The West is Redrawing the Map of Missile Production

The Emerging Story is No Longer Simply that the West is Running Short of Missiles. It is Where—and Under Whose Control—it Will Build the Next Wave of Production

War Brief 

 

 

 

Three production tracks now stand out. The Pentagon is pressing US defence firms to accelerate weapons output. Rheinmetall and Lockheed Martin are preparing to manufacture ATACMS in Germany. Meanwhile, Kyiv is leading Freyja, an attempt to create a European-controlled ballistic-missile interceptor, after President Donald Trump backed away from his pledge to allow Ukraine to manufacture Patriots.

Together, these developments reveal two approaches to rebuilding the West’s arsenal. One moves the production of American-designed weapons into Europe. The other attempts to create a system whose supply chain and future development can be controlled within Europe itself.

America expands production

Deputy Defence Secretary Steve Feinberg has given industry leaders 21 days to submit plans for faster deliveries and expanded production of critical weapons, according to a Pentagon memo obtained by The Washington Post.

“Years-long development cycles are not acceptable,” Feinberg wrote. “We must dramatically accelerate our program schedules and expand our production capacity now.”

Last week, the Pentagon announced framework agreements worth more than $3 billion with Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman to expand production capacity for Patriot and THAAD interceptor components. The previous week, it awarded Lockheed Martin a contract worth up to $58.6 billion to triple Patriot interceptor production by 2030.

The agreements are intended to enable Patriot production to triple and THAAD output to quadruple. They include a second source for PAC-3 solid-rocket motors and additional capacity for other critical components.

The expansion follows heavy interceptor use and transfers during the wars in Ukraine and Iran. In late July, the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated that US Patriot inventories had fallen below 1,000 interceptors, while THAAD stocks stood at approximately 250.

But much of the proposed expansion remains future capacity rather than missiles arriving today. Some framework agreements are non-binding and depend on congressional funding. New suppliers must also establish production lines and qualify components before output can rise.

ATACMS comes to Europe

Lockheed Martin and Rheinmetall plan to manufacture Army Tactical ​Missile Systems (ATACMS) at Rheinmetall’s Unterluess site, creating the missile’s first production line outside the United States.

The joint venture still requires approval. Production facilities are due to be established next year, while Rheinmetall expects its first revenue in 2028. Chief executive Armin Papperger has warned that replenishing depleted US arsenals will take “much longer” than two years.

ATACMS is an offensive ballistic missile rather than an interceptor. But its relocation reflects the same industrial shift: missile production is moving closer to the countries expected to use and replenish the weapons.

Local production should improve European access and supply security. But ATACMS remains an American-designed system controlled through a transatlantic partnership. Producing a US missile in Germany strengthens European capacity - it does not necessarily deliver technological sovereignty.

Ukraine tests a different model

President Trump on Saturday denied the proposal allowing Ukraine to manufacture Patriot interceptors, despite his earlier indications that a grant allowing production licence was under consideration. He cited concerns over sharing sensitive US missile technology.

Even with Trump’s reversal, officials and defence companies reportedly continue to examine more limited cooperation. Options include manufacturing components in Ukraine for final assembly elsewhere in Europe or adding Kyiv to an existing US-European production programme.

Even if approved, the first missiles would not be available for at least another year. New component lines generally take between three and seven years to establish.

That delay helps explain Ukraine’s parallel investment in Freyja.

Led by Ukrainian manufacturer Fire Point and supported by nine European partners, Freyja would combine a Ukrainian FP7.X interceptor and launcher with European radar, guidance and command technology. Fire Point CEO Iryna Terekh told Reuters the company aims to produce a ballistic interceptor for less than €1 million per missile, and hopes to attempt its first ballistic interception by mid-2027.

Rather than manufacturing an established American weapon under licence, Ukraine and its partners are attempting to build an open European system whose supply chain is not controlled by one country.

But Freyja remains unproven. It has not intercepted a ballistic missile, while its price, timetable and production targets remain ambitious.

The race between factories and missiles

None of these initiatives solves Ukraine’s immediate problem.

New factories, licensing agreements and supply chains take years to mature. Russia is firing ballistic missiles now, while Ukraine’s deliveries of air-defence interceptors have fallen sharply.

The near-term contest therefore remains one of magazine depth: whether Ukraine and its allies can preserve enough high-end interceptors until industrial expansion catches up with wartime consumption.

The West is not merely increasing missile output. It is redrawing the geography of its missile industrial base by expanding production in America, moving US weapons into European factories and attempting to build a European-controlled alternative.

What emerges will determine who controls production, who receives weapons first—and whether Europe can sustain a missile war without waiting for someone else to reload.