Tuesday, September 15, 2026

 “Now, This is a Lie”

Genocide Apartheid and The Countless Claims against Israel that Never Stick

Inverted World

 


 

No court on Earth has ever convicted Israel of genocide. No court on Earth has been asked to stop trying. When a state has been accused of genocide and apartheid this many times and never found guilty, systemic bias and coordinated efforts of groups with shared antizionist ideologies can be brought to bear in their nefarious plots.

Since 1982, I have counted 28 distinct groups that formally or openly accused the state of genocide, ranging from governments and UN mandate holders to rights organizations, scholarly associations, and a private court with no legal standing. Since 1975, at least 14 distinct parties have claimed that Israel is practicing apartheid.

Add these together, and the count is above 40. Israel has zero convictions in any court with the authority to convict.

The number of times one of these groups has reversed its own ruling: 1. The number of times a report was withdrawn under pressure: 1. The number of times an organization’s affiliate disagreed with its parent body’s findings: 1.

This is not what a record of guilt looks like. It’s what unproven claims amount to when they are repeated at an unheard-of rate, decade after decade, from the same set of actors, with the same agenda towards the Jewish state.

The normal response is to go through each of these charges line by line and ask whether Israel was guilty. This article does something else entirely. It publishes the documentary history, names each party involved, and then turns the microscope around to see whose fingers were on the paper and whose pen recently lost ink.

There are two conclusions I ask you to decide on:

1: A country of 10 million people has attempted to destroy a protected group numerous times and over forty years and created a system of racial domination to such a degree that 40+ groups have stated as much since 1975.

or the second option:

2: An overlapping web of groups with shared political goals and funding, many of whom have common ideological influences, have filed innumerable legal grievances at a very high rate, continuing a pattern of making false and exaggerated claims even after being unsuccessful this many times.

I will leave that decision to you.

The genocide history begins early and is thinner than the current fervor would suggest. The word was associated with Israel by the UN Assembly in 1982, which called the Sabra and Shatila massacre “an act of genocide.”

The killings were carried out by Lebanese Phalangist militia, not the IDF. Israel’s commission found the state indirectly responsible for not preventing the massacre, a decision of negligence not ill intent.

The word genocide attached itself to the massacre, one the Israeli military never committed.

The MacBride Commission concluded that Israeli conduct towards Palestinian nationhood during the Lebanon War amounted to genocide. In 2001, a similar NGO running alongside the infamous Durban Conference Against Racism accused Israel of war crimes, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. 

 


 

In 2013, the Malaysian Prime Minister convened a private mock-trial, and had it convict Israel in absentia of genocide.

Scholars and academics followed suite. Francis Boyle has said Israel is committing a “slow genocide.” Ilan Pappé describes it as an “incremental genocide.”

Not a government, or the G7, or the ICC, or any rights organization used the word genocide about the Gaza campaigns in 2008, 2009, or 2014. Before 2023, the genocide charge remained scattered among individuals, NGO forums, UN groups, and a private tribunal with no legal standing; it had not become a sustained campaign backed by major governments or a court with authority.

The current wave we have now has a point of origin: South Africa’s application to the ICJ alleged violations of the Genocide Convention. 19 other states have filed declarations, including Colombia, Mexico, Spain, Bolivia, Ireland, Cuba, and similar usual suspects.

Most of these are under Article 63 of the court’s statute on a question of legal interpretation, taking no position on the facts, something the media coverage completely ignores.

Colombia, Turkey, Chile, and Ireland regularly push the boundaries of this article with “acts of solidarity” being a motivating factor. This is why 63 states deliberately that “the Intervening State takes no position on the application of those provisions to the facts of the present case.

Francesca Albanese presented her “Anatomy of a Genocide” to the UN Rights Council, concluding there were reasonable grounds to show Israel’s actions met the standard for genocidal conduct and intent. Michael Fakhri used the same term in a study on deliberate starvation. The UN Commission of Inquiry (CoI) chaired by Navi Pillay, released another finding in 2025, the first inquiry of its kind in UN history to conclude any state had committed genocide.

Amnesty International published a genocide report, and Human Rights Watch followed weeks after, though its findings were narrower than the headline leads people to believe.

The International Association of Genocide Scholars passed a resolution in 2025. Raz Segal wrote in Jewish Currents in 2023 as one of the earliest academic voices, followed by Omer Bartov, Amos Goldberg, and Martin Shaw. Four names, a couple of years, with one word doing what it does.

A short list of heads of state and foreign ministers put that word into use as well. Mahmoud Abbas called the Gaza war a genocide as early as 2014. Luiz Lula da Silva of Brazil compared Israel’s actions to Hitler’s at the African Union summit in 2024, drawing a declaration of persona non grata from Israel. Gustavo Petro of Colombia severed ties with Israel, citing genocide. Recep Erdoğan of Turkey called it “complete genocide” and repeated the claims at the UN that year. Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia joined them as well.

28 hands by a conservative count across 44 years, and none of them belong to a government of the G7, which have the most thorough and independent intelligence, foreign policy capacities, and legal means to evaluate the claims.

The apartheid accusations are similar, and no less volatile. Its rhetorical ancestor was the 3379 resolution, which declared Zionism itself “a form of racism and racial discrimination.” Desmond Tutu drew a comparison in a widely cited piece for The Guardian, which said Israeli checkpoints and settlement policies were like apartheid-era South Africa.

It went into the UN record for the first time in 2007, when Special Rapporteur John Dugard reported that occupation practices “resemble aspects of apartheid.” In 2009, South Africa’s Research Council commissioned a legal study by Virginia Tilley that said the West Bank and Gaza practices met apartheid’s legal definition. It was an academic study and not a government one, though it is routinely cited as if this important difference does not exist.

The Russell Tribunal on Palestine in 2011, modeled on the ‘60s tribunal that judged the Vietnam War in absentia, made its apartheid assessment through a self-selected group of activists and sympathetic individuals with no state or legal authority.

Richard Falk, Dugard’s successor as Special Rapporteur, concluded in his report that the occupation amounted to apartheid and possible ethnic cleansing. The UN Commission for Western Asia published a report in 2017, authored by Falk and Tilley, reaching the same conclusion. UN Secretary-General Guterres ordered the report withdrawn from the UN’s website within two days. The commission’s secretary resigned shortly after, calling it “capitulation to political pressure.”

Michael Lynk, Falk’s successor, reached a similar finding in his final 2022 report. B’Tselem extended the word to the entire territory, the first Israeli group to do so, followed by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. That same year, South Africa called for Israel to be designated an apartheid state at the Human Rights Council.

Francesca Albanese called Israel’s relationship to the territory “settler colonialism,” producing an apartheid. She later added genocide to her list of legal pejoratives.

The ICJ, in a 2024 opinion, found Israeli practices in violation of Article 3, the article prohibiting apartheid. This is regularly reported as the world court ruling Israel guilty of apartheid. It’s narrower than the headline allows, and is a specific treaty violation rather than a freestanding declaration. Article 3 of the treaty condemns both "racial segregation" and "apartheid.” The Court found that Israel’s measures created a separation between communities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, amounting to a breach, it did not specify which of the two concepts it was finding a violation of.

Jimmy Carter’s 2006 book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid belongs on this list as well, though its claims are narrower than assumed.

Read straight through, these two histories reveal who Israel’s enemies actually are. One resolution was formally revoked by the body that made it in 1991. One report was withdrawn by the UN’s Secretary-General before it could spread through the public, over the objection of an author who resigned in protest.

One organization’s affiliate openly rejected its parent body’s headline finding within a month of its release, was suspended for two years for doing so, and complicated by citing claims of racism within the company.

One scholarly association’s vote was decided by a fraction of its membership, conducted over a mailing list, with dissenting comments removed, and a promised forum for objection quietly canceled. One UN fact-finding mission’s chairman, Richard Goldstone, retracted his report’s central charge in a Washington Post op-ed, writing that Israel had not intentionally targeted civilians as a matter of policy. The three colleagues who wrote the report with him refused to join the retraction.

None of this is what settled, independently corroborated facts look like. It’s what a system looks like when it has bad-faith actors who use it with more force than it was built for.

Let’s look at that system and some of its output: the Human Rights Council’s Agenda Item 7.

When the Council reorganized in 2007, it created 10 standing agenda items. 9 cover the human rights condition of the entire world in general or under themes, an entire planet’s grievances, separated out politely. Item 7 exists for a singular country: Israel is the only state with a permanent place on the Council’s agenda, present at every regular session whether or not anything happened that year to warrant it.

The United Kingdom’s official explanation at the Council’s 40th session dropped all the usual niceties: “Item 7 represents systematic institutional bias and as such weakens the voice of the Council and hardens positions.” Ban Ki-moon had made a milder version of the same point.

A system built to indict one country will keep doing so until its mechanisms are changed. The output proves its design by the sheer numbers. It says nothing about the conduct underneath. The bloc behind the instrument did not arrive at its interests incidentally.

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation, 57 member states, was founded in 1969 in direct response to an arson attack on the Al-Aqsa Mosque. The Palestinian cause was present at its creation. The OIC’s Council of Foreign Ministers adopted a recurring resolution on the cause of Palestine, continuing a decade-long pattern of advocacy across its membership.

57 states voting in near lockstep on a single question is not corroboration. They are not independent conclusions. They’re a bloc which votes as one. One witness with 57 mouths, and it should be weighed as one rather than counted as 40 separate confirmations.

The vocabulary this bloc use was not invented for the current time. Between 1967 and 1988, the Soviet Union ran a state propaganda project known as “Zionology,” which produced roughly 50 books, up to 10 million copies, and distributed in more than 100 countries under the supervision of security services. It cast Zionism as racist, fascist, and colonial.

Its signature achievement was the resolution mentioned before, 3379 which, as a reminder, stated “Zionism is a form of racism.” Ambassador Daniel Moynihan told the Chamber what happened the moment it passed: “The abomination of antisemitism has been given the appearance of international sanction.”

Then four words that have outlasted everyone there, came out of his mouth: “Now, this is a lie.”

16 years later, the assembly agreed with him and revoked it. It’s the only time a resolution reached a formal conclusion and ran against its authors by more than four to one.

Technically, 4.44 to 1.

A vocabulary designed in Moscow to delegitimize a state does not become evidence by resurfacing decades later in a UN report’s footnotes.

The commission that produced the 2025 genocide finding carries a mandate no comparable body has ever had: no finishing clause or investigation of root causes broad enough to make the state’s legitimacy a permanent subject of scrutiny.


If we turn the spotlight around for a second, perhaps we can see something all these people share.

Commissioner Miloon Kothari said in a that he and his colleagues were very disheartened by the social media that is controlled largely by “whether it is the Jewish lobby or it is specific NGOs,” and went on to ask why Israel was even a UN member.

He apologized ten days later, calling the phrase “incorrect, inappropriate, and insensitive.” Pillay defended Kothari in the open, saying his words had been “deliberately misquoted.” They were not.

When the council reconstituted the commission, it reappointed Chris Sidoti, the one member who had served throughout. His record is not clean either. He described groups supporting the international definition of antisemitism as “government-organized fronts.

Pillay and Falk were not strangers before any of this. While serving as UN High Commissioner, Pillay appointed Richard Falk as special rapporteur. He produced the 2014 and 2017 reports.

Falk’s history goes to 1979, where his New York Times op-ed, titled Trusting Khomeini, called the depiction of the Ayatollah as a “fanatical reactionary” “certainly and happily false,” and praised Khomeini’s “new model of popular revolution” as “a desperately needed model of humane governance for a third world country.” A Times colleague, Anthony Lewis, called the piece “outstandingly silly.”

Writing under his title for Al Jazeera, Falk questioned the official account of September 11th and promoted a 9/11 conspiracy online. Ban Ki-moon called his remarks “preposterous.” Pillay’s office defended Falk, saying he had spoken in his “personal capacity” and did not remove him from the mandate.

Francesca Albanese, whose report gave the current hype its title, carries a history of using similar language. An old social media post described the United States as “subjugated by the Jewish lobby.” She referred to the language as “imprecise.”

Hours after the October 7th massacre, she posted that “today’s violence must be put in context.” The context being “almost six decades of hostile military rule.” Four days later, she cast doubt on the reports of rape and beheading, warning that “divulging unverified information” about Hamas’s conduct “risks escalating tensions.”

Ehen Emmanuel Macron called October 7th the century’s greatest antisemitic massacre, she corrected him openly. The victims, she said, were not killed for their Judaism but “in reaction to Israel’s oppression,” a formulation the French government found antisemitic enough to protest.

The U.S. State Department sanctioned her over her advocacy role in pressure campaigns targeting American and Israeli citizens.

A rapporteur who called the United States a country subjugated by a Jewish lobby wrote the report which gave the entire genocide hysteria its name.

Amnesty’s report produced the strangest internal event on any account. According to accounts from Amnesty staff at the time, the project carried the word genocide as its working title from early in the research, months before the investigation was complete. One staffer described the resulting pressure with an unusual and shocking candor: “from the outset, the report was referred to in internal correspondence as the 'genocide report,' even when the research was still in its initial stages...Imagine how difficult it is for a researcher to work for months on a report titled 'genocide report' and then to have to conclude that it is 'only' about crimes against humanity.”

A document named for its answer before the evidence is gathered is a title looking to be justified, not a finding. Amnesty’s Israeli section broke ranks and rejected the finding, maintaining that Israeli conduct may have amounted to crimes against humanity, but not genocide. They were suspended for two years for saying so. The section’s board had already split, half for too little attention to Palestinians, and half for too little to Israelis.

The researchers closest to the country said the conclusion did not hold and were disciplined rather than heard. A report by advocacy group EiGHT adds that an Amnesty staff member praised the Hamas commander Yahya Sinwar online as “Legend!!”

Amnesty has responded to the wider antisemitism findings the report describes, but not to that post specifically. There are numerous examples the report gives of Amnesty staff either experiencing antisemitism in the workplace or feeling pressured to conform to an antizionist perspective. “The genocide report” is only one example of the Procrustean bias through which Amnesty must conform its materials.

Human Rights Watch’s founder made an analogous complaint about his organization. Robert Bernstein said the organization had strayed from its founding mission into a pattern of reporting that was “helping those who wish to turn Israel into a pariah state.” The man who built the tent of Human Rights Watch said this 12 years before the organization’s apartheid report and described the trajectory the report would confirm.

Danielle Haas, the senior editor, made an almost identical case in 2023. Years of politicization of the Israel-Palestine work, she wrote, had “frequently violated basic editorial standards related to rigor, balance, and collegiality.” Of the 2021 report specifically, she wrote that its careful legal argument would rarely be read in full, and the organization knew as much when it published it. It was, in her words, “a one-word gift to those who want to categorize Israel with as little nuance as possible.”

The International Association of Genocide Scholars deserves its own part because the vote behind the 2025 resolution is worse than any headline could ever suggest. Of a roster of 500 members, only 129 cast their ballots. 86% of those who voted were in favor, but barely a 25% of the membership as a whole, conducted over a listserv and not a meeting. Sarah Brown of the advisory board said that no real discussion was allowed, dissenting comments were removed from the thread, and a promised town hall was never held.

More than 500 scholars of genocide, Holocaust history, and international law signed an open letter warning that diluting the legal definition of genocide for ideological purposes “is a form of moral violence.”

South Africa brought the case that anchors this entire wave, and its history deserves a mention. For instance, the ruling African National Congress has hosted Hamas delegations repeatedly, most recently in 2023, where the ANC’s international relations chair described meeting Hamas leaders as “an advantage for us.”

Separately, in 2015, South Africa’s High Court ordered the government to prevent Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir from leaving the country while an ICC warrant for his arrest, three counts of genocide among them, remained outstanding. The government let him fly out anyway, a decision its Supreme Court found unlawful and the ICC found in breach of South Africa’s treaty obligations.

What needs no speculation is the ANC’s conduct. The Zondo Commission final reports documented systemic bribery and state capture, reaching senior ANC-linked officials across Eskom, Transnet, and the tax authority.

The ANC’s deputy secretary general, Jessie Duarte, compared Israel’s conduct to Nazi Germany, asking whether “lest we forget” has “lost its meaning” for the Israeli people. A comparison South African Jewish organizations called obscene.

Turkey filed to intervene, while its official policy maintains that the Armenian genocide of 1915 is a matter of historical dispute, not to mention its military’s continuous operations against Kurdish populations that rights organizations have documented for decades. Nicaragua severed relationships with Israel, calling it an enemy of humanity, and was also the subject of a UN determination that its civilians are suffering crimes against humanity under the Ortega-Murillo government.

Syria’s government accused Israel of genocide on the floor of the UN Assembly, while the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has attributed repeated chemical attacks on Syrian civilians, and the UN Commission of Inquiry found its detention system amounted to extermination and a crime against humanity.

A list of governments this compromised does not corroborate a claim.

To be clear, this is a list of governments that are criminal. When the loudest and most legally consequential accusers are governments whose own conduct has found genocide, extermination, and crimes against humanity from the same UN system, their moral authority is not equivalent to the volumes of signatures they receive.

Nearly all of this in the UN rests on the authority of a single order from The Hague, one that’s routinely misreported. The ICJ’s provisional measures state in paragraph 30 that the court was “not required to ascertain whether any violations of Israel’s obligations under the Genocide Convention have occurred,” and finds that “at least some of the rights claimed by South Africa are plausible.” Rights, not violations.

Joan Donoghue, who presided over the court, corrected the record herself in a BBC interview: “It did not decide the claim that genocide was plausible. The shorthand that often appears that there is a plausible case of genocide is not what the court decided.” Marko Milanovic wrote that, absent any extraordinary new evidence, it would be “highly unlikely for a majority of the court to infer genocidal intent on the merits of this case.”

The strongest objection to everything I have mentioned above is that just because the accusers are of disrepute does not mean their accusations are false. While this is true, it’s important to note that these states have not conducted independent factual investigations.

Their filings address treaty interpretation and draw on the same base that I’ve spent this whole time examining: the same commission, the same NGOs, the same rapporteur reports. A democracy, even a healthy democracy, that adopts a false record without testing it, has not done its part for truth.

The case grows weaker the closer one gets to its makers. Resolution 3379 was revoked. The Falk-Tilley paper was pulled. Goldstone later rejected the claim that Israel deliberately targeted civilians as policy. Amnesty’s Israeli branch rejected its genocide finding. Human Rights Watch’s founder accused the group of helping make Israel a pariah; a senior editor later described politicization and failures of rigor. The International Association of Genocide Scholars spoke with the prestige of a field after little more than a fifth of its members voted for the resolution.

Meanwhile, UN officials, NGOs, states, scholars, and journalists repeatedly cite one another until it looks like corroboration.

That is the larger history of more than forty claims, zero findings of guilt, and the same set of people set against the state. Revocations, withdrawals, shared personnel, inherited language, coordinated voting, internal dissent, and circular sourcing now tell us as more about those who brought them then they ever tell us about Israel.

Repetition cannot substitute for proof forever. The next paper will carry a new date, perhaps some other author, but not a different history. It will have over forty attempts behind it. But now, that weight belongs to others.

*Paid subscribers will receive my Bayesian Argument on the improbability that Israel is committing genocide or apartheid.


“Kile’s ‘The Inverted World,’ along with his research and writing, is invaluable in the fight against antizionism. As a non-Jewish and non-religious person who stands for Israel, he has a unique and powerful perspective. I recommend this Substack to anyone interested in passionate scholarship that fights against Jew-hatred.”

—Andrew Pessin, Institute for the Critical Study of Antizionism

 

 

 What If Spent Nuclear Fuel Were Viewed Not Primarily As Waste But As A Valuable Energy Resource?

Ronald Stein Olivia Vaughan Steve Curtis 

 


 

The recent shift in the national conversation around nuclear-generated electricity is encouraging. After decades of political hesitation, federal and state leaders are once again speaking positively about nuclear power’s role in delivering reliable, abundant electricity. That change in tone matters.

However, favorable rhetoric alone will not solve one of the industry’s most persistent challenges: what to do with America’s growing inventory of spent nuclear fuel. That “spent” is also referred to as “slightly used nuclear fuel” (SUNF), which still contains about 95% of its unused potential energy after years inside a reactor

The Department of Energy’s Nuclear Lifecycle Innovation Campus initiative is a case in point. The program has generated headlines by identifying five states as potential partners in exploring integrated nuclear fuel cycle facilities. 

Yet, the reality is more modest than many observers assume. Although the states have signed non-binding memorandums of understanding to continue discussions, they have not committed to accepting spent nuclear fuel, nor have final host agreements been executed.

That distinction is important because public discussion sometimes creates the impression that a solution to the nation’s nuclear waste dilemma is just around the corner. In reality, the United States remains a long way from establishing a permanent or consolidated system for managing spent fuel.

Decades after Congress assigned the federal government responsibility for disposing of commercial spent nuclear fuel, most of that material remains stored at reactor sites around the country. The Government Accountability Office has repeatedly described the nation’s waste management program as being at an impasse and has called for congressional action to move the process forward.

The Limits of a Government-Only Strategy: Federal efforts in recent years have focused heavily on “consent-based siting,” a process intended to identify willing host communitiesfor spent fuel storage facilities. DOE describes this approach as a collaborative, community-centered process that may ultimately lead to negotiated agreements for interim storage facilities.

Consent-based siting is an improvement over past approaches that attempted to impose solutions from Washington. Communities deserve a meaningful voice in decisions that affect their future.

But the challenge is that process alone is not a solution, as evidenced by the fact that no state has “consented to accept” spent nuclear fuel, either as a permanent solution or an interim solution.

Too often, public policy substitutes studies, committees, consultations, and funding announcements for measurable progress. Government can facilitate discussions and establish regulatory frameworks, but it cannot create effective economic incentives necessary to transform spent nuclear fuel from a liability into a valuable resource.

As long as success is measured by meetings held, grants distributed, and reports published, there is little incentive to deliver a commercially sustainable outcome.

Turning a Liability into an Asset: A different approach begins with a simple question: What if spent nuclear fuel were viewed not primarily as waste, but as a valuable energy resource?

Many advanced nuclear technologies, particularly fast reactors, are designed to utilize materials that remain in used nuclear fuel. Supporters of fuel recycling argue that a significant portion of the energy potential contained in spent fuel remains available for future use. In that view, the challenge is not merely disposal but resource recovery.

This is where private enterprise can make the difference because there is huge commercial opportunity in turning spent nuclear fuel into electricity.

Rather than relying indefinitely on federal appropriations and political cycles, policymakers should consider creating conditions that allow private industry to assume greater responsibility for managing and recycling spent fuel. The federal government would still play an essential role by establishing clear rules, enhancing safety, and honoring existing commitments. But innovation, investment, and execution should increasingly come from the private sector.

A Proposal for Partnership: One model would be to use resources already accumulated through the Nuclear Waste Fund and related federal commitments to facilitate the transfer of spent fuel management responsibilities into a commercially driven framework. At the same time, one or more states would need to voluntarily agree to host facilities capable of receiving, processing, recycling, or otherwise managing used nuclear fuel.

Such an arrangement would not simply spend public money. It would seek to leverage public resources to catalyze private investment, job creation, technological development, and long-term industrial growth.

The DOE has promoted Nuclear Lifecycle Innovation Campuses as hubs that could eventually support fuel fabrication, enrichment, recycling of used fuel, and waste management functions. If structured properly, such campuses could become engines of private-sector innovation rather than primarily government-directed programs.

The economic potential could be substantial. DOE has stated that innovation campuses could attract significant private investment and create large numbers of high-paying jobs in host regions.

From Subsidy to Incentive: There is an old saying: give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day; teach him to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime.

The same principle applies here.

Simply distributing government funding without creating strong incentives for performance risks perpetuating the cycle of study, delay, and dependency. By contrast, jump-starting companies to enter the business of successfully recycling, processing, and utilizing spent nuclear fuel aligns economic incentives with public objectives.

When private investors have capital at risk, delays become costly, innovation becomes valuable, efficiency becomes essential, and results become measurable.

That does not mean government disappears from the process. On the contrary, government remains responsible for enhancing public safety, environmental oversight, and policy certainty. But government should create the conditions for success rather than attempting to manage every aspect of implementation.

A Historic Opportunity: The United States may be entering a unique moment, as public attitudes toward nuclear energy have become more favorable, concerns about energy security are increasing, and advanced reactor technologies continue to gain attention.

Federal leaders deserve credit for recognizing the strategic importance of nuclear power and for reopening discussions about the back end of the fuel cycle.

The next step, however, is to move beyond discussion.

America’s spent nuclear fuel challenge will not be solved by rhetoric, grants, or endless study alone. It will be solved when states voluntarily participate, when private industry sees opportunity rather than liability, and when policymakers create incentives that reward actual progress.

The choice is simple. America can continue talking about the problem or build a system that finally solves it. The most promising path forward is one in which government enables, private enterprise leads, and the nation transforms a long-standing burden into a lasting economic opportunity to provide affordable and abundant electricity to its citizens and to the world.

Ronald Stein, P.E. is an engineer, energy consultant, speaker, author of books and articles on energy, environmental policy, and human rights, and Founder of PTS Advance, a California-based company.

Olivia Vaughan holds a Bachelor of Commerce in Law and a MBA and operates across key sectors in the circular economy with focus on sustainable systems and the built environment. She lives in the Eastern Cape of South Africa.

Steve Curtis has a Master’s degree in Health Physics from UNLV. He has spent decades studying spent fuel issues in Nevada and worked as a technical field team leader for nuclear search and characterization missions for the Department of Energy. He is currently engaged in education, speaking, and writing in favor of nuclear power returning to the United States, especially from recycling spent nuclear fuel in fast reactors.

 

 

 

Monday, September 14, 2026

 Why Energy is Fundamental to Material Progress

How Energy Surplus Scalability and Fossil Fuels shaped the Path from Poverty to Progress 

Michael Magoon 

 


 

Material progress depends on more than ideas and institutions. It requires enough scalable energy to support specialization, growth, and innovation. 

For most of human history, people lived close to the edge of survival because they could command only small amounts of useful energy. They had intelligence, skills, institutions, and technologies, but every one of those depended upon the physical ability to:

  • move matter,

  • produce heat, and

  • perform work.

Material progress is therefore impossible to understand without energy.

At the most basic level, energy is a necessary factor that allows humans to change their environment. We use it to grow and cook food, heat homes, move people and goods, shape wood and metal, pump water, manufacture products, construct buildings, and power machines.

Every material improvement requires some combination of:

  1. energy,

  2. technologies,

  3. skills, and

  4. social organization.

Technology determines what humans can do with energy. A river contains enormous energy, but without waterwheels, dams, gears, and mechanical skills, most of that energy simply flows downstream. Coal contains concentrated chemical energy, but without mines, furnaces, transportation networks, and later steam engines, it remains largely useless underground.

This means that technological progress and energy use reinforce one another. Better technologies allow humans to capture and control more energy. More abundant energy then allows those technologies to operate on a larger scale and makes entirely new technologies economically possible.

The quantity and type of energy available also places limits on how complex a society can become. A society must first devote enough energy to:

  • feeding its population,

  • maintaining shelter,

  • transporting necessities, and

  • reproducing itself.

Only after those needs are met can increasing amounts of energy be devoted to manufacturing, transportation, infrastructure, education, science, and other activities that support sustained material progress.

For most societies in human history, that energy surplus remained small. Their energy came overwhelmingly from food, animal fodder, wood, wind, and flowing water. These sources could support civilizations of remarkable sophistication, but each pre-industrial energy source faced severe geographical constraints and could only be expanded so far.

That is why energy deserves a central place in any theory of material progress.

Energy and Complex Societies

As Vaclav Smil has pointed out in his very impressive works on the subject, energy is critical to survival and innovation. The most important type of energy for animals is food. Food is essentially a form of energy that animals can consume to convert into useful energy to perform a behavior. The energy acquired from food is then devoted to behaviors that promote survival and reproduction.

Ongoing consumption of energy enables biological organisms to overcome the Second Law of Thermodynamics; they effectively create order from chaos (thus reversing what scientists call “entropy”). As soon as a biological organism loses the ability to consume energy and transform it to a useful form, it dies. The order of life is transformed back into the chaos of the rest of the universe.

For biological organisms, the ultimate source of energy is the sun. The sun fuses hydrogen into helium and releases huge amounts of solar energy. A small portion of that solar energy reaches Earth. Plants use the process of photosynthesis to consume that energy, then combine it with carbon dioxide and water to create sugars. Sugar enables plants to survive, grow and reproduce. Herbivores consume plants and use the energy to survive, grow and reproduce. Carnivores in turn consume the herbivores to fuel their survival and reproduction.

Human societies also rely on large amounts of energy to survive and reproduce. Just as with other biological organisms, the ultimate source of that energy is the sun. Energy in the form of food is the most important; without food, survival and reproduction are impossible. As we will later see, the quest to produce, prepare and consume food has been the dominant struggle in human history.

But humans have been able to innovate technologies that have enabled them to use other forms of energy: animal power, power from burning wood, windpower and waterpower. These additional energy sources have enabled humans to use far greater amounts of energy than any other species. Humans have used this additional energy to create far more complex technologies than would otherwise have been possible. In doing so, they have been able to solve problems far beyond the scope of any other animal.

The greater the technological base of a society, the larger the amounts of energy that the society needs to consume. As a society innovates new technologies, it sometimes identifies more efficient energy sources that can then be combined with natural materials to make useful technologies. These new energy sources effectively increase the rate of innovation.

Historically, by far the most important non-food energy source over the last two centuries has been fossil fuels. Fossil fuels have the critical advantage of being far denser (i.e. they have far more energy per unit of mass) than other energy sources used by humans. Energy density is critical to progress, as each additional unit of energy enables humans to innovate more specialized and complex technologies, skills, and social organizations.

Energy functions

For our purposes, energy performs four especially important functions:

  • mechanical work

  • transportation

  • domestic heat of buildings

  • industrial heat

Pre-industrial societies had access to several important energy sources, but every one of them faced severe geographical constraints

Pre-industrial Energy Sources

Energy comes from different sources. Each energy source is highly constrained by geography. None are anywhere near close to evenly distributed across the Earth and even less so across the Universe.

Each energy source have different physical characteristics and densities. The latter is extremely important to its usefulness for human societies. In general, human societies have evolved from less dense energy sources to more dense energy sources.

Food

We do not often think of food as an energy source, but it is. Food is an energy source that is digestible to humans. Because all animals need energy in the form of food to survive, it is the single most vital form of energy. A local region might have plenty of energy, but if it had low levels of this specific kind of energy, complex societies were impossible.

Food provided energy for human muscle. Humans have invented a vast number of subsistence technologies to exploit this energy source. Grain agriculture, livestock raising, crop rotation, irrigation, plows, harvesting tools, storage systems, roads, and markets all helped societies capture more food energy from the land and distribute it more efficiently.

Dry cereal grains contain roughly 15 to 19 megajoules of gross energy per kilogram, making them relatively concentrated biological energy sources. But the total supply was constrained by climate, soils, rainfall, growing seasons, available farmland, and agricultural technology.

Fodder

Fodder is an energy source that is digestible to working domesticated animals.

Fodder converted plant energy into animal muscle. Horses and oxen could plow fields, pull wagons, turn machinery, and move goods much more effectively than humans alone.

Humans have invented a vast number of subsistence technologies to transform fodder into useful work. Better harnesses, horseshoes, breeding, haymaking, crop rotations, stables, and improved roads increased their usefulness.

Fodder is significantly less energy dense than human food: 6–11 MJ/kg. The exact amount depends on the type Straw is near 6–7 MJ/kg metabolizable energy; higher-quality oat forage can exceed 10 MJ/kg.

But animal power carried a major hidden cost. Just like humans, working animals had to be fed. More horses meant more pasture, hay, oats, and other crops, which meant devoting more land to producing animal energy rather than food for humans.

Wood

Wood supplied most pre-industrial heat. Humans gradually invented energy technologies to harness the energy created from combusting wood. Wood heated homes, cooked food, brewed beer, fired bricks, boiled salt, and supported many industrial processes. Charcoal made from wood could reach higher temperatures and became especially important for metalworking.

  • Air-dried wood typically contains roughly 13 to 16 megajoules per kilogram (Moisture matters enormously. Wetter wood delivers substantially less usable heat.)

  • Charcoal can exceed 30 megajoules per kilogram. This makes charcoal significantly more energy dense than wood, but a substantial wood energy is lost in producing the charcoal.

The problem with wood was geography. Forests occupied land that could often be used for agriculture. Trees grew slowly. Nearby forests could be cut faster than they regenerated, forcing consumers to reach farther outward for additional fuel.

Because wood was bulky relative to the amount of energy it contained, moving it long distances over primitive roads quickly became expensive. Charcoal was lighter and more energy dense, but producing it consumed substantial quantities of wood.

Waterpower

Waterpower converted the movement of rivers into mechanical work. The key energy technology related to water energy was the watermill

Watermills ground grain, fulled cloth, sawed timber, pumped water, and powered other machinery. Medieval and early modern societies developed increasingly sophisticated waterwheels, millraces, dams, sluices, gears, and transmission systems.

There is no definitive energy density for water, as it varies greatly. Waterpower is better measured from water flow × vertical drop.

Waterpower had one overwhelming limitation. The energy could not be moved. A useful mill required a suitable combination of flowing water and vertical drop, and output varied with local conditions and seasons. Factories therefore had to move to the power source rather than bringing the power source to the factory.

Windpower

Wind had similar strengths and weaknesses. The two key energy technologies related to wind energy were windmills and sailing ships.

Windmills could grind grain, drain land, saw wood, and perform other mechanical tasks. Sailing ships were even more important because they transformed wind into long-distance transport without consuming food, wood, or fossil fuel. Better hulls, sails, rigging, navigation, cartography, ports, and shipbuilding skills allowed Commercial societies to capture vastly more value from wind.

There is no definitive energy density for wind, as it varies greatly. Waterpower is better measured from as watts per square meter of swept area; power rises approximately with the cube of wind speed.

But wind was intermittent and geographically uneven. Its energy density depends strongly on wind speed, and the available power rises roughly with the cube of that speed. A windy coastline could therefore offer far more useful energy than a sheltered inland region. Wind could move a ship across an ocean, but it could not reliably produce intense industrial heat.

Peat

Peat (think “baby coal”) is a less common energy source that you may not be familiar with. Formed from centuries of decayed vegetation in wetlands, peat could be cut, dried, and burned like wood. The Dutch made especially heavy use of peat for household heating and industrial processes, which helped them support a highly urbanized Commercial society despite limited forests.

Once cut and dried, peat provides 15 to 20 megajoules per kilogram, depending heavily on moisture content and quality. 

Peat, however, was also tightly constrained by geography. Large deposits existed only in certain wetlands, and extraction required drainage, digging, drying, and transport. Wet peat was bulky and expensive to move, so its usefulness fell rapidly with distance from the bog.

Peat also accumulated far too slowly to be renewable on economically meaningful historical timescales. It therefore behaved more like a geographically concentrated stock of stored energy than a renewable fuel.

Coal

Coal was the first industrial energy source. Coal was later followed by oil, natural gas, hydroelectric, and nuclear power. The electrical grid also played a key role in distributed the energy created by those generators. The energy sources enable a vast number of new technologies to be developed over the last 200 years.

Coal was fundamentally different than all the previous energy sources. Like wood, it could be stored, transported, and burned when needed. But coal contained much more energy per unit of land because its energy had accumulated underground over geological time rather than having to be regenerated through annual photosynthesis. Its use was therefore not directly limited by the amount of farmland or forest that a society could maintain.

Coal still had its own geographical constraints. Useful seams had to exist in the right places. They had to be thick enough, shallow enough, dry enough, and accessible enough to mine with available technology.

Coal has an energy density of 25–35 MJ/kg, but it strongly depends on coal grade. Hard coal is around 29 MJ/kg and anthracite can exceed 30 MJ/kg.

Note that coal is not actually that coal has dramatically more energy per kilogram than charcoal. The advantage of coal is that it does not require annual biological regrowth or vast forests. Britain could increase coal production by digging more coal, while increasing charcoal production required devoting more land and decades of tree growth to fuel production.

Humans gradually innovated key energy technologies to fully exploit the energy containing within coal. Miners needed tools, pumps, drainage systems, ventilation, carts, roads, canals, rivers, or ports to move coal from the seam to consumers. A huge coal deposit that could not be reached or transported economically was of little practical value.

At first, coal mainly supplied heat. It could warm homes and provide energy for brewing, brickmaking, salt production, glassmaking, metalworking, and many other industrial processes. Its greatest long-term importance came when a sequence of technologies made it possible to convert coal into mechanical work: the steam engine and later the locomotive.

Steam engines were the most efficient means for doing so. Early engines combined coal with boilers, cylinders, pumps, metalworking skills, and increasingly precise manufacturing. Steam power eventually allowed stored chemical energy to be converted into mechanical work wherever sufficient fuel and water could be delivered. By the nineteenth century, steam increasingly freed factories and transportation from dependence on human muscle, animal muscle, favorable winds, or particular river sites.

This gives us a useful way to think about the geography of energy before the Industrial Revolution.

  • Biological energy (food and fodder) was land-constrained.

  • Water and wind were site-constrained.

  • Peat was bog-constrained.

  • Coal was deposit-constrained.

  • Steam and the locomotive increasingly made mechanical power (particularly in the form of coal) transportable.

The fundamental problem facing every pre-industrial society was therefore not simply that it lacked energy. Pre-industrial societies lacked large quantities of energy that could be controlled, concentrated, transported, and applied to many different purposes.

Energy Surplus

The most important measure of a society’s energy system is not simply how much energy it consumes. What matters even more is how much useful energy remains after meeting the basic requirements of survival and reproduction.

Every society must first devote large amounts of energy to feeding its population, maintaining shelter, transporting necessities, and reproducing itself. In poor societies, these needs absorb almost all of the available energy, leaving only a small surplus for everything else (and typically elites control that surplus).

A larger energy surplus changes what a society can support. Fewer people need to spend their lives producing food and other necessities, while more people can specialize as craftsmen, merchants, builders, sailors, engineers, administrators, teachers, scientists, and inventors.

This specialization matters because material progress depends upon solving increasingly complex problems. A society in which nearly everyone must focus on immediate survival has limited capacity to accumulate specialized skills, experiment with new technologies, or build complex organizations.

By contrast, a society with a large energy surplus can support a much wider division of labor. A large energy surplus enables:

  • people to become more specialized,

  • which raises productivity,

  • creates new technologies, and

  • supports more complex institutions.

Those improvements can then generate even larger energy surpluses, creating a reinforcing cycle of material progress.

Cities are one of the clearest examples. Urban populations produce little of their own food. They survive only because agricultural regions generate enough surplus food energy to feed large numbers of people who are doing something else. Once that surplus becomes reliable, cities can support dense concentrations of merchants, artisans, engineers, financiers, and other specialists.

The same principle applies beyond food. A society with abundant energy for heat, transportation, and mechanical work can devote more resources to manufacturing, infrastructure, trade, and experimentation.

Energy that would otherwise have been consumed merely maintaining existing living standards can instead be used to expand production and solve new problems. This helps explain why increases in energy availability can have effects far beyond the industries that directly consume the energy.

An energy surplus does not guarantee material progress. A society can waste that surplus, or elites can capture it for themselves. But without a substantial and growing surplus of useful energy, sustained material progress becomes impossible.

Scalability and Marginal Cost

Energy sources differ not only in how much energy they contain, but also in how easily their production can be expanded. This distinction is critical to material progress. A society may have enough energy to support its existing population and economy, yet still face severe difficulties when it tries to increase production. The key question is not simply whether more energy exists, but how costly it becomes to obtain each additional unit.

Pre-industrial energy sources usually became more expensive as societies tried to expand them.

  • The best farmland was cultivated first, so producing more food often meant bringing less fertile land into production.

  • The most accessible forests were cut first, forcing woodcutters to travel farther from consumers.

  • The best watermill sites were occupied first, so additional mills had to use less favorable rivers or require more expensive engineering.

  • Peat extraction faced similar problems as easily accessible bogs were depleted or producers moved farther from transportation routes.

Economists describe this as rising marginal cost. The marginal cost is simply the additional cost of producing one more unit of something. When the easiest sources are exploited first, later production usually requires more land, more labor, more capital, longer transportation, or more complicated technology. A society might therefore become wealthier, more urban, and more technologically sophisticated while simultaneously making its next unit of energy more expensive to obtain.

That created a powerful constraint on pre-industrial growth. Increasing production raised demand for food, heating fuel, transportation, and mechanical power. Meeting that demand from traditional energy sources pushed societies toward progressively less favorable land, forests, rivers, bogs, and transportation routes. Growth itself could therefore make further growth more difficult.

Coal changed this relationship. Coal mining also faced rising costs as mines became deeper, wetter, or farther from markets, but large coal deposits contained enormous quantities of stored energy in relatively concentrated areas. Production could therefore expand dramatically without requiring a proportional expansion of farmland, forests, or favorable river sites.

This gave coal an important advantage beyond its energy density: coal was unusually scalable. A society could dig more mines, deepen existing mines, improve drainage, expand transportation networks, and increase output by orders of magnitude. The costs certainly rose, but the physical resource base was large enough to support a scale of energy consumption that biological and site-specific energy sources could rarely match.

This distinction between availability and scalability is essential. Many pre-industrial societies possessed substantial energy resources. Far fewer possessed an energy source that could expand rapidly enough, and cheaply enough, to support sustained increases in population, urbanization, manufacturing, transportation, and mechanical power.

Material progress therefore depends not only on having energy, but on having energy sources that can scale as society itself scales.

 


 

  

Energy and The Five Keys to Progress

I believe that energy in the form of coal played an essential role in the British Industrial Revolution. That economic transformation:

  • Dramatically escalated pre-existing material progress

  • Invented new technologies that exploited fossil fuels, enabling a large number of other nations to break the geographical constraints that had trapped them in widespread poverty for millenia.

  • Shifted the balance of global power from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes.

To be clear, coal was only one of the five key causes of the British Industrial Revolution. I want to briefly go over the others here.

To transition from poverty to progress, a society needs to acquire the following preconditions:

  1. A highly efficient food production and distribution system. This enables societies to overcome geographical constraints to food production so that large numbers of people can focus on solving problems other than getting enough food to eat.

  2. Trade-based cities packed with a large number of free citizens possessing a wide variety of skills. These people innovate new technologies, skills, and social organizations and copy the innovations made by others.

  3. Decentralized political, economic, religious, and ideological power. It is of particular importance that elites are forced into transparent, non-violent competition that undermines their ability to forcibly extract wealth from the masses. This also allows citizens to freely choose among institutions based upon how much they have to offer to each individual and society in general.

  4. At least one high-value-added industry that exports to the rest of the world. This injects wealth into the city or region, accelerates economic growth and creates markets for smaller local industries and services.

  5. Widespread use of fossil fuels. The incredible energy density of fossil fuels injects vast amounts of useful energy into society enabling it to solve a wide variety of problems. Without this energy, life would return to the daily struggle for survival that dominated most of human history.

Note that the First and the Fifth Key to Progress is about energy. The First Key to Progress is about generating a surplus of food energy. The Fifth Key to Progress is about generating vast amounts of controllable and scalable energy: fossil fuels.

The other three Keys to Progress are more indirectly related to energy. Cities cannot possibly survive without energy. First they need food, which their own population cannot grow more than a small percent of the calories necessary to survive. That is why the First Key to Progress is so essential. A food surplus make trade-based cities to grow. Most large cities in pre-industrial cities were political capitals that acquired their wealth from expropriating the food surplus from the farmers and military conquest.

The Fourth Key to Progress is also not possible without vast amounts of surplus energy. Of course, the amount and type of energy required varies greatly by industry, but energy in the form of water, wind, peat, fossil fuels, or electricity is essential to high-value-added industry. Indeed, the higher the value added, the more likely that it is energy intensive.

The Third Key to Progress is about ensuring that elites cannot cooperate to expropriate the food and energy surplus in society for themselves. Transparent, non-violent competition forces elites to focus on producing results that benefit society rather than hoarding a limited amount of wealth for themselves.

So the Five Keys to Progress is essentially about:

  1. Energy production, and particularly the degree to which a society creates surplus energy beyond basic survival

  2. Ensuring that surplus energy :

    1. is not hoarded by elites

    2. and is instead devoted to activities that produce wealth for the masses.

Commercial Societies = Gateway into modern material progress

A society type that played a critical role in laying the foundations of modern material progress was Commercial societies. I believe that a few Commercial societies in Northwest Europe gradually evolved the first four Keys to Progress. In other words, they invented surplus food and energy and ensured that it was devoted to activities that produce wealth for the masses.

This enabled them to invent the trend of long-term trend of material progress, but that trend was highly restricted to a scattering of geographical areas:

Famous examples of Commercial societies include the:

Because all four of those societies were inherently dynamic and innovative, they gradually evolved the key enabling technologies that made the Industrial Revolution possible somewhere. The enabling package would include at least:

  • sailing ships and oceanic navigation

  • ports, canals, roads, and coastal shipping

  • mining and drainage techniques

  • ironworking and metal tools

  • mills, gears, pumps, and other mechanical technologies

  • banking and credit

  • stock markets and joint-stock companies

  • insurance

  • accounting and commercial law

  • skilled artisans, engineers, and mechanics

  • dense cities and specialized labor markets

  • printing and mechanisms for spreading technical knowledge

  • international trade networks and large markets

This matters theoretically because none of these by itself produces an Industrial Revolution. Coal in an Agrarian society is not enough; nor is a sophisticated Commercial society necessarily enough without a scalable mineral-energy source.

So very briefly stated, I believe that:

Commercial society + favorable coal geography + accumulated enabling technologies = Industrial Revolution

Coal is the critical energy source because other fossil fuels (oil and gas) are extremely difficult to detect, extract and distribute using pre-industrial technologies. So coal is the “gateway energy source” of the Industrial Revolution, and there was likely no substitute (although we will explore possibilities in this article).

Energy and the British Industrial Revolution

Virtually all economic historians agree that energy, particularly energy in the form of coal, played an important role in the British Industrial Revolution. But just how vital was coal to this economic transformation?

  • Was coal a necessary precondition?

  • Was coal only necessary precondition, or at least the most important?

  • Or was coal secondary to other causes.

In my next article in this series, I will explore a counter-factual:

What if Britain had no domestic coal? Would Britain still have industrialized? Would it still have been the first nation to industrialize?

Stay tuned to find out.