Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye : A New Power Bloc in the Making?

Easier said Than Done : Can the Mecca Pact evolve into a Real Alliance? A difficult Road lies Ahead 

Seyithan Ahmet Ates

 

 

Years of rising tensions in the Middle East produced a potentially consequential development: The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement.

It is far too early to know what sort of institution will emerge from it, but comparisons with a “Muslim NATO” were almost inevitable.

The agreement brings together three countries with unusually complementary strategic assets. Saudi Arabia is the Gulf’s economic heavyweight and a dominant force in global energy markets. Türkiye has NATO’s second-largest army and a rapidly expanding defence-industrial base. Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim-majority country with a declared nuclear-weapons capability, with an arsenal estimated at around 170 warheads.

In another word, the three countries bring together oil, nuclear deterrence, capital, defence technology and conventional military power. On paper, at least, that is complementing resources.

Under the pact, an attack on one of the signatories is to be regarded as an attack on all three, giving the arrangement an unmistakable collective-defence character.

But an alliance should be judged by the obligations and institutions they create, rather than the announcements.

There is no shortage of ambitious multilateral projects in the Muslim world that have fallen short of their original promise.

The D-8, for instance, established in Istanbul in 1997 by conservative muslim leader, Necmettin Erbakan to strengthen economic co-operation among major developing Muslim countries. Although Muslim leaders set ambitious economic and political goals, nearly three decades later the D-8 appears to have fallen well short of expectations, even if it cannot be called an outright failure. More or less the same fate has befallen other Muslim organisations, including the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and, in the security sphere, the Gulf Cooperation Council.

It is this history that should make us cautious about the Mecca Declaration and raise a number of questions about the nature and prospects of this new alliance.

Is this primarily a political declaration signalling closer strategic co-operation, or will it create enforceable and operational mutual-defence obligations? What, precisely, have the three countries agreed to do?

The agreement does contain language that resembles the principle underpinning NATO’s Article 5: an armed attack against one member is to be considered an attack against all. The stated objective is to strengthen collective deterrence and deepen defence co-operation. That is, for sure, significant. But an Article 5-style sentence does not by itself create NATO.

The Atlantic alliance relies on more than a treaty clause. Behind it stand decades of integrated military planning, command structures, exercises, standardisation, intelligence sharing, logistics and political consultation. Therefore, until it becomes clear whether the Mecca agreement will develop comparable mechanism it is premature to call it a “Muslim NATO”.

A strategic partnership and an institutionalised collective-defence alliance are two very different things.

A Formidable Combination

On the other hand, caution about the institutional character of the agreement should not obscure its potential geopolitical weight.

Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye collectively command substantial economic, military and diplomatic resources. Pakistan adds a nuclear deterrent estimated by SIPRI at roughly 170 warheads. Türkiye contributes NATO experience, substantial conventional forces and an increasingly sophisticated defence industry. Saudi Arabia brings financial firepower and enormous influence over global energy markets.

Türkiye and Saudi Arabia also exercise political and economic influence well beyond their borders, although this has at times brought the two countries into competition with each other. Any durable strategic alignment between Ankara, Riyadh and Islamabad would therefore have consequences far beyond the three signatories themselves.

As seen, feature of the arrangement is not simply its aggregate power but its strategic complementarity.

Pakistan has nuclear weapons and a large military, but its economy remains vulnerable and its political environment remains unstable. Saudi Arabia possesses vast financial and energy resources but has long depended heavily on foreign military technology and external security partnerships. Türkiye, meanwhile, combines a large conventional military with an increasingly capable domestic defence industry, but remains dependent on imported energy and has endured recurring economic and currency pressures.

Whether those assets can actually be integrated is another matter.

Why Now?

Four factors help explain the timing of the agreement.

The first is the increasingly unstable security environment surrounding Iran and the broader Middle East. The second is the expanding military reach of Israel and the uncertainty it has created among regional states. The third is the security of energy infrastructure and transit routes, particulary an importan concern for Saudi Arabia. The fourth—and perhaps most important—is growing uncertainty about the future extent of America’s security role in the region.

All in all, the agreement should also be seen as an evolution rather than an abrupt diplomatic invention.

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in September 2025, establishing the principle that aggression against either country would be treated as aggression against both. The new trilateral arrangement extends that logic by bringing Türkiye into the framework.

Ankara and Riyadh have meanwhile been steadily deepening their political, economic and defence-industrial relationship.

The result may therefore be more accurately understood as the institutionalisation of a regional convergence already under way rather than the sudden birth of an entirely new geopolitical bloc.

If the framework eventually opens itself to additional members, as stated by Erdogan, its significance would increase considerably. What matters at this stage is that the process appears potentially fluid rather than necessarily limited to three capitals.

The First Dividend Could Be KAAN Fighter Jet

One of the first tangible consequences may emerge not on a battlefield but on an ambitios military project.

Türkiye’s KAAN fifth-generation fighter programme is among Ankara’s most ambitious defence-industrial projects. Developing and producing a modern combat aircraft at scale requires enormous capital, a large production run and a sophisticated technological ecosystem.

Saudi participation could therefore be transformative.

Riyadh has already demonstrated serious interest in the programme. In February President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Türkiye had received strong Saudi interest in KAAN and referred explicitly to the possibility of joint investment. Reports have also suggested that Washington has sought clarification from Riyadh about its potential participation in the Turkish programme.

The Mecca pact could provide a political framework for turning such interest into deeper industrial participation.

Saudi investment, Pakistani involvement and Turkish technology could potentially transform KAAN from a predominantly national programme into a multinational defence project. Joint production, technology partnerships, procurement agreements and greater interoperability would also allow Ankara to expand its defence-industrial footprint across the Gulf and South Asia.

In that sense, the alliance’s first important test may be industrial rather than military.

From Defence to Trade

The consequences of the new pact may extend well beyond the defence industry.

For instance, a closer Turkish-Saudi co-operation could also affect reconstruction and investment in Syria. Saudi capital combined with Türkiye’s commercial presence, construction sector and geographic access could provide a basis for larger infrastructure projects there.

The three countries may similarly find scope for more co-ordinated humanitarian, diplomatic and potentially security-related initiatives concerning Gaza.

There is also an economic-geography dimension to the emerging partnership.

Türkiye and Saudi Arabia signed memorandum in June to deepen railway and transport co-operation, including logistics, infrastructure, technology and training. Ankara has also been promoting overland connectivity through Syria and Jordan towards the Gulf, reviving interest in transport corridors that echo the geography of the old Hejaz railway.

If political relations continue to improve, security co-operation could therefore be accompanied by new transport, trade and energy corridors linking Türkiye to the Gulf through the Levant.

The significance of the Mecca agreement may consequently extend well beyond defence. Military co-operation could become the political foundation for deeper integration in defence manufacturing, technology, infrastructure, investment, energy and trade.

What Does Washington Think?

At first glance, the emergence of a new regional security grouping might appear to challenge America’s traditional role in the Middle East.

In fact, the reality is more complicated.

All three countries retain important security relationships with Washington, although the nature and depth of those relationships differ substantially. A regional arrangement that improves deterrence without requiring additional American troops or resources could even fit Washington’s longstanding preference for allies and partners to shoulder more of their own defence burden.

The agreement could therefore cut in two directions.

For Riyadh, it provides another means of reducing excessive dependence on the American security umbrella. For Washington, however, a capable group of friendly regional powers taking greater responsibility for their own security need not necessarily be unwelcome.

The pact also emerges from a broader trend. Saudi Arabia has spent years diversifying its diplomatic relationships beyond Washington. Türkiye has pursued an increasingly autonomous foreign policy while remaining firmly inside NATO. Pakistan, caught between China, the Gulf, the United States and its own South Asian security imperatives, has likewise sought to broaden its strategic options.

The Mecca agreement can therefore be read as another manifestation of a more fragmented international system in which middle powers are hedging rather than choosing a single patron.

Iran will nevertheless be watching closely.

The emergence of closer military co-ordination among three major Sunni-majority states could complicate Tehran’s strategic environment, even if none of the three intends to construct an explicitly anti-Iranian alliance.

Indeed, their reluctance to confront Iran may prove to be one of the agreement’s greatest tests.

The Yemen and Iran Tests

The first test may come in Yemen.

Houthi attacks against Saudi targets immediately raise an awkward question: would Türkiye and Pakistan actually become involved in a Saudi confrontation with the Houthis?

The question becomes still more difficult when Iran enters the equation.

Imagine that a future American or Israeli strike against Iran prompted Tehran to retaliate against Saudi oil infrastructure. Would Ankara and Islamabad genuinely be prepared to take military action against Iran on Riyadh’s behalf?

That is where declarations of solidarity collide with geopolitical reality.

Neither Türkiye nor Pakistan has an interest in a direct confrontation with Tehran. Pakistan in particular has traditionally had to manage its Iranian relationship cautiously, not least because the two countries share a long and sometimes volatile border.

The same dilemma applies in the other direction.

If Pakistan were involved in another major military confrontation with India, how far would Saudi Arabia and Türkiye be prepared to go in fulfilling their new commitment?

The credibility of the pact will ultimately be determined by the answers to such uncomfortable questions.

Even without becoming a formally anti-Iranian alliance, however, closer co-ordination among Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan could alter Tehran’s strategic calculations. Each brings a different asset—military, technological, financial, nuclear or geographic. Their significance lies less in what they intend to do together today than in what they may become capable of doing together during the next regional crisis.

Türkiye’s NATO Problem

Türkiye faces another complication: NATO.

Ankara has been a member of the Atlantic alliance since 1952 and today fields its second-largest army. It also possesses more than seven decades of experience operating within NATO’s institutional and military structures.

If the Mecca agreement develops into a genuine collective-defence organisation, Türkiye will have to manage the relationship between its existing NATO commitments and its new trilateral obligations.

In ordinary circumstances the two may be perfectly compatible.

In a crisis involving Iran, Israel, India or the United States, however, the calculation could become considerably more difficult.

Yet Türkiye’s NATO experience may also be one of the new grouping’s greatest assets. Ankara understands better than most regional powers that a military alliance is not simply a promise to come to another country’s aid. It is an institutional system.

Going Beyond the Declaration: Can the Pact Become a Real Alliance?

That is ultimately the central question confronting the Mecca agreement.

Obviously, pooling the military and economic resources of three powerful states does not automatically create a credible alliance. That requires institutions.

Joint military planning, interoperability, intelligence sharing, common exercises, command and co-ordination mechanisms, defence-industrial integration and procedures for rapid decision-making in a crisis will all matter.

Above all, an alliance requires political leaders to honour their commitments when doing so becomes costly.

Türkiye’s long experience inside NATO could help accelerate this process. It has spent more than seven decades working inside what remains the world’s most institutionalised military alliance. If Ankara can transfer some of that organisational experience into the new framework, the Mecca agreement could become operational far more quickly than many previous attempts at regional co-operation.

Creating an integrated military architecture requires considerably more money, capabilities, bureaucracy and political commitment than signing a treaty.

The Mecca agreement could eventually become a strategic bridge connecting the Gulf, South Asia and Eurasia. It might even provide the foundations for a broader regional security architecture.

On the other hand, political fragility and uncertainty in Pakistan and Türkiye could become one of the pact’s main vulnerabilities. Türkiye’s 2028 presidential election is one example. A victory by the secular opposition could fundamentally alter Ankara’s approach to the Mecca Agreement and, in the most extreme scenario, turn it into little more than a dead letter. This is a possibility that should not be overlooked.

When Necmettin Erbakan (the then-prime minister), who had championed greater co-operation among Muslim countries and played a leading role in the creation of the D-8 in 1997, left office, subsequent Turkish governments showed considerably less enthusiasm for the initiative.

Political continuity within the member states will therefore matter almost as much as military capabilities if the pact is to develop durable institutions.

Ultimately, the real strength of the Mecca Agreement will be measured not by the declarations being made today, but by whether Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia can act together when the next crisis comes, whether the military pact can develop lasting institutions, and whether it can survive political change at home.

By Seyithan Ahmet Ates, PhD.

The author is a Visiting Research Fellow at Saïd Business School and Pembroke College, University of Oxford.