse - Is YOUR Area Included?” GB News. January 6, 2025. https://www.gbnews.com/news/uk/starmer-grooming-gangs-uk-areas.

[18] Hardy, Jack. “Chilling Moment Afghan Asylum Seekers Drag 15-year-old Girl Into the Bushes Before Raping Her: Pair Jailed Over ‘horrific’ Attack.” Mail Online, December 8, 2025. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-15364309/Teenage-asylum-seekers-raped-15-year-old-schoolgirl-park-filmed-dragged-away-footage-horrifying-cause-riot.html.

[19] Patrick Christy quoting a grooming gang survivor in the sentencing of R v Saddiq and Ors [2024] (citation unavailable and case name approximated).

[20] Trevor Philips. “Why White Victims of Grooming Gangs Is Different, ‘They Covered It Up’.” YouTube. Times Radio, March 5, 2026.


Jonathan Smith is a contributor at the Ideological Defense Institute.