Sunday, August 2, 2026

 The Big Picture of the US-Iran War

A Block-Based World and the Permanent Hormuz Crisis
WeissWord 
 

America’s global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its power on the Eurasian continent is sustained.” — Zbigniew Brzezinski

Since the outbreak of the US-Iran war, I have analyzed various angles of the conflict in separate posts. However, with new subscribers joining the fold, it is time to connect the dots into one cohesive picture. In this post, I will deconstruct the complexity of this situation as much as the platform allows.

For the United States, Iran is just a single piece of a global puzzle, not the core focus of White House foreign policy. Despite the natural information asymmetry regarding deliberations inside the White House, the Pentagon, and other US agencies, public actions and long-term trends reveal a clear trajectory—one that transcends whoever happens to sit in the Oval Office.

The Chokepoint Gambit: Shutting Down Hormuz

Most global trade moves by water—arguably humanity’s greatest innovation, far outstripping space travel. Consequently, nations always vie for maritime dominance, specifically over naval chokepoints, much like the Roman or Ottoman empires fought over terrestrial bottlenecks. The core principles of geography haven’t changed; the Earth remains the same.

Global maritime trade is massive. Moving goods across thousands of miles carries region-specific risks, requiring large institutions—predominantly European—to insure these cargoes, ships, and crews to the tune of billions of dollars. European insurance entities, chiefly the Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs concentrated in London and Europe (under the umbrella of the International Group of P&I Clubs), wield immense power over global shipping. These clubs insure roughly 90% of global maritime trade against third-party liabilities, pollution, and war risks, relying heavily on intelligence from European security agencies. With the nexus of insurance power anchored in London, MI6 and Lloyd’s are effectively within walking distance.

The US shares its most sensitive intelligence first and foremost with the “Five Eyes” (FVEY) alliance—the world’s closest, oldest, and deepest intelligence partnership, rooted in the WWII-era UKUSA Agreement (comprising the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). Yet, on the eve of the initial strike on February 28, 2026, the US and Israel decided to act on hyper-targeted information—mostly derived from Israeli intelligence—without sharing the timing or scope of the operation with the UK. Official sources in London later confirmed that Britain was caught entirely off guard.

This operational compartmentalization stemmed primarily from Washington’s fear that Prime Minister Keir Starmer might attempt to throw a wrench in the gears or refuse to authorize the use of British bases, such as Diego Garcia or RAF stations in Cyprus and the UK, due to legal and diplomatic constraints. The lack of early warning triggered absolute panic in London.

Within 48 hours of the war’s outbreak, war risk insurance premiums in the Strait of Hormuz skyrocketed four- to six-fold. Lacking American intelligence on subsequent target sets or Iranian capabilities against civilian shipping, underwriters concluded the risk was unquantifiable. By March 5, 2026, leading P&I clubs began announcing blanket cancellations of insurance coverage for any vessel attempting to transit the strait.

No shipping company or tanker owner was willing to risk hundreds of millions of dollars in cargo without liability coverage. Tanker traffic plummeted to near zero, sparking the historic surge in oil and gas prices through March and April. The takeaway? It wasn’t the Iranians who shut down Hormuz; it was the Americans.

Redrawing the Global Energy Map

As surging energy prices dominated headlines and social media, narratives flooded the media claiming the Iranians were closing Hormuz. While the source of these reports remains murky, their intent was clear: pin the blame on Tehran and mobilize global pressure against it. In reality, Iran had zero incentive to close Hormuz. Doing so directly strangles its own exports, decimates its revenues, and alienates its key trade partners like China, Pakistan, and India.

Furthermore, closing Hormuz doesn’t hurt the US. America isn’t dependent on imports transiting the strait. The spike in US consumer fuel prices happened because American energy companies chose to export fuel to highly profitable global markets at the expense of domestic consumers. There wasn’t a global shortage of crude oil, but rather a bottleneck in refined fuels, and Asian importers bore the brunt of the pain.

Amid this crunch, decision-makers in Japan, the Philippines, India, Thailand, and elsewhere scrambled to sign long-term supply contracts with American energy firms, completely reshuffling the global energy deck. Hormuz and the Persian Gulf states suddenly looked volatile and unreliable, while American imports offered a stable alternative. For the White House, a temporary spike in domestic pump prices is a cheap fee to pay for a grand strategy that permanently restructures the energy market. Besides, Washington possesses plenty of fiscal levers to blunt the domestic consumer’s pain.

This structural disruption aligns perfectly with long-term US foreign policy. Look at the historical playbook: fierce opposition to Nord Stream 1 (a European partnership split between Russia, Germany, France, and the Netherlands); opposition to Nord Stream 2 (a Russian-German venture); sanctions on Russian LNG; sanctions on the Yamal project to prevent Russia from becoming a global LNG superpower; and the sabotage of Nord Stream during the Russia-Ukraine war in September 2022. In November 2022, the White House published its National Security Strategy, explicitly stating:

“We want the most robust, productive, and innovative energy sector in the world — one that is capable of not only powering American economic growth, but also being a leading export industry for America in its own right.”

Is it pure coincidence that one of the world’s primary energy export arteries—Hormuz—is locked in a protracted, US-managed crisis, while the United States has emerged as the world’s largest energy exporter?

The Ultimate Naval Paywall

For a global superpower like the US, maintaining a massive, dominant navy is non-negotiable. It is the primary instrument through which Washington dictates global politics, commerce, and economics, allowing it to intervene anywhere on earth. Hence the endless chess match over chokepoints like the Panama Canal, Greenland, Hormuz, Malacca, and Gibraltar.

The US Navy is what gives the US Dollar its unyielding dominance in China, Russia, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Japan. It’s not the ruble or the renminbi running the world; everything trades in dollars because there is simply no alternative to the American fleet. To preserve this status, the White House actively works to dismantle the leverage held by European commercial entities.

Washington’s calculated silence when insurance policies were canceled at the onset of the conflict was deliberate. It allowed the US to step in and provide alternative insurance coverage—but only to the players it favored. The US offered select tanker owners, both domestic and allied, “Special War Risk” policies backed directly by the US Federal balance sheet. Washington effectively told London that it would not allow British insurance clerks to dictate the flow of global energy or the success of an American military campaign.

Additionally, European nations levy heavy taxes on American shipping companies operating in Europe because they don’t meet European fuel consumption standards, driving up American freight rates and favoring European shipping lines. In response, the US slaps steep tariffs on European firms that build ships in China. By destabilizing the maritime insurance architecture, the US is engineering absolute hegemony over global shipping. Washington is leveraging a physical military confrontation with Iran to dismantle centuries of European financial and industrial maritime dominance, replacing it with total American supremacy.

The Forever Crisis and the “Humanitarian Credit Card”

In May, US President Donald Trump met with Chinese President Xi Jinping, shifting the entire dynamic of the war. While the exact details of that meeting remain under wraps, it immediately catalyzed Pakistan-mediated cease-fire talks between the US and Iran, culminating in a 60-day Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

Under this agreement, Iran was forced to accept unprecedented restrictions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This included pulling IRGC fast-attack boats back from forward bases along the Hormuz coastline and strategic islands like Qeshm and Abu Musa, returning them to home ports like Bandar Abbas.

Crucially, Iran is barred from receiving cash or foreign currency like dollars or euros directly for its oil. All oil revenues—including authorized quotas to China or frozen assets like the $6 billion in Qatar—are deposited directly into escrow accounts in third-party nations, primarily Qatar and Oman, under the draconian supervision of the US Treasury. Iran cannot withdraw these funds to finance its national budget, pay IRGC salaries, or procure military hardware. The money functions strictly as a credit line for international suppliers, limited exclusively to essential humanitarian goods.

The US essentially handed Iran a humanitarian credit card. Iran can pump oil, but in return, it only gets vetted cargo ships full of wheat and medicine, while the physical cash stays safely out of the IRGC’s reach.

Predictably, this has triggered intense internal friction within the Iranian regime between pragmatists supporting the deal and hardline factions. Any frustrated IRGC operative can launch a drone or threaten a tanker to generate media noise and regional panic, driving insurance premiums back up. The American-enforced closure of Hormuz has demonstrated to tens of thousands in the region that disabling the global energy flow is remarkably easy.

However, these hardliners are shooting themselves in the foot. Asian consumer nations are rapidly realizing that viable alternatives exist in the Americas and Africa. Consequently, the long-term stability of the Persian Gulf is shattered. Without rapid economic diversification, the Arab Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and others—face a massive economic reckoning that will reverberate across the entire Arab world.

Ultimately, the Hormuz crisis suits Washington perfectly. The US holds a virtual monopoly on helium exports—critical for the global semiconductor industry—giving it immense geopolitical leverage over Asian manufacturing giants, particularly China’s chip sector. Will China try to build its own supply chain independence? Absolutely. But that takes time.

The US is playing for absolute hegemony across industry, technology, and AI, and it achieves this by seizing control of the physical foundations of the material economy. Because the American establishment—regardless of who sits in the Oval Office—views the rise of China as an existential threat to national security, its global maneuvers are engineered to secure asymmetric advantages ahead of a potential conflict. The Hormuz crisis is not an isolated flashpoint; it is a critical piece of the global puzzle in a new era where the world is fracturing into competing blocks.


 

 

 

Saturday, August 1, 2026

 Gaza, Iran, and Seeing the Whole Board

There's a lot More Going on Than you're Seeing.. Here's the Big Picture 

Rod Martin 

 


 

Yesterday, President Trump announced that Hamas has agreed to be fully disarmed and hand over the government of Gaza to a new body under Trump’s Board of Peace.

Some of you are telling me the Gaza deal can’t last. You’re not seeing the whole board.

There are two default assumptions at work here.

The first is that Islamist radicals can just spontaneously produce missiles, guns, and money from thin air. They can’t.

The second is just black pilling, which is frankly stupid. So you’re demoralized: big whoop. You’d have been more demoralized in the summer of 1940, or for that matter of 1942. And you’d have been just as wrong. Get over yourself. Look at the facts.

First, Israel beat the crap out of Hamas, one of the most bloodthirsty terrorist groups on Earth. They are as murderous with their own people as with the Israelis, and have been for decades. It is no accident that since Israel handed Gaza to the Palestinians in 2006, the Christian Arab population there has been “reduced” by 2/3. And that’s not a lot different from the West Bank Palestinians, who upon gaining control of Bethlehem “reduced” its Christian population from 80% to about 10%, or the PLO and Hezbollah in Lebanon, where the Christian population was about 54% before the Civil War and is now about 37%.

The people pretending that it’s the Jews who are killing Christians are willfully blind, and intentionally blinding you.

No matter what you think of Israel, Hamas is evil. They went too far in 2023, as they were always going to do, and Israel has defeated them. They can no longer field an effective military force. They cannot resupply. They’re done.

Can individual or small groups of militants still kill people? Sure. But there’s no longer any sanctuary, and the days of your tax money being funneled through the PA to pay for suicide bombers are long over (although if you live in Tim Walz’s Minnesota, that is not true of Somalia).

The black pill types told us nine months ago that the peace would not last a week and that Trump could never pull off the deal agreed to yesterday. Yet here we are, nine months later, and he has. “Oh, it won’t last,” you say, but you said that last October, and the peace has held. Why? Israel cut off Hamas’s ability to fight, while Trump cut off its ability to resupply. It’s that simple.

Second, the reason that’s simple is that Hamas’s three chief patrons were Iran, which now can’t get ships in or out of its own ports, along with Turkey and Qatar. Trump has reduced Qatar to a U.S. protectorate. He’s dealmaking with the Turks on F-35s and the disposition of Syria, including new oil pipelines (to be built and owned by U.S. oil companies). Turkey suddenly needs peace to achieve its own ends; Qatar simply has nowhere to go. And Hamas has no one to ship them weapons or pay their bills.

They could have made Gaza into the Riviera. Instead, they dug up the water and sewer pipes to make missiles they fired for two decades at schools. So now the Board of Peace will build what they did not.

Third, they’ll do that because no one hates Hamas as much as the Arabs. Every country the Palestinians have entered in any numbers, they’ve immediately plunged into civil war. No one wants them anywhere near anything important. Egypt’s wall along its border with Gaza makes a maximum security prison look like a sand castle. It has no such wall along its Israeli border. There’s a reason.

Trump has carefully cultivated enormous business and investment deals with every regional power. He’s gone out of his way to give them things they need and want, from the Saudi nuclear power deal to the Turks’ favorite installed in Damascus. Their interests are interlocked with ours, and tightening by the day. Everyone now profits from peace. The Palestinians are in their way.

Fourth, a massive generational shift is underway. The old timers wanted a Palestinian state, so long as it was safely contained somewhere else, and they used it to show they were “tough” against Israel when in war after war they’d been shown to be impotent. It was low cost and (moderately) higher reward for them.

Their children, exemplified by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), are sick of it. They want peace with Israel. They want to make money in Israel, and they want the Israelis to bring tech and investment to them. Even more so, they want military and intelligence cooperation, which all of them badly need. They have none of their parents’ sentimental attachment to long-dead Palestinian leaders or decades-old lost wars. And Trump is daily incentivizing them to double down.

Fifth, why? Because Trump knows three things the black pill guys do not:

  • Trump knows that prosperous countries rarely attack one another.

  • Trump knows Americans can make fortunes in the Middle East if peace is the rule rather than the exception, and that will never be achieved through a Bush-style occupation. He also knows that we can save fortunes if we don’t have to worry about the Middle East anymore.

  • Trump knows that without money, you’re done. And he knows how to cut off the cash.

Trump calls this “commerce not chaos”. It’s catching on.

No one funds Hamas now. No one funds Hezbollah now. A Lebanese peace requires a stable, functioning Lebanese government and the dismantling of Iran’s proxy army on Israel’s northern border — the one that has also occupied and terrorized Lebanon for half a century.

So Trump let Israel annihilate Hamas, which has now unconditionally surrendered. He also let it beat Hezbollah into submission. On the ground, these were the two biggest obstacles to regional peace, now each shattered.

And now we have a way to give everyone what they want in both countries: a Palestinian state under new management, military and intelligence cooperation with Israel, Israeli energy exports to Egypt and Jordan (and Syria and Lebanon soon enough), and the restoration of Lebanon as “the Paris of the Middle East,” as it was before the civil war.

Sixth, most people watching see these as disconnected issues. They aren’t. They never were. But neither is Syria, under new management and (despite its sordid past) desperate to balance Turkish, Israeli, Saudi, and U.S. power so it can have the breathing room to avoid becoming Ankara’s colony. Suddenly it has an intense interest in peace as well; just as suddenly, it is no longer an essential Russian outpost or a colony of Tehran.

And also neither is Iraq, where pro-Iranian militias have wreaked havoc for 20 years. Those days are over. Iraq’s new President is disarming the militias and arresting their leaders. The militias spent the early part of this year reinforcing the IRGC in its massacre and crackdown on the Iranian people. They’re also the final obstacle to a durable peace — and economic development, and pipeline construction, and prosperity — in Iraq itself.

Seventh, all these roads lead one place: Iran. The Islamic regime is the primary source of funding, armament, and direction for the bad guys in every armed conflict in the region: literally all of them. Tehran used all these proxies to build a de facto Persian Empire from Baghdad to Beirut and from Abadan to Aden. That’s gone now. It won’t be coming back.

Eighth, the Iran war has shown the Gulf Arab states that the Iranian regime really is a clear and present danger, not a convenient idiocracy that keeps its country from becoming a rich regional power. Months of Iranian bombardment of Arab hotels, water plants, airports, and shipping have been more persuasive than decades of American leaders. Now Saudi Arabia carries out joint attacks on Iran with the U.S.; so do Kuwait and the UAE. And with a host of currency swap lines, nuclear power deals, and direct military support, Trump is drawing all of them closer to the U.S. by the day.

Ninth, all that works because of what doesn’t. China is a nonfactor. Supposedly Iran’s ally (much like it was supposedly Russia’s “ally without limits” while it pushed Putin into his Ukrainian quagmire), China hasn’t lifted a finger. Rumors of shoulder-fired missile shipments are just that: rumors. But even if true, they’re the exception that proves the rule. China is not sending advanced fighter jets, not at any price. China is not sending troops. China is not sending its Navy. If anything, it’s sparring with the U.S. over the pending Taiwan arms sale...but only very, very gently.

No one in the Middle East is stupid enough not to understand what China calls “the Malacca Dilemma”. 80% of its oil has to flow through the Strait of Malacca. The U.S. already had de facto control of the chokepoint; it has turned that into control into a chokehold with its new defense pact with the heretofore “Non-Aligned” Indonesia. It’s also flipped India, which not only signed an “impossible” February trade deal with Trump (or so said the black pillers) but immediately began capturing illegal Russian Shadow Fleet oil tankers. 

Iran has to use that Shadow Fleet too: 90% of its oil exports are to China. But China hasn’t lifted a finger, and India doesn’t care. That was even before Trump sealed Iran’s ports tight.

Tenth, all of this has required complex negotiations with at least a dozen countries that mostly don’t like each other, and all of that takes time. If you see Trump call a cease fire to “negotiate” with Iran, don’t be dumb: he’s actually using that time to negotiate with Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and Oman, and Qatar, and Bahrain, and Kuwait, and Iraq, and Syria, and Lebanon, and Turkey, and Israel. Iran is a threat to every one of them, and in many cases has been their murderous oppressor. They’re skittish, they’re gunshy, they know their militaries are strong on paper but weak in fact, and like all people, inertia has kept them in the long status quo.

But Trump has destroyed that status quo: it is never coming back. And slowly, every country in the region is getting the point and getting on board.

How Iran finishes is almost irrelevant. Oh, you’re not going to believe our expanded target package over the next few weeks. The prospect of a successful Iranian revolution and a free Iran is very, very real. A free Iran would be the greatest investment opportunity of the 2030s, and everyone would benefit, no matter how tough change may be.

But at this point it wouldn’t matter. Iran spent trillions of its people’s money on underground complexes in which to build nuclear weapons and the ICBMs to load them on. It has literally nothing left to show for it. And every day it threatens Hormuz or the Bab al-Mandab is another day that its well-armed, wealthy neighbors become more determined that it can never be allowed to rise again. If the U.S. doesn’t finish Iran, the Arabs will.

Trump plays the part of a chaos agent. He does this to keep all his enemies off balance. He’s been telling you this on video and in print since at least 1987. If you can’t see the play, that’s on you.

But no one ever does the homework. So it keeps on working for him. He’s remaking the Middle East no matter what happens in Iran, and our grandchildren will thank him, not just for peace but for the prosperity that comes from it. What they won’t remember is your black pill foolishness, your temporary gas price inconvenience, or your inability to see the world being transformed before your eyes.

Which is good. You want your grandchildren to respect you, after all.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 The Revolution That Changed America

The Fractured World of the Global Energy Map 

Weissword 

 


 

“Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety, and variety alone.”
—Winston Churchill, British House of Commons, 1913

One man, somewhat less well known than the names that accompany us, such as Steve Jobs, Elon Musk, or Sam Altman, is responsible for the enormous transformation of the United States from an energy-importing country into one of the world’s largest exporters. His name is George Mitchell, and he persistently advanced various technologies for extracting gas from rock formations. He agreed to finance experiments for years, even when the wells did not justify the investment. Most importantly, he was not looking for the perfect well, but for an inexpensive process that could be repeated again and again. The revolution associated with his name was not the discovery of a new resource, but the discovery of a new way to produce a resource that was already known.

 


 

At the beginning of the 2000s, the United States worked vigorously to import enormous quantities of gas from Algeria, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Qatar, Oman, Australia, Malaysia, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Egypt. Vast investments were made in infrastructure intended to connect it to gas suppliers in the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East. American gas became more expensive in the early 2000s, conventional production appeared to be stuck, and demand for electricity, heating, and industrial use continued to rise. In practice, the Americans competed against other LNG-importing countries during those years, including countries in Asia and Europe. The country that paid more received the tankers at the expense of other countries.

At the beginning of the 2000s, Washington did not try to keep Russian gas out of the American market. On the contrary. The George W. Bush administration viewed Russia as a potential source for diversifying the world’s energy supply. In 2002, Bush and Putin launched a joint “energy dialogue.” The declared objective was to increase Western investment in the Russian energy industry, develop Siberia, the Russian Far East, and offshore regions, and expand Russian energy exports to global markets. Perhaps you now understand why, years later, the United States opposed Germany and acted against it over Nord Stream. It was not because of Europe’s dependence on Russia, but because more gas flowing from Russia to Europe would come at the expense of the United States and, above all, would provide Europe with the ultimate ability to dictate elements of American foreign, economic, and industrial policy.

The United States and Russia declared that they were interested in American investment in Russian LNG facilities and in increasing Russian LNG exports to the American market. The two governments even sought to advance actual projects by 2008. At that stage, Russia was viewed in Washington in three ways: as an alternative to OPEC countries and the Persian Gulf in the oil market; as a new source of LNG for the Atlantic market; and as a country that could be integrated into the Western trade and investment system. This policy was almost the opposite of the one that developed after 2014. Washington was still concerned about Russia’s political power and its influence over its neighbors, but in the field of energy, it hoped that investment, trade, and integration into the Western market would turn Russia into a more predictable partner.

Qatar developed the North Field and became one of the world’s largest LNG exporters. The relationship was not limited to purchasing cargoes. Qatar Petroleum and ExxonMobil jointly established the Golden Pass terminal in Texas as an import facility. The model was that Qatari gas would be liquefied in the Persian Gulf, cross the ocean, and enter the American pipeline system. Following the shale revolution, that same project was converted into a facility for exporting American gas, while Qatari ownership remained part of the project. The Department of Energy describes Golden Pass as a joint venture in which Qatar held 70 percent and ExxonMobil approximately 30 percent.

During the 2000s, the United States prepared for a future in which a growing share of its gas would arrive by ship from Russia, Africa, and the Middle East. However, the American soil was blessed by the heavens, and an entrepreneur like George Mitchell, through the teams working under him, found an inexpensive method for extracting gas from rock formations. The shale revolution erased that future almost overnight. LNG imports fell rapidly after their 2007 peak, while American gas production increased by almost 80 percent between 2007 and 2021. Before the shale revolution, Russia and Qatar were potential suppliers that the United States wanted to integrate into its market. After the shale revolution, they became competitors of the American industry in the global market.

In 2011, the State Department established the Bureau of Energy Resources. Its purpose was to place energy at the center of American diplomacy: to manage the geopolitics of energy markets, work with producing and consuming countries, protect transit routes, and shape the energy policies of other countries. In 2014, the White House itself emphasized that LNG exports were a long-term solution. Large export facilities were not yet operating, constructing a liquefaction terminal took years, and some of the gas would be sold according to market prices rather than by government order. The reason is that if the United States supplies energy to countries around the world, it will be able to use energy as a political weapon and force countries to bend according to its interests against competing states.

 


 

 In February 2016, Sabine Pass began exporting commercial LNG. From that moment, the United States was no longer merely talking about diversifying the gas supply; it was capable of actually sending cargoes. By the end of the Obama administration, the policy explicitly connected LNG exports with European security. The administration helped Ukraine reduce its dependence on Russia, promoted European infrastructure, and expected that a more liquid LNG market would weaken Moscow’s ability to use gas as an instrument of pressure. Yes…yes…the Obama administration.

The first Trump administration did not invent the geopolitical use of gas. The Obama administration had already laid the foundations and used the possibility of exports against Russia. Trump’s change was in the language, pace, and scale. In June 2017, the White House said that turning the United States into a major energy exporter was a “strategic advantage” that could advance American interests abroad, and that energy policy was also foreign policy. The administration adopted the term “Energy Dominance,” promoted LNG permits, and linked gas deals to trade negotiations with Europe, China, and Asian countries.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was the stage at which the strategy became a large-scale supply system under the Biden administration. The Americans told the Europeans that they could supply gas instead of Russia, whereas years earlier they had only proposed alternatives to Russia, such as connecting pipelines to Central Asia. When the United States becomes the alternative to Russia as Europe’s gas supplier, it effectively dictates the foreign and security policies of European governments. The sanctions against Russia and the measures being led by the European Union against Chinese industry could only come into existence through the energy weapon employed by the United States. For the Europeans, the choice is between Moscow and Washington, and naturally, the United States is the preferred alternative.

 


 

In November 2025, the Trump administration published the United States’ National Strategic Policy. The document included a sentence that translates the declarations into the reality now taking shape: “Expanding the United States’ net energy exports will deepen its relationships with allies and reduce the influence of its rivals.” The document adds that energy will help the United States defend itself and, when necessary, project power. This is much more than “Drill, baby, drill.” Cheap energy at home is the foundation of reindustrialization, providing the United States with a technological and military advantage, and as energy exports grow, the dependence of its allies on the United States becomes greater, thereby reducing the influence of America’s rivals.

Three different presidents—one policy.

What Is the Meaning of the War in Hormuz?

The United States wants to be less dependent on energy passing through Hormuz, but it is not prepared to allow a rival to control the energy that passes through it to the rest of the world. The United States itself is not as dependent on Hormuz as it was in the past. But China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Europe are still affected by it. Therefore, the importance of the strait has changed. It is less of a direct American vulnerability and more of a point of control over the energy system of competitors and allies.

Is Trump in a hurry to reopen Hormuz, or does the crisis serve the United States? An increase in risk, insurance costs, and fears of disruption is enough to increase the relative value of American energy. A shipowner transporting oil or gas will not want to endanger the ship’s crew, the ship itself, or the cargo it carries in an unstable region if oil and gas can be transported more safely to global markets from another region, such as the American continent.

Shipping through Hormuz stopped on the third day of the war because insurance companies could not provide coverage, and the American administration did not say a word about this step. In practice, Washington did not provide British intelligence with information regarding the developing situation in the Persian Gulf, and British intelligence could not provide any information to British insurance companies. The use of this technical element gave the United States the change it wanted to achieve from the countries of Asia…and it came.

 


 

The Hormuz crisis demonstrated that gas exported from the Gulf may be inexpensive at the point of sale, but it must pass through a narrow strait, in a sensitive region, aboard a vessel that requires insurance. American gas travels along longer routes, but it leaves from coasts that are not dependent on Hormuz. China was the country that anticipated the expected crisis in Hormuz and prepared for it for many months. Other countries in Asia were forced to diversify their energy imports away from the Persian Gulf and toward the United States.

The Changing Energy Map

What is new today is that geopolitics determines energy policy far more than “market forces,” and what was once efficient and economical is no longer relevant today. The world has changed and continues to change. The number of conflicts between countries is rising, and the arms race is in full swing. The crises in Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Black Sea are not separate campaigns, but rather a single system intended to disrupt the energy map in the war between the great powers. For example, transporting oil from Venezuela to India is not an efficient or economical route, but it is much safer than the Persian Gulf.

I will begin with the Middle East. The regime in Iran is divided between politicians who seek to reach an agreement with the United States and, by doing so, moderate the influence of extremist elements within the Revolutionary Guards. Those extremists are, in practice, a cartel that controls weapons, drugs, oil and gas, food imports, medicine, and more, and they are the ones who run Iran. An agreement with the United States neutralizes their power because it transfers the revenues from Iranian oil and gas exports into an American supervisory system that allows food and medicine to be purchased.

The cartel is not prepared to lose billions of dollars in revenue, and therefore, the war is being conducted against elements within the Revolutionary Guards rather than against Iran as a state. The cartel has no interest whatsoever in rebuilding Iran or restoring its economy. As with cartels in other countries, a crisis gives them an opportunity to rule. It is no different in the Red Sea against the background of the Houthi attacks. This does not involve all of the Houthis, but rather those elements connected to the Iranian cartel. In the Israeli context, one can see the pressure being applied to Lebanon, which for years served as the cartel’s drug field.

The Americans will try to strike the cartel surgically, and this presents the Americans with a problem for which, at present, they have no tools to deal with. Elements in China know this and are exporting weapons to the cartel in order to wear down the Americans in the Hormuz region, inflict casualties, and encourage them to withdraw from Hormuz.

According to a Reuters report published several days ago, Iran signed a deal to purchase 300–400 Chinese-made portable air-defense systems, mainly QW-12 and FN-16 models, at an estimated value of $60–70 million. The first shipment is expected to arrive within weeks. These are short-range missiles carried and operated by a small team, intended primarily for low-altitude targets such as helicopters, drones, and low-flying aircraft.

 


 

According to the report, the contract was signed with a Hong Kong company called Zhongqing Baoshang International Investment, which allegedly served as an intermediary between Iran and the Chinese supplier. The reported plan is to transport the systems from Urumqi in western China, through Pakistan, and from there to Iran. The sources could not say with certainty whether the Pakistani leg would be carried out by air or by land.

If those elements in Iran lose their ability to protect the energy infrastructure, China loses an oil supplier, a strategic partner, and leverage against American power in the Gulf. Therefore, Russia and China are providing intelligence to those Iranian elements so that they can strike American targets across the Middle East with precision. By doing so, they hope to wear down decision-makers in Arab countries, who may come to view the American presence as a security burden, and to erode the status of the United States in the region.

Another crisis is taking place in the Black Sea. The Ukrainians are striking Russian energy facilities, but, for some reason…Kazakhstan’s energy facilities are also being hit. What is strange is that Ukraine, which is supported by the Europeans, is striking the pipeline that transports oil from Kazakhstan to Europe, while European decision-makers remain silent. In the first quarter of 2026, Kazakhstan was the European Union’s third-largest oil supplier, after the United States and Norway, providing approximately 9.6 percent of European oil imports. The media focuses far more on the strikes in Saudi Arabia than on those in the Black Sea.

Finally…this week, Cyprus announced that it would export gas to Europe through Egypt. Almost anyone who opens a map can see that this makes no economic sense, since Cyprus is closer to Europe. But…geopolitics.

Turkey opposes projects in the Eastern Mediterranean that, in its view, ignore it or the rights that it attributes to Northern Cyprus. It also wants to become the main energy transit country between the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Europe.

On July 28, the energy companies Eni and TotalEnergies announced the final investment decision for the development of Cyprus’s Cronos field. The plan is to transport the gas from Cyprus to the Zohr facilities in Egypt, liquefy it in Damietta, and export it mainly to Europe beginning in 2028. Eni presented the move as a structural renewal of Egyptian LNG exports and the establishment of a regional gas hub in the Eastern Mediterranean.

One day later, on July 29, a drone struck two gas vessels inside the port of Damietta. It is difficult to ignore the timing. It does not prove that the Cronos announcement was the reason for the attack, but it certainly justifies examining the possibility that the target was selected because of Damietta’s future role in Europe’s energy map.

 


 

 Strikes on energy facilities and infrastructure have become legitimate means, and as a result, the world’s energy map is changing. The impact will be quite extensive on foreign policy and international economies across every continent, and almost every person, everywhere, will feel it.

 

 The Rotten Core : Why Europe’s Giants Are Crumbling

Europe’s Economic Decline is Real. What it Actually looks like is However not what You’ve Been Told it does

Leo and Kaiser Bauch 

 


“You’re losing.”

That was the stark judgment of Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan, the largest bank in the world by market capitalisation, speaking at an event in Dublin about a year ago. “Europe has gone from 90% of U.S. GDP to 65% over 10 or 15 years. That’s not good. The EU has a huge problem at the moment when it comes to the competitiveness of its economy.”

This echoed the warning by Mario Draghi, one of the most respected members of the technocratic EU establishment, made a year earlier in his report on the competitiveness of the continent. Ringing the alarm bells about Europe’s pervasive falling behind has become something of an evergreen over the past decade or so. Complaining about the lack of impactful European tech companies especially has gotten as old as cheese way past its due date. Even though one might be slightly annoyed by all the kvetching, this assessment of Europe being uncompetitive is still largely correct.

Yet one must always look past the aggregate numbers talking about the European economy as a whole, since the reality is that while the European Union represents a powerful homogenising force in many respects, Europe is still a continent of many different regions and countries with very different levels of economic development and culture.

Beyond the narrative of the ‘European’ economy and its competitiveness, a multitude of simultaneous stories unfolds, which often move in contradicting directions. A most interesting pattern emerges, but is not often mentioned: the European countries affected most by various forms of economic, social and political decline tend to be the largest, most important and most populous ones. They also often happen to be former imperial powers.

The Sick Men of Europe

The United Kingdom and France, historically great rivals, the second and third most populous countries of Western Europe and once its mightiest colonial powers, seem to somewhat mirror each other in their chaotic socio-political development.

The political centre, represented by Labour Prime Minister Starmer and President Macron, seems to be singing its swan song, while populist challengers from both left and right sharpen their knives, confident that their time is coming. Yet few truly believe that this change will bring a return to stability in societies convulsed by lack of economic growth and ethnocultural divisions caused in large part by mass immigration from former colonial territories. Some even speak of the real possibility of more widespread political violence.

If we look at labour productivity — or simply how much value a worker creates per hour of work — which is perhaps the ‘cleanest’ measure of economic sophistication, since it removes both the impact of population and employment growth that often distorts GDP figures and the differences in working hours that can distort GDP per capita, we can see that both countries are facing long-term stagnation.

Using the 2010 level as a baseline of 100%, productivity in France and the UK in 2025 would stand at 106% and 107% respectively. For frame of reference, labour productivity in the US economy grew by 25% over the same period, and in Poland by 50%. Yet before one concludes that Poland is simply undergoing catch-up growth and the US is an exception, it is worth noting that even countries like Denmark or Switzerland have grown their productivity by nearly 20%. The annual labour productivity growth in France between 1999 and 2025 was 0.3%, showing that its stagnation started even before the 2008 crises.

Italy, a nation of almost 60 million people and thus the third most populous country in the EU, has become the epitome of economic stagnation. It is in fact one of the few European countries — along with Greece and Luxembourg — whose labour productivity has not grown at all since 2010, currently sitting slightly below that level. Facing strong demographic headwinds with persistently low fertility and the second oldest population on earth after Japan, spending 16.1% of GDP on pensions — the highest figure in the world — and burdened by decades of very high debt that severely limits the government’s fiscal options, it is very hard to imagine significant growth for Italy anytime soon. Stagnation, at this point, seems like the optimistic scenario.

And of course, there is the industrial heart of the old continent: Germany. In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, Germany was seen as the uncontested hegemon of Europe — it weathered the crisis better than its peers, returned to growth, recorded massive trade surpluses and even reduced its already considerable public debt through budget surpluses.

Yet when problems came, they formed a perfect storm, with enough power to sink a Bismarck-class battleship. The reality is that Germany’s successful 2010s were the product of a confluence of factors that were never going to remain in place. The Chinese economic boom was fueling enormous demand for German industrial products such as cars, but especially the machinery used to equip Chinese factories.

Cheap gas from Russia guaranteed competitive energy prices, keeping industry viable. The massive baby boom cohorts were in their peak productive years, still working but edging towards retirement, which suppressed wages as workers preferred pre-retirement stability over pay rises. Meanwhile, the euro was undervalued relative to the needs of the German economy, further supporting exports.

Yet a good thing rarely lasts forever. Reliance on cheap Russian gas turned from a blessing into a curse as soon as bombs began to fall on Ukrainian cities. And as if that were not enough, Germany proceeded with its plan to shut down its nuclear power plants — which produce no CO2 — in order to reduce the amount of CO2 it produces. If you needed to read that sentence again because you thought you had missed the logic, do not worry. There simply isn’t any. China, meanwhile, transformed from an export market into a ruthless competitor, slowly but surely squeezing the German industrial sector, which is a whopping 15% below its peak production levels from around 2017. The baby boomers began to retire, and the plan to replace them with Syrian refugees backfired as spectacularly as, say, the famous 1,300-tonne Gustav artillery gun would.

In terms of labour productivity growth since 2010, Germany fared somewhat better than the aforementioned countries, reaching close to 112% of its 2010 level. Yet that growth occurred almost entirely during the 2010s. Since 2020, German productivity has barely moved. The countries mentioned comprise half the population of, for lack of a better term, ‘political Europe’ — meaning the EU and non-member states such as the UK, Switzerland, Norway and so on. If they are in trouble, the continent as a whole will inevitably be.

Moreover, it is instructive to look at the 10 OECD countries with the lowest labour productivity growth since 2000. Five of the six founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s — the foundation of what would later become the EU — appear on that list. Luxembourg, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium all feature, with only Germany missing.

The View From the Periphery

Yet it is also true that Europe offers many examples of countries that remain dynamic, though these lie mainly in the continent’s periphery and are often among the smaller states. There is the post-communist East, which continues its catch-up growth and is drawing closer to Western European living standards, albeit with still a long way to go.

In the five years since 2020 alone, Poland and Croatia have recorded higher productivity increases than Italy or France have managed since the year 2000. GDP per capita in purchasing power parity in Czechia, Lithuania, Slovenia or Poland is now above that of Japan, Israel, or New Zealand — a testament to the staggering success of post-communist European economies’ efforts to bridge the gap with the West.

That Eastern Europe is growing faster than the European average is well known, yet another interesting story is unfolding in Southern Europe. Every year, The Economist puts together a ranking of the best performing advanced economies on the planet based on inflation, GDP growth, employment, and stock market performance. In 2022 and 2023, Greece took first place; in 2024 it was Spain, and in 2025, Portugal. How many people would have believed that ten years ago?

Moreover, Southern European countries were previously seen as a byword for chaotic public finances and an inability to rein in sovereign debt. Cyprus and Greece have recorded some of the highest public debt reductions in recent history, their debt-to-GDP ratios having fallen by a remarkable 60% since 2020. Portugal is not far behind, with a reduction of almost 40% over the same period. Greece and Cyprus recorded primary budget surpluses of almost 5% of GDP in 2025, with Portugal once again being close behind. It is of course true that these countries, and especially Greece, were very heavily indebted to begin with, and are therefore reducing their debt from an elevated baseline. Much of their economic growth — and thus their ability to generate budget surpluses — stems from the post-COVID tourism boom, a sector that does not meaningfully increase productivity, since it is difficult to implement new technologies when serving tourists their sangrias and tzatziki. Yet it illustrates something important: there are European countries that are capable of confronting their systemic problems, even when doing so requires making painful political decisions. Needless to say, this reality goes against the narrative of a continent which is unable to make tough choices.

 


 

 Spain deserves closer attention. Not only is it one of the largest countries in Europe, but also the fastest growing eurozone economy in recent years by far and, by some metrics, the best performing advanced economy on the planet, outpacing even the United States in both GDP growth and job creation in 2024.

Yet Spain’s vaunted unmitigated success story requires qualification. The perhaps uncomfortable truth is that the Spanish boom has been powered by the aforementioned massive tourism boom, a large increase in public spending, and consistently large immigration figures year after year, which I wrote about in a previous piece for LEO.

Spain has also not managed to reduce its public debt to the same degree as Greece or Portugal. These drivers of growth have one thing in common: they are not based on rising productivity or individual citizens getting wealthier. Yet growth still matters, especially for countries grappling with persistent government debt. There are however examples of countries that managed to combine similar mixes of increased spending and large immigration waves without achieving anything close to the nominal GDP growth seen in Spain, most notably the UK.

The Spanish economy has seen growth not only in tourism, but also in business services, consulting, and insurance. This is partly a consequence of increasing wages in Eastern Europe, which means that to many multinational corporations, Spain has once again become an attractive location for their administrative and back-office centers. While the Spanish case may not be nearly as glamorous as the headlines of The Economist suggest, it is still better to grow quickly with caveats than not to grow at all.

 


 

 So far we have only been talking about countries that are outside of the wealthiest part of Europe. Yet even in the latter we can find cases of countries that, while already among the world’s wealthiest, continue to grow and remain competitive. Switzerland, Sweden, and Denmark have managed to grow their labour productivity by 25-30% between 2000 and today, which is not quite at the American level, but much closer to it than Italy, France, the UK, or the Netherlands.

It is perhaps no coincidence that among all European states spending at least 3% of GDP on research and development — the threshold broadly associated with the most sophisticated and innovative economies — the only large country that qualifies is Germany, while the list is otherwise dominated by smaller states: Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and Finland.

Sweden is a country of just over 10 million people, yet it is home to 48 unicorns ( tech companies valued at over one billion dollars),almost the same number as France, which has nearly seven times the population. This makes it the country with the fourth most unicorns per capita in the world, and Stockholm itself produces more unicorns per capita than New York or London. The Nordic countries, with the exception of Finland, along with Switzerland and The Netherlands, carry very low levels of public debt and operate some of the most sustainable and well-functioning public pension systems in the world. These are far better equipped to handle their ageing populations than even the United States, where Social Security runs a growing deficit every year that needs to be covered by federal government borrowing, which in turn contributes to the already large and dangerously growing government debt.

The Rotten Core

The economic malaise of Europe is, in reality, mostly the economic malaise of its largest and most important states: the UK, France, Italy, and, in the past couple of years, Germany.

Europe is being dragged down by its hegemons; it is they who tend to underperform relative to their economic weight. Had the UK, France, or Germany been able to produce as many unicorns per capita as Sweden, there would be far less talk of European tech’s impotence.

Had France or Italy been capable of the kind of debt reduction seen in Greece or Portugal, both countries would find themselves in a considerably more comfortable fiscal — and thus political — position. The same applies to the construction of more efficient pension systems, which is most glaring in France, which spends the second highest share of GDP on pensions in the world despite having relatively healthy demographics compared to Italy, Germany, or Japan. Had the UK been able to transform its post-COVID “Boriswave” of over 2.5 million migrants into the kind of growth Spain has delivered over the same period, the political atmosphere in the country would be at least somewhat less charged. Had the German industrial sector performed as Poland’s or Lithuania’s has over the past decade, there would be no talk of a sick man of Europe.

To examine the reasons for this state of affairs is a task for another time. Perhaps the EU’s fixation on making the continent increasingly centralised, no doubt inspired by the examples of China and the United States, is misplaced.

Europe is a continent that has always been defined by its great internal diversity, which encouraged fruitful competition within a shared civilisational framework.

The lesson is clear: no matter what the naysayers claim, Europe is not an open-air museum only. Currently, it is a continent where dynamic development and stagnation exist side by side. It simply needs its giants to turn the tide.

 

 

 

 

 Public Humiliation Can Be Fatal for Aging Dictators

Ines Burrell 

 


 

When Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, issued a decree on 8 May authorising Russia to hold the military parade on Red Square on 9 May from 10am Kyiv time, many took it as a brilliant publicity stunt and masterful trolling. In reality, Zelenskyy was dead serious. He did authorise the parade. From this year onwards until the end of the war, come May, the Kremlin will need to seek Kyiv’s permission to hold the parade in front of the mausoleum holding Lenin’s corpse, because the expectation will be that Kyiv will otherwise gatecrash it. Putin knows it. Putin’s elites know it. This bell cannot be unrung.

Pathetic Spectacle by the Mausoleum

In hindsight, it might have been more prudent for Putin to chance the Ukrainian long-range drones and Flamingo missiles. It is highly likely that Kyiv would not have struck Moscow anyhow — the countless rings of air defence around Moscow left other targets wide open, and Ukraine might have considered those juicier. Putin could have framed any attacks as proof of righteous war. It would have been a weak response, but he might have looked more like a man and less like Gollum during his brief speech at the parade. Instead, he decided to believe Ukraine would crash his party, and paid for it by looking pitiful.

A popular joke in Russia suggested that Russians should persuade Zelenskyy to authorise the return of mobile internet, blocked on and off for the past few months. Another joke spoke of popular surprise at seeing a president who allows things instead of banning them.

In a system where authority is derived entirely from the appearance of strength, any sign of weakness is treated as a cause to question that authority. This is especially true in Russia. Russians accept ruthless leaders, they do not accept weak ones.

If this was not enough, earlier Moscow had tried to threaten Kyiv with the usual end of the world to get its way on the parade front. The Kremlin declared a unilateral ceasefire from midnight on 8 May and, as a way to enforce it, told embassies in Kyiv to evacuate and warned of a massive missile strike on the city centre. The fear of the attack was supposed to ensure Kyiv’s compliance. This time nobody was scared. Kyiv ignored the threat completely, continuing to strike defence industry and oil infrastructure deep inside Russia. Russia issued threats it could not back up with actions and had to retreat. Ukraine did not even issue threats, but Russia had to seek protection from Donald Trump, and the only way Trump could deliver Ukrainian compliance was by meeting Kyiv’s price — a prisoner exchange.

The humiliation this brought was unrivalled and very public. Putin now has to act — except that his options are very limited, each worse than the last.

Kneejerk Threats

The initial reaction was taken straight from the standard Kremlin rulebook. At a press conference following bilateral meetings in the Kremlin on 9 May, Putin tried to inflate Russian significance and present Russia as a major player in the South Caucasus by suggesting Armenia put its EU aspirations to a public vote via referendum — as if Russia had any say in Armenia’s future. He also issued a thinly veiled threat by reminding his audience that the current situation in Ukraine was a consequence of Ukraine’s EU bid.

This, of course, was the direct result of the Western leader summit (sans US) in Yerevan showing the Kremlin’s diminishing reach in the region. In truth, the longer the war in Ukraine lasts, the further Armenia moves from Russia. Additionally, Armenian integration in the EU is in Azerbaijan’s interests — the last thing Baku wants is for Russia to renew its destabilisation attempts in the region. Short of removing the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, by force, there is not much Russia can do to change Armenia’s course while Russia is otherwise occupied. Russia is slowly learning that its threats can no longer change outcomes.

In the same speech, Putin stated that he was amenable to meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy even outside Moscow, which is where he had previously insisted the meeting should happen. This was supposed to show his flexibility — however, he immediately walked that back by insisting that any such meeting was to be held only to sign the final agreement. Considering that his presidential aide Yuri Ushakov had reaffirmed on 10 May that Moscow would only start negotiating in earnest once Ukraine had walked out of Donbas, Putin clearly meant the meeting was intended to accept Zelenskyy’s capitulation. Russia’s position has not changed one bit — they still want control over as much of Ukraine as they can get, even if they cannot take it by force.

And finally, Putin tried to walk back on the prisoner exchange — the price Russia was supposed to pay for the humiliation on Red Square. President Zelenskyy did not even deign to grant Putin any agency in this matter — he announced that the US was in charge of the prisoner swap. Putin could try to weasel out of it, but he would be punishing the US as the guarantor of the agreement, not Ukraine as the beneficiary.

All the traditional Kremlin tactics have stopped working. And yet a response is required. Putin must prove to his elites that he has not lost control, grip, and influence over the country and the situation.

Three Doors, No Exit

At this point, Putin has three choices available to him.

He can push forward with military action and try to take the remainder of Donbas to show he has not been throwing around empty threats. In current circumstances this would be almost impossible to achieve — with the Russian offensive coming to a virtual standstill, Russia might soon be walking backwards instead of forwards. Ukraine’s mid-range drones — known among Ukrainian engineers as “middle-strikes” — have extended the kill zone, a term popularised by former commander-in-chief Zaluzhny to describe territory controlled by enemy drones where all movement stops, to up to 250km behind Russian lines, effectively collapsing logistics and supply chains.

Ukraine’s plan to kill more troops than Russia can recruit is slowly showing results. With current recruitment levels Russia cannot sustain traditional offensives. More manpower is needed, but the number of men willing to die for Putin’s goals is dwindling. A new mobilisation is needed, and yet Putin does not dare call one. The grumbling in Russia has increased. Russians stayed largely uninvolved when Ukraine was invaded in their name, remained aloof when some of their compatriots were scooped off the streets and sent to the frontline meat-grinder, or when their opposition leader was murdered in prison. However, taking away their mobile internet connection turned out to be the rallying cause. And then, of course, there are the regions hosting oil processing plants which suddenly discovered that when you attack your neighbour, that neighbour can hit back. In other words, there is a palpable air of displeasure in Russia. It is not a sign of impending revolution — Russian people have abdicated any agency long ago. However, it is enough for Putin to fear the consequences of wider mobilisation, including individual non-compliance from the conscripts who might not want to die. And that leads to loss of control.

Putin can also stop yanking everybody’s chain and give diplomacy a real chance. This, however, leaves him vulnerable to a different kind of reality — the one where millions of men who are used to killing, raping, and pillaging, plus getting paid handsomely for it, are released into wider society alongside former criminals recruited from prisons, and expected to come to terms with the fact that all that blood and violence has effectively bought them barely 1% of Ukraine’s territory per year.

Between the promises of stability Putin gave his subjects and the chaos a demobilisation would unleash, the wild 90s, when criminal gangs created by chaos and violent elements returning from colonial wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya controlled Russian streets, will seem like a fond childhood memory.

Even the last argument — nuclear weapons — is a card that can never be played. Once used, you can no longer control the reaction of your adversaries, and dropping a nuclear bomb on Ukraine would not give Putin control over it. Putin is a coward (literally, according to the Russian opposition) and would never choose an option that can cost him everything and still not create a favourable outcome.

And this leaves Putin with door No 3. He can do nothing. This, however, will not mean that things will stay the same. Quite the opposite — they will only get worse.

The state of the Russian economy is such that according to almost all economists, including Russian ones in exile, even a miracle cannot save it. It is going down, and one day it will hit rock bottom. Time is the only variable. And it is capable of inflicting untold pain in the process even before it expires completely.

The other element is the stagnating (indeed, reversing) frontline. In April 2026, for the first time since Ukraine’s Kursk incursion, Russia suffered a net loss of controlled territory. A year ago, it was gaining an average of 171 square miles a month. The loss of internet connection and overall quality of life were supposed to be offset by the glory of wiping out yet another village in Ukraine nobody in Russia had ever heard of before. Living much worse and not getting the glory people were promised can create the kind of cognitive dissonance that snowballs.

And then, of course, there is the ever-growing impact of Ukrainian attacks on Russian industrial targets. Most of the oil industry and defence sector has been built within city limits. When oil starts to rain from the sky or burn through streets to the accompaniment of air raid sirens, and the population increasingly has to search for shelters that do not exist, doing nothing no longer looks like a winning strategy.

The Cornered Rat

Putin has no good moves left. Every single action he takes brings him closer to an outcome he is trying to avoid. And so does inaction. In chess terms this is called zugzwang — a position where the obligation to move is itself the problem, because every available move makes things worse.

As a very gifted tactician and abysmal strategist, Putin can nonetheless employ moves that would temporarily correct the course of action. He did so in the autumn of 2022 when Russian defeat seemed unavoidable. The mobilisation and deployment of Iranian drones stalled the Ukrainian counter-offensive and stretched the war by several years. None of it changed the overall outcome — Russia will not be able to control Ukraine. What it did was drag other countries into the agony of the eventual collapse of Putin’s power.

In his fight for relevance, Putin can still inflict untold suffering not only on Ukraine but on other neighbouring countries. After all, he is not constrained by the welfare of his subjects or even by sustaining minimum life-preserving conditions. For Putin, the goal is his own physical survival and that of his immediate family. The loss of power threatens that survival, so holding on to power is all that matters. Yet all the options available to him lead to loss of power, making him the proverbial cornered rat. This cornered rat has no plan but still has plenty of moves it can throw at us without worrying about consequences.