Beyond Containment : Rethinking Gulf Security

Containment, Regional Order and the Search for Lasting Stability 

The Long View (From Singapore) 

 

 

 

 

As tensions between the United States and Iran intensify once again, much of the world’s attention is understandably focused on the immediate risks of military escalation. Yet amid the familiar cycle of missile exchanges and threats to maritime security, an altogether different conversation has begun to emerge.

A Challenge to the Existing Order

In a recent article published in Le Monde, Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi challenges one of the organizing principles of Gulf security since the Iranian Revolution. He argues that the logic of containing Iran has rested on a flawed assumption and proposes instead a more inclusive regional order incorporating all eight Gulf littoral States - the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) together with Iran and Iraq.

His conception of regional security is also geographically expansive. By linking the Strait of Hormuz with the Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea, he presents the region’s principal maritime chokepoints as interconnected elements of a single strategic system rather than separate theatres. Albusaidi’s central contention is that exclusion has itself become part of the region’s security problem. A durable order, he argues, cannot be built by treating one of the Gulf’s principal powers as a permanent outsider; it requires a framework in which all littoral states have a stake in maintaining regional stability.

Oman is uniquely placed to advance such an argument. As one of only two states sharing sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, it occupies a geographical position that leaves it deeply invested in regional stability and freedom of navigation. It is also an unusual diplomatic actor: a member of the GCC that has consistently maintained channels of communication with Iran while preserving close relations with the United States, the United Kingdom and its Arab neighbors. Over several decades, Muscat has repeatedly acted as a discreet intermediary during periods of regional crisis. Its foreign policy has been guided by a conviction that dialogue is a strategic asset. Albusaidi’s article should be understood as an attempt to prepare the intellectual ground for the regional order that may eventually emerge from the present cycle of confrontation.

The larger question his intervention raises is whether the strategy of containing Iran has actually produced the stable regional order it was intended to create.

The Mixed Record of Containment

Containment was not without purpose or achievement. Following the upheaval of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, many Gulf monarchies understandably viewed the new Islamic Republic with deep concern. Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric, support for armed non-state actors and growing missile program reinforced those anxieties. External security guarantees, particularly those provided by the United States, reassured regional partners and helped deter large-scale interstate conflict. In that sense, containment served important strategic objectives.

The broader record is more ambiguous. Nearly five decades after 1979, the Gulf has experienced repeated military crises, attacks on shipping, proxy conflicts, missile exchanges, disputes over freedom of navigation and periodic fears of wider regional war. The region has remained heavily militarized while becoming increasingly vulnerable to asymmetric forms of conflict that conventional deterrence has struggled to prevent. Whatever its successes in limiting some risks, containment has not produced a durable and self-sustaining regional security order.

Part of the explanation lies in the changing character of regional competition itself. Containment proved more effective at deterring conventional interstate aggression than at managing the diffuse forms of rivalry that came to dominate the Gulf after the Cold War. Proxy warfare, missile proliferation, maritime disruption and competition through non-state actors increasingly occurred in spaces where traditional deterrence was less effective. The result was the evolution of conflict into more complex and persistent forms.

Recognizing this is not the same as accepting Iran’s own conduct as benign. Tehran’s regional policies have contributed significantly to instability. Its relationships with armed groups across the Middle East, its missile program and willingness to project influence beyond its borders have understandably affected the security calculations of neighboring states. Equally, military interventions by external powers, the strategic choices of regional governments and the actions of Israel and various non-state actors have all influenced the evolution of the Gulf’s security environment. The region’s instability cannot be reduced to the actions of any single state. It is the product of interacting decisions by multiple regional and external actors over several decades.

Albusaidi’s critique deserves to be evaluated as a challenge to an inherited strategic framework. To argue that containment has produced only partial success is not to argue that Iran never posed a threat. It is to ask whether a strategy designed to manage that threat ultimately created the political order it sought. Whether a different framework is politically attainable is a separate question.

Can Institutions Change Strategic Behavior?

Albusaidi’s proposal also raises an obvious question. Can institutions genuinely alter state behavior, or do they merely reflect existing power relationships? While institutions rarely eliminate strategic rivalry, they can change the environment in which rivalry is conducted. By increasing transparency and creating regular channels of communication, they reduce opportunities for miscalculation and make cooperation on narrowly defined interests more sustainable even when broader political disputes remain unresolved. The experience of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) illustrates that institutions need not eliminate strategic rivalry or even create mutual trust, to make competition more transparent, predictable and therefore more manageable.

Imagining a Different Gulf Security Order

If exclusion has not produced lasting stability, what might an alternative look like?

Albusaidi proposes an inclusive regional security architecture built around the participation of eight Gulf states, the GCC plus Iran and Iraq. He deliberately leaves the institutional mechanics largely undefined. Yet if his vision is to move beyond principle, one could imagine an incremental framework built around practical confidence-building measures rather than an immediate grand bargain.

A permanent Gulf Security Forum bringing together the GCC states, Iran and Iraq could provide regular meetings between foreign and defense ministers. Agreed norms governing maritime conduct in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz could reduce the risk of dangerous incidents at sea. Military hotlines, incident-reporting mechanisms and joint search-and-rescue arrangements could improve communication during periods of tension. Over time, such confidence-building measures could create opportunities for broader regional cooperation. While initially focused on the Gulf, such mechanisms could also provide a foundation for wider cooperation with neighboring maritime security initiatives covering the Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea, consistent with Albusaidi’s broader conception of an interconnected regional maritime system. The purpose of these measures would be to make crises more manageable before they escalate into open conflict.

Not all Gulf states are likely to embrace such a vision with equal enthusiasm. Differences in historical experience and threat perceptions mean that any move towards a more inclusive regional order is likely to proceed unevenly.

Such an approach would also imply a different role for external powers. Since 1979, Gulf security has depended heavily upon American military guarantees. That reality is unlikely to disappear overnight. The United States will remain an indispensable strategic actor for the foreseeable future. Yet an inclusive regional architecture would gradually shift responsibility towards the states of the Gulf themselves. External powers would remain important participants, but they would no longer be the principal architects of regional order. The center of gravity would move from externally managed security towards regionally owned security.

The Long View

History offers numerous examples of durable security orders emerging only after prolonged periods of conflict expose the limitations of existing arrangements. ASEAN itself grew from the recognition that managing rivalry indefinitely was less sustainable than constructing institutions capable of managing it collectively. The Gulf may not have reached that point yet. But Oman appears to believe that the conversation must begin now. It is attempting to shift the discussion from crisis management to order building.

Strategic orders are built upon assumptions. Over time those assumptions harden into orthodoxy, making them increasingly difficult to question even when circumstances change. Whether or not Oman is ultimately correct, Albusaidi’s article challenges one of the Middle East’s longest-standing strategic assumptions. The first step towards a new regional order is rarely a treaty or a summit. More often, it begins with the willingness to reconsider the ideas on which the old order rests.