Saturday, August 29, 2026

Part One : Introduction 
Paul Weston 
 

The situation in Britain and most of the West is very bad and getting worse by the day. A political solution still exists but so does the very real possibility of cancelled elections in Britain, Germany and France in 2029. If this happens, we will be left with no other option than to physically fight against the tyrannical establishment.

Even if the elections take place, and political parties like France’s Rassemblement National, Germany’s AfD, and our very own Restore Britain come to power, there is a high probability of religious war in those countries resulting from a violent hard left / Islamic pushback against attempted large-scale deportation/remigration. If this happens, we will be forced to fight in a horrific scenario similar to the civil wars in 1970s Lebanon and 1990s Yugoslavia.

The idea we will have to fight is difficult to accept for the majority of people, but when you look around at what has been done to us over the last few decades, and where this can only logically lead, it becomes very difficult to argue against a near inevitable confrontation between Western Civilisation and the Red-Green Alliance - AKA the Neo-Communist Left and Islam.

This Red-Green Alliance presents a far greater threat to Western civilisation than Charlemagne, Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin combined – simply because it means not only the end of economic systems and similar European cultures, but the obliteration of the European people as a race, culture, and civilisational entity. Never forget, the Communists and Islam erase the past completely when they seize power.

If we lose the coming confrontation, we won’t just lose a battle or a war, we will lose everything; our territory, our history, our traditions, our freedom, our religion, and of course our very lives. We will lose our entire civilisation formed over literally thousands of years, and we could lose this by the time English babies born today reach secondary school age.

In 1910, finely dressed aristocratic Russian ladies sipped tea from China cups in St Petersburg’s Art Nouveaux Café Yar. Such scenes were replicated in Berlin, Paris and London. And then came 1914 and WWI, followed by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the subsequent massacre of millions. At much the same time the Islamic Ottoman/Turks massacred close to two million Greeks, Armenians and Assyrians.

Soon after that came WWII followed by Mao, Pol Pot and Asian Communism. Everything changed from the heady days of Café Yar on a sunny summer morning in 1910. Western civilisation was rocked to its foundations. Hundreds of millions of people perished in the most horrific manner imaginable. The Red-Green Alliance in the West of today is rooted in very recent monumental violence.

England/Britain in 2026 feels very much like early 1914, and just as then, the inhabitants of the modern liberal West cannot really imagine what is coming their way. We suffer from the Illusion of Permanence, as Samuel Huntington termed it in his book the Clash of Civilisations. Tomorrow will be little different to today, ditto next week and next month, but what of next year or the next five years? Hinge point in history events have always happened and will always happen. I believe we stand before a historical hinge point today and everything will soon explode into unimaginable horrors.

More and more people are becoming aware of this. Non-political friends of mine tell me of the chilling atmosphere that greets them in England when they return from abroad. Friends of mine who escaped totalitarian Communist countries tell me the feeling of unease, of constantly being watched, the fear of interaction with State functionaries be they policemen or university professors is JUST as they once felt in Communist Prague or Warsaw. We have sleep-walked into something very dark in the once free West.

All our great Institutions of the State have been captured and subverted by the hard-left in a successful attempt to undermine and destroy the foundations of Western civilisation, including the gleeful destruction of the very people responsible for building it who have now become a de-facto and de-jure second class and persecuted citizenry in their ancient homeland, ascribed as guilty of global oppression, historical evil and literal Original Sin and thus unworthy of continued racial existence in our brave new multicultural world.

We have a revolutionary hard-left political Traitor Class across much of the West, intent on increasingly authoritarian control. These same politicians actively appear to want a boots on the ground war against Russia, which means WWIII. We have a fifty million and exponentially growing Islamic demographic in Europe which makes no secret of its cruel, theocratic ambition.

We have a native demographic catastrophe which combined with surreal levels of immigration / invasion amounts to a credible ethnocide, running alongside a probable army of 250,000 young males of fighting-age imported into Britain from African/Islamic backgrounds who now outnumber frontline British soldiers by 10:1 and who are housed strategically across the country, with some thousands in the barracks of Ministry of Defence sites.

Any one, just a solitary single one of those instances I just mentioned could lead to civil war or religious war. But they number eight in total, not just one. Combined they amount to our eradication or our survival via resistance. Whichever path we choose, we are clearly not going to be sipping tea out of China cups in London’s Café Royal circa 2035.

The following quote is from A E Houseman on the dawn of WWI – replace the issues he mentions with the eight mentioned above and you will understand how I feel. Quote:

“Europe is a powder keg. The Germans are gripped by fervent nationalism, the British feel afraid of German expansion….the French still remember the bitter defeat of 1870. Germany enters into a pact with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but that empire is being torn apart by ethnic tensions and it will take just one spark to ignite a European war on an unimaginable scale.”

If we are to survive as a civilisation, it seems we will have to fight. As of today, that would be an impossibility. Unlike America we have no First or Second Amendment, by which I mean no freedom of speech or the right to bear arms. That said, we must accept the reality of war in order to prepare for it - and prepare for it we must. Our days of peace are rapidly drawing to a close even as our DEI captured military and King sit on their hands and do nothing. No one is coming to save us. Only we can do that, as the bloody course of British history will affirm.

 

 Chinese Organised Crime, the Shadow Economy & the Chinese Communist Party in the UK

Study of CCP-Linked Individuals in the UK Suggests Systemic Involvement in the Shadow Economy and, in Some Cases, Crime; New Evidence Suggests Beijing asked the 14K Triad to Suppress Dissidents Here 

UK-China Transparency 

 


 

Over the coming week, UK-China Transparency (UKCT) will publish evidence of systematic linkages between the United Front influence network of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese shadow economy in the UK, including crime, money laundering, fraud, and illegal migrant labour.

UKCT has begun to publish case studies of figures who are connected to crime or the Chinese shadow economy in the UK and are (or have been) concretely involved in the CCP’s United Front work or other state-linked activity, including by running influence operations, intimidating dissidents, campaigning in support of the CCP’s position on territorial and political disputes, including Hong Kong, befriending politicians and training candidates for parliament.

The National Crime Agency’s (NCA) 2025 Strategic Assessment states that “offenders linked to China currently pose the biggest non-British SOC [serious organised crime] threat to the UK.” Security agencies have labelled the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as “the biggest state-based threat to the country’s economic security” and the country’s intelligence services as carrying out “large scale espionage”. The PRC has been referred to as one of the “three most flagrant transnational repression perpetrators in the UK” by a Parliamentary Committee.

But the state threat and the criminal threat have not been connected publicly – until now. According to the Wilson Report, a new study sponsored by the Home Office, government departments and police forces are also beginning to wake up to this combined threat. The study refers to the “involvement of [Chinese organised crime groups] with the Chinese State in the UK” and “evidence of [Chinese organised crime group] activity being specifically directed by the PRC”.

The recent National Security Act trial at the Old Bailey, in which two men were found guilty of spying for China and evidence of connections between underworld actors and the CCP was presented, has added further to the urgency of this issue. Evidence from the trial suggested that the CCP asked the 14K triad to assist in transnational repression in the UK. Evidence of Chinese organised crime groups cooperating with Irish paramilitary organisations is also multiplying. 

A global pattern

For the CCP to build connections with figures linked to crime and the irregular economy in the UK reflects a global pattern of which there is growing awareness – from Paraguay to British Columbia, Italy to the Philippines. Research has begun to expose Chinese crime figures working as proxies for political interference in various countries. There is growing evidence of what British academic and China expert Dr Martin Thorley recently termed “systemic geocriminality” connected to the Chinese state.

This trend reflects the fact that shadow economies offer a backdoor into society. Potential underworld proxies are not only accustomed to secrecy, but already adept at exploiting relationships with officials and politicians, as well as being in possession of often substantial resources, logistics networks, personnel and capabilities. It is for related reasons that there are countless historical instances of intelligence agencies from many countries using such proxies for recruitment and support, including for political interference and espionage operations.

“There are many good guys amongst them [triads].”

Comment attributed to Deng Xiaoping, 1984

For the CCP, the building of connections with crime figures appears to be fundamentally tied in to its goal of the “reunification” of China, which requires building support amongst the diaspora for policies regarding Hong Kong, Taiwan and elsewhere; and to the goal of “national rejuvenation”, which involves improving China’s ability to project power worldwide, including in southeast Asia where Chinese-speaking crime groups have deep roots. Ties to crime figures are likely to be useful in effecting transnational repression against those in the diaspora who are opposed to the CCP and its agenda, and for aiding political influence operations in strategic locations. UKCT will publish concrete evidence that physical violence against anti-CCP protestors in the UK has involved a criminal element.

Hong Kong’s triads, secret societies, and associated networks are well established worldwide, based amongst Chinese diasporic groups linked to southern China and Chinese populations in southeast Asia. They have long been present in the UK. Since the 1990s, Chinese organised crime in the UK has been transformed by the arrival of Chinese-speaking migrants from Vietnam and Malaysia, as well as a wave of migrants from the Chinese mainland, many hailing from the province of Fujian, which is home to important Taiwan-related military and political institutions and major organised crime syndicates, some with proven political networks.

“In the mid-2000s, two sets of personnel competed for the executive committee positions of [a UK Fujianese association]. There were threats and physical confrontations between the two factions. On the evening of the election, both sides have their gang members all geared up in London Chinatown for the election to take place. Twenty minutes before the election, someone from the Chinese Embassy called the [association] telling them that the Chinese Embassy is sending a Fujianese PhD student in an Embassy vehicle to the meeting. The same evening, both sides celebrated the ”election” of a new Chairman in the form of the PhD student.”

‘Supporting Hongkongers to settle in the UK’, joint policy paper by UK-based organisations, 2021

The UK’s vulnerability

It has been estimated there may be as many as 200,000 undocumented Chinese migrants in the UK; the Home Office deported or otherwise removed more than 40,000 people to China between 2004 and 2016. As well as working amongst these undocumented communities, there is evidence of crime groups systematically recruiting and exploiting Chinese students in the UK, who number roughly 150,000, as underlined in the Wilson Report. Chinese organised crime is a blight on these communities especially, as well as on the wider public.

It is concerning that police forces lack critical capabilities required to deal with Chinese organised crime, as also underlined in the Wilson Report. One of the main issues facing police and other government agencies appears to be linguistic. Cantonese, the different forms of Hakka, Hokkien, and Eastern Min are not dialects of Mandarin, but distinct language groups in their own right. Securing trustworthy interpreters and translators has been a major challenge for law enforcement, and there is little evidence to date that investment in technological solutions has been made. Initial reporting from the recent National Security Act trial at the Old Bailey suggests most of the suspects arrested as part of the case, Chinese nationals, were released without charge due to the fact that data from their devices could not be translated in time for the deadline by which they had to be charged – these individuals subsequently left the country and will not face justice. Lack of access to Chinese social media apps is also an important issue.

“I may as well tell you a story from my own experience. When a state leader visited a foreign country, an organization that is similar to the triads you mentioned dispatched 800 of its members to guard our state leader against any danger.”

Tao Siju 陶駟駒, Chinese Ministry of State Security, 1993

Concrete case studies

The research being by UKCT will detail several case studies of individuals involved in or linked to the shadow economy and the Chinese state, including the following.

  1. This week, UKCT will publish evidence that Christine Lee 李贞驹, named as a CCP interference agent by MI5, was involved in a multimillion-pound bogus immigration scheme involving at least 600 illegal workers supplied to Chinese restaurants. This was around the same time, in 2008, that Lee launched her career as a political activist and built ties with the British and Chinese governments. The scheme relied on fictions and was described as a “charade” and as an “abuse” of the law in the Court of Appeal. Christine Lee & Co, the firm which administered the scheme, described it as “sensible, legal & reasonable” apparently without disclosing that Christine Lee’s father and her friend were the directors of the Irish company on behalf of which the firm claimed to have devised the scheme.

  2. An individual, Lihao Lin 林礼豪, who ran a ‘secret police station’ in the UK and is connected to the United Front Work Department. Mr Lin has been implicated in the operation of a brothel and is known to have met Scottish political figures. He is also the sponsor of a Chinese student group in Scotland, and according to an academic paper is alleged by one former student to have acted as a vector for “gangsters” to interact with students. UKCT has already published research about Mr Lin, which can be read here.

  3. A prominent individual, Jiajin He a.k.a. Anthony Kar King Ho 何家金 , who has a serious criminal record, set up an ongoing CCP influence operation in the UK. Mr Ho has been involved in running money services companies for decades, the most important of which have been subject to regulatory or legal sanctions within the UK. Over the past two decades, hundreds of millions of pounds, including criminal proceeds, have left the country via these companies, one of which now reportedly cooperates formally with the Chinese state-owned Bank of China. Mr Ho is understood to have met or built relationships with at least two political figures, and appointed several public figures, including a former commander of the Met Police’s Specialist Crime Unit who later joined GCHQ and a former MP with reported security connections, to the board of one of his companies. For over a decade after his first offences, and whilst continuing to be investigated, he was nonetheless a police informer connected to a specialised Metropolitan Police team that was shut down in the wake of Mr Ho’s most serious conviction. UKCT raises further questions about improper conduct within that team and suggests it shut in part because of the relationship with Mr Ho. UKCT will publish more information about this case in the coming weeks. Mr Ho told UKCT he disputes elements of UKCT’s reporting and that “References to investigations where no charges were brought, or to associations presented without context, should not be used to imply wrongdoing.”

  4. A highly prominent multimillionaire, To Ming Lam 林道明, whose businesses have been fined hundreds of thousands of pounds for employing illegal migrants in recent years, is alleged to have been a UK-based leader of a Chinese triad, though this would not be evidence of criminal conduct. Lam’s business interests include famous Chinese restaurants such as Royal China and a large site, Bang Bang Oriental Foodhall, in Colindale, London. Lam has campaigned in support of the CCP’s “reunification” agenda in the UK and is close to Chinese diplomats. He runs the European branch of a Hong Kong official organisation closely linked to the Hong Kong Economic & Trade Office in London. Through this relationship, Lam was pictured repeatedly with one of those convicted in the recent National Security Act trial. The other man convicted was a long-running member of another organisation Lam leads and sponsors. Evidence presented during the trial includes text messages between this second individual and a former senior Hong Kong police official, in which the former official refers to Lam as having been a 14K triad leader. The correspondence also suggests that the 14K had been asked by Beijing to undermine Hong Kong democracy activists in the UK. There is no evidence Lam did so or was otherwise involved in the crimes which the two men were found guilty of. UKCT will publish more information about Lam in the coming weeks.

  5. An individual, ‘Mr D’, who was blacklisted by the European Central Bank and ran a highly controversial investor visa programme in an EU country. Mr D is behind an ongoing CCP influence operation in the UK. Mr D’s whereabouts are unknown. Legal proceedings related to his activity in Ireland are ongoing. UKCT will publish more information about Mr D in the coming week.

  6. Feng Zhang 张锋 and Chi Tan Huynh were involved in a brawl in central London during which anti-CCP protestors were badly injured. Zhang, filmed repeatedly punching a Hong Kong democracy protestor in the head in London’s Chinatown in 2021, is a “patriot” with long-running connections to United Front work in the UK, having been pictured with Xi Jinping during the Chinese leader’s visit to the country. Huynh, filmed tussling with democracy protestors and later arguing with police, was convicted of conspiracy to facilitate the illegal entry of foreign nationals into the UK in 2018. A British far-left organisation which supported the event which led to the brawl is linked to Neville Roy Singham, an American billionaire who has spent hundreds of millions funding pro-CCP activity around the world, with hundreds of thousands of pounds sent to a British company. UKCT will publish more information about Zhang, Huynh, and Singham’s UK footprint in the coming weeks. 

    Many of these individuals and the organisations or enterprises with which they are associated are (or have been) based in London’s Chinatown. Just up the road from Whitehall and Westminster, Chinatown has long been celebrated as a cultural asset for the nation’s capital. It has always had connections to Britain’s underworld, however, and although the bombings and machete attacks of the last century are now a distant memory, Chinatown is still populated in part by prostitutes, irregular migrants paid below minimum wage, and major casinos, some linked on occasion in the past to money laundering.

    Too often, such characters been treated by politicians, police, and dignitaries as British Chinese communities’ legitimate representatives, possibly simply because of the proximity of their position in London to Whitehall, Westminster and Fleet Street. The acceptance of such characters as legitimate representatives does those communities great discredit. The promotion of these characters by the Chinese embassy in London, which has treated several of them as “Overseas Chinese leaders”, is similarly insulting. Most British Chinese people have nothing whatsoever to do with these dubious groups.

    The case studies outlined here are indicative of networks whose business ecosystems are interwoven with labour exploitation, questionable business practices, serious crime, and CCP influence. That this ecosystem has thrived so near to Westminster is a national security scandal that urgently requires a response.

    A note on Chinese organised crime at the street-level

    There is no suggestion that any of the individuals mentioned above are involved in these activities, unless stated otherwise elsewhere in UKCT’s forthcoming reporting. In general, Chinese organised crime in the UK has in recent years included:

  7. The smuggling of tobacco and other licit goods.

  8. Drugs cultivation and smuggling, including of synthetic opioids.

  9. Extortion, mostly from British Chinese communities.

  10. Loan sharking.

  11. Prostitution.

  12. Illegal gambling operations.

  13. Money laundering, including via physical and online casinos, and cryptocurrencies.

  14. Human trafficking.

  15. Illegal labour exploitation (in various industries).

Some of these crimes are sometimes partly or mostly committed or coordinated from overseas. UK-China Transparency would be happy to share the Wilson Report with anyone interested prior to its academic publication.

 

 

 The Great Nordic Convergence

After WWII, Finland, Sweden and Norway built Divergent Security Models in Response to the Same Threat. With Sweden's New Arctic Strategy the Last of Those Models Disappears 

Lukas Wahden 

 


 In early June, the Swedish government released a new Arctic Strategy. It supersedes a 2020 predecessor, which was representative of its time insofar as it contained little actual strategising, advocating instead for cross-border cooperation, environmental protection and sustainable development. The 2026 strategy, by contrast, squarely foregrounds military logics. It reframes the European Arctic from a region of political cooperation into a unified operational theatre, one in which Stockholm may claim much agency by offering its territory, infrastructure and military capabilities as instruments of collective deterrence.

The shift in Sweden’s tone surprised few, mirroring as it does the Arctic policy updates announced last year by Finland and Norway. All three of the states whose territories make up the European Arctic — bar Russia — are now within NATO, and all three have publicly committed to military integration, both inside the alliance and through complementary mini-lateral formats. Their Arctic strategies now echo each other in form and in substance. Each names Russia as an unequivocal threat, and the other two as indispensable allies.

 


 

Set against the war in Ukraine, this convergence of Nordic approaches to Arctic security at first sight appears self-explanatory. What makes it truly notable, however, is that it has no historical precedent. A shock emanating from Russia, the very same country that produced three divergent strategic reorientations across Fennoscandia after WWII, has this time produced a strategic convergence in the region. Military integration across the Nordics now appears a foregone conclusion, and has advanced at pace. Yet the cultural paradigm shift that drives it may run even deeper than any comparable recent reconfiguration in Europe, including Germany’s Zeitenwende or Macron’s efforts to strong-arm France’s security pivot from the south towards the northeast. Finland, Norway and Sweden survived neighbouring the Soviet Union on three fundamentally different security models. Under Putin, post-Soviet Russia has pushed all three to converge on essentially the same approach to regional defence.

It is worth dwelling on how the Nordic security cultures came about in the first place. A first factor is geography. With the northern parts of Finland, Sweden and Norway on average warmer, more densely populated, and better connected to southern metropoles than those of other Arctic states, politics in the Nordics has long played out uniformly across their national territories. Security, and life at large, in the Arctic regions of Sweden, Finland and Norway has always been inseparable from the security of their heartlands at large.

In the 1930s, Sweden, Finland and Norway then confronted the mounting threats of Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union. Norway prided itself on having held to neutrality through WWI, and its interwar security concept was optimistic about the country’s capacity to continue staying out of trouble. It maintained official neutrality, careful diplomacy, adherence to international law, geographical remoteness, and productive relations with Britain. Norway, it was hoped, was simply too peripheral to interest Europe’s feuding great powers.

The German invasion of 1940 upended these assumptions. The Nazis cared greatly about Norwegian geography, and about its north in particular, which offered defensible access to North Atlantic sea lines of communication, to Swedish iron ore deposits, and to maritime approaches to the Soviet Union. Britain, for its part, mined Norwegian waters days before the German landings and had troops embarked for a landing of its own. Five years of occupation, the Soviet liberation of eastern Finnmark, and the scorched-earth German retreat, deeply traumatised the young country. The war had falsified Oslo’s dearly held security tenets, at catastrophic cost.

After the war, Norway rearmed decisively and abandoned neutrality. Unable to stop the great powers from caring about its coastlines, Oslo set out to ensure that the powers it favoured would henceforth commit to proactively defending them, and became a founding member of NATO in 1949. Yet Norway simultaneously imposed limits on its own membership, including no permanent foreign bases in peacetime, no nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil, and a series of restraints on allied activity near the Soviet border (which were eased by the Norwegian governments in late August 2026). The hope was that this blend of integration, deterrence and reassurance towards the Soviets would keep the narrow Norwegian north from becoming a forward platform that Moscow would read as threatening.

Finland, by contrast, had spent the best part of the 1930s nourishing a dual approach of political neutrality and defence cooperation with neighbouring states, especially Sweden. As with Norway, the Finnish approach failed to safeguard peace. In November 1939, the USSR invaded Finland, and Sweden declined to enter the war. The Finns spent the next six years fighting alongside alternating foreign invasion forces, but always with the objective of regaining their independence. During the 1941-1944 Continuation War against the USSR, Finland banked on Nazi Germany to help it regain territories lost to Moscow in 1939. When the German front against the Soviet Union collapsed, Finland switched sides to fight with the USSR against Germany in 1944-1945. The Wehrmacht operated from northern Finland against the Soviet Arctic and Murmansk, Petsamo emerged as a strategically important wedge, and the German scorched-earth withdrawal towards the south devastated Finnish Lapland.

After the war, Finland, like Norway, concluded that its neutrality had failed it. But unlike Norway, the newly Soviet-aligned Finland did not enjoy the manoeuvring space required to join any western alliance. In 1948, Finland was muscled into signing the Finnish–Soviet “Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance”, which gained it political independence from the USSR, but in exchange obliged it to coordinate with Moscow on security issues. Simultaneously, Finland doubled down on universal conscription, and built up a formidable military force to independently deter the Soviet Union from attacking. For Finland, the end of WWII brought official neutrality, managed accommodation with Moscow, and an independent military deterrent maintained as an absolute national priority.

Sweden, lastly, concluded from the war that its own neutrality had been vindicated, but only by a hair’s breadth. The price of non-invasion had been high. Stockholm supplied Nazi Germany with iron ore throughout the war years and permitted German troop transit across its territory to occupied Norway. Britain, for its part, weighed interdicting the ore traffic and drew up plans to occupy Swedish ore fields under cover of aiding Finland. In the north, the Finnish wars exposed the vulnerability of open terrain in any wider regional conflict involving the Soviets. Protection for Sweden, in the end, had come from concessions, but also from meaningful military capability, extensive mobilisation, and a good deal of diplomatic luck.

Sweden thus resolved after 1945 to maintain its neutrality, but also that neutrality would only hold if backed by substantial military power. Swedish defence industries were expanded, universal conscription doubled down on, and from 1945 to 1972 the country ran a nuclear weapons research programme that even brought it within range of a deployable nuclear device in 1965. Stockholm’s proposal for a Nordic defence union, meanwhile, foundered on Norwegian insistence on American security guarantees. And while Sweden committed publicly to neutrality vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, it prepared in secret to receive Western military assistance in any regional conflict.

The three resulting models — armed neutrality in Sweden, territorial defence plus accommodation of Moscow in Finland, and alliance integration plus self-restraint in Norway — held until the Soviet collapse. The result was a fragmented security region, both in the Scandinavian south and north. From Moscow’s point of view, Finland could be assumed to remain pliant and posed no threat, Sweden mattered chiefly in the Baltic, its neutrality driving a wedge between allied northern territory and Finland, and Norwegian Finnmark was unlikely ever to become a viable staging area for a NATO offensive. Two of the three countries could be dealt with on the bilateral level typically preferred by the USSR. Seen from the allied side, the Norwegian north was highly vulnerable but of considerable value for intelligence collection. Norwegian Cold War planning was structured explicitly around giving up Finnmark, holding at the Lyngen position, and waiting for allied reinforcement from further south. The European Arctic thus never became a likely frontline of bloc confrontation, which showed in the comparatively modest ground deployments on both sides.

 


 

The fragmentation of the European Arctic security region became an irrelevant issue after 1991. But while the basic strategic tenets of the Nordics lasted untouched, deeply into the post-Cold War era and beyond the 2014 annexation of Crimea, they could not survive the shock of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. With Finland and Sweden now in NATO, the alliance’s operational area runs across the whole of Fennoscandia. The NATO-Russia border in the region grew from 196km before the war to more than 1,500km. Denmark, Finland and Sweden have been folded into the area of responsibility of JFC Norfolk, bringing the North Atlantic and the European Arctic under a single joint command. Beneath it sits Multi-Corps Land Component Command Northwest in Mikkeli, a headquarters capable of treating Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian land forces as components of one northern campaign. The Forward Land Forces battlegroup established in June 2026 under that structure is Swedish-led and based at Boden in Sweden, though it is designated FLF Finland, with its staff element at Rovaniemi. In the air domain, CAOC Bodø, activated in October 2025 as NATO’s third combined air operations centre, now plans and directs air operations across the Nordic region, the Baltic, the North Atlantic and the Barents. NATO is thus increasingly able to plan and execute a single integrated defence effort across the whole of the North.

But far from relying on NATO streamlining alone, the Nordics have also launched an ambitious supplementary programme of integration among themselves. NORDEFCO, which dates from 2009, was rebuilt after 2022. Its Vision 2030, signed in 2024, sets objectives including the ability to conduct and command multinational combined operations, host nation support and military mobility between and through the Nordic countries. The Nordic chiefs of defence followed in September 2024 with a joint Defence Concept setting out principles for acting together in peace, crisis and armed conflict. The air domain has gone furthest. In March 2023, before Sweden had even acceded, the air commanders of Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark signed a declaration of intent aiming to operate their roughly 250 fighters seamlessly as one force. Norway, chairing NORDEFCO this year, has set the ambition of making the Nordic region “the most integrated region in Europe within defence.” Should the war in Ukraine end, a rearming Russia would therefore face not three states with separate diplomatic and military approaches, but a group that plans as one and increasingly operates as one. A conflict there would no longer be three separate problems, such as a Norwegian delaying campaign in Finnmark, a Finnish effort fought alone, or a Swedish neutrality to be respected or violated at will, but a single campaign across one operational space against a very capable single opponent.

This is a fundamentally different outcome from the one produced by WWII and the early Cold War, and the plausible reasons are many. Russia is a weaker opponent than the Soviet Union ever was, and is seen as less predictable, raising threat perceptions accordingly. But the Nordics have changed too. Finland, Sweden and Norway are, by orders of magnitude, richer, militarily more capable and politically closer to one another than in 1945. And the alliance they have joined is not an uncertain proposition but a mature and deeply integrated organisation with seven decades behind it. From the Russian point of view, this constellation of factors, as well as the fundamentally altered security landscape of the European Arctic, should long have raised the alarm.

In the relevant Russian literature, as well as in media reporting and government statements, no such realisation seems to have sunk in, however. Some Russian commentary notes that accession gave NATO an almost continuous northern flank. Russian officials, however, still routinely speak of Arctic “militarisation”, juxtaposed with the cooperation baseline represented by the fledgling Arctic Council. But official Russia has not responded to the Nordic convergence as a convergence. Finland is addressed as a nation betraying its historical commitments, Norway barely at all. The Swedish strategy drew no Russian ministerial statements. Its most substantive mentions came from Sergei Belyaev, the Russian ambassador in Stockholm, in a RIA Novosti interview nearly three months after, and even there it was a secondary item in a conversation mostly about detained shipping.

Should the war in Ukraine end on terms that let Russia reconstitute its military, the European Arctic will pose a problem neither side has had to wrestle with before. A rearming Russia will confront not three states with separate national arrangements, but a Nordic bloc that increasingly operates as one, and that in the air already operates jointly. The asymmetry that structured the Cold War-era European Arctic is gone. Whether that configuration can produce stability is an open question. Deterrence works when the opposing side reads a posture as defensive, which cannot be said of Russia’s visible evaluations of Nordic military integration. In any case, the European Arctic is unambiguously more militarised than at any point since WWII, and whether it is safer will not be clear until the war in Ukraine, which produced this transformation, finally ends.

 

 

 The Perfect Storm

How Compounding Shocks are Breaking the Global Food System

Atlas  

 


 

 A simple loaf of bread gives little indication of the extraordinary revolution that brought it to the supermarket shelf. Modern agriculture produces more food with fewer people and less land than ever before, transforming what was once a localized, weather-dependent gamble into a remarkable exercise in global efficiency.

Historically, a farm’s success depended entirely on local inputs and immediate surroundings, leaving it completely vulnerable to regional shocks. Intuitively, you might expect today’s interconnected world to have solved this. By sourcing nutrients, labor, and transport across a vast global web, the modern food system should be more resilient than ever. If a disruption hits somewhere in the chain, the network should easily absorb it by rerouting, using different suppliers, or drawing from diversified buffers.

However, maximum efficiency often comes at the cost of redundancy. As multiple compounding pressures now begin to mount simultaneously across the globe, they are driving the food system toward a scenario that would immediately remind meteorologists of the Perfect Storm.

The phrase entered the public lexicon after the catastrophic 1991 storm off the coast of New England, when a developing low-pressure system, a powerful blocking high, and the remnants of Hurricane Grace converged under highly unusual conditions. The result was a nor’easter far more powerful than any of those individual forces could have produced alone. The danger lay not in any single weather system, but in their precise, fateful convergence.

Today, that exact dynamic is no longer just a metaphor. The convergence of compounding disruptions is the reality unfolding across our food chain. 

As a foundational staple food and critical grain, wheat sits close to the core of the global food system, yet its production is unusually concentrated.

Russia is the world’s largest exporter, while Ukraine remains one of the world’s most important suppliers of wheat, corn, and other grains. Together, the two countries account for roughly 30% of global wheat exports, shipping the vast majority of this harvest across the waters they share. This makes the Black Sea far more than a regional shipping corridor; the body of water is instead one of the world’s most important arteries for moving calories from surplus regions to food-importing countries.

Tragically, the war is now choking that vital food artery from both sides. While Russia initially held a monopoly on terrorizing Ukrainian ports and grain routes around Odesa back in 2022, Kyiv is no longer hesitating to return the favor by dismantling Russia’s own export infrastructure. Last week, Ukrainian drone and missile strikes on the Russian port of Novorossiysk damaged two major grain export terminals, while Russian strikes targeted grain cargo vessels in Odesa. 

 


 

 Ukraine has aggressively rerouted exports through roads, railways, and the Danube ports of Reni and Izmail, while Russia routes its exports through the same region. These alternatives offer redundancy rather than equal capacity, and the waterways are fast reaching their limits. By late August, up to 70 vessels were backed up near the Sulina Canal with a throughput of just three ships a day. With costs reaching $8,000 per vessel daily, exports have plummeted to a fraction of normal volumes.

As a direct result, Chicago Wheat Futures surged to a 3-year high last week, underscoring how quickly physical disruptions translate into severe global market shocks.

The crisis has shifted downstream to the rivers. Yet, for a different reason.

Take the Rhine, Europe’s vital inland waterway connecting North Sea ports to the German industrial heartland. It handles everything from agricultural commodities to fuel and other bulk goods, but its capacity is fixed by nature. When low water levels or blockages disrupt shipping, there are no extra lanes to open—and the shockwaves ripple immediately across the entire European logistics chain.

 


 

 In August, water levels at Kaub, one of the Rhine's critical shallow points, fell below 10 centimeters for several days, effectively disrupting shipping south of Mainz. Barge operators were forced to slash payloads as freight costs surged to record highs. The crisis grew so severe that French shipping giant CMA CGM introduced an emergency inland surcharge to offset the paralyzed traffic across the Rhine and other vital European waterways.

For farmers, rivers serve a dual purpose: they are essential for irrigation, livestock hydration, and crop production, but also act as the primary highway for exporting produce and importing agricultural inputs. Low water levels therefore trigger a severe dual squeeze, disrupting vital on-farm water supplies while sending transport costs for both imports and exports skyrocketing.

 


 

Crucially, this vulnerability is global. Vital shipping lanes for the global food chain are facing escalating threats from extreme weather. Prolonged droughts are repeatedly crippling traffic through the Panama Canal—the primary maritime shortcut connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans for major food and crop shipments. Meanwhile, extreme low-water levels on the Mississippi and the Danube are routinely forcing operators to slash cargo loads, directly threatening agricultural supply lines.

Ultimately, this demonstrates how food can grow more expensive without any actual shortage of supply. When vital waterways stall, soaring transport costs trickle down to your grocery bill. After all, if a barge is forced to operate at half-capacity, the number of required journeys multiplies, and consumers foot the bill.

Yet, transport is only half the equation. Before food can ever be shipped, it has to be grown—and modern agriculture depends on a handful of critical inputs. Chief among them is fertilizer, whose supply chain is itself inextricably tied to energy.

Within this category, nitrogen fertilizer is particularly vital. Ammonia, the basis of most nitrogen fertilizers, relies heavily on hydrogen derived from natural gas. This makes energy a fundamental input into the food system: from gas to fertilizer, from fertilizer to yields, and from yields to grain. Consequently, disrupt one link, and the effects travel relentlessly down the chain.

This interconnectedness explains why the Strait of Hormuz matters far beyond oil. Around 8% of global ammonia production sits behind the strait, while Qatari gas and LNG supply fertilizer plants around the world. As a result, any disruption can hit twice: by restricting fertilizer exports directly, and by cutting off the energy needed to produce fertilizer elsewhere—as recently seen when Middle Eastern conflict cut off Qatari LNG supplies and forced major gas-based fertilizer plants in India to temporarily shut down.

 


 

Alarmingly, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has warned that this fertilizer scarcity threatens to suppress yields and tighten food supplies well into 2027. They highlighted a strict agricultural reality:

“Agriculture operates within a crop calendar that cannot be postponed. Fertilizers must be applied at specific moments in the crop cycle. If they do not arrive on time, yields are reduced, regardless of what happens later.”

Because of this rigid timeline, the next planting season carries far higher stakes than the current harvest. Farmers may still be gathering pre-disruption crops, making today’s shortage feel nearly invisible. This persistent tightening continues to choke supply, as exporting nations have slammed the door, starkly illustrated when Russia suspended ammonium nitrate exports in April, cutting off roughly 25% of the global ammonium nitrate supply.

Adding to the strain, the Hormuz shock feeds directly into input costs farmers cannot simply absorb.

Modern farming relies heavily on diesel to power tractors, combines, and grain trucks—making fuel prices a critical variable that dictates the economics of every single planting and harvest season. Particularly in the United States and Europe, diesel prices are approaching all-time highs. The nationwide U.S. average hit $5.62 per gallon in August—just twenty cents shy of the record set in May 2022.

 


 

The drivers are clear: global supply shortages caused by refinery damage from conflicts, shipping disruptions in key waterways, and deeply depleted fuel inventories. For Russia—the world's second-largest diesel exporter—the crisis is so severe that domestic supplies have forced drastic intervention:

“Russia is set to extend its diesel export ban through September as fuel shortages persist in the domestic market, with a number of refineries still idle following repeated Ukrainian drone attacks, three industry sources told Reuters.

One of the sources said extending the ban until the end of the year is also under discussion.”

For American farmers, the timing couldn’t be worse. The United States is the world’s second-largest agricultural diesel consumer after China, far outpacing every other country. Diesel accounts for roughly 5% of production costs for major crops like wheat, corn, and soybeans, even before factoring in transportation. During the 2025–26 planting season alone, U.S. farmers spent an estimated $1.4 billion more on diesel than the year before—and costs heading into the harvest season are projected to eclipse even that figure.

The drivers are clear: global supply shortages caused by refinery damage from conflicts, shipping disruptions in key waterways, and deeply depleted fuel inventories. For Russia—the world's second-largest diesel exporter—the crisis is so severe that domestic supplies have forced drastic intervention:

“Russia is set to extend its diesel export ban through September as fuel shortages persist in the domestic market, with a number of refineries still idle following repeated Ukrainian drone attacks, three industry sources told Reuters.

One of the sources said extending the ban until the end of the year is also under discussion.”

For American farmers, the timing couldn’t be worse. The United States is the world’s second-largest agricultural diesel consumer after China, far outpacing every other country. Diesel accounts for roughly 5% of production costs for major crops like wheat, corn, and soybeans, even before factoring in transportation. During the 2025–26 planting season alone, U.S. farmers spent an estimated $1.4 billion more on diesel than the year before—and costs heading into the harvest season are projected to eclipse even that figure.

The high fuel prices compound the ongoing fertilizer shock. As a result, farmers are squeezed at every turn: paying more to prepare fields, plant, harvest, and transport yields to market. Unlike fertilizer, where application rates can sometimes be tweaked, the required fieldwork demands fuel. This relentless cost pressure cascades through every single stage of the agricultural cycle.

Consequently, the real question is how farmers will adapt when planning their next crops. They may shift their crop mix or plant fewer acres. While individual decisions might seem modest, multiplied across millions of hectares, they ultimately dictate the size of the next global harvest.

Skeptics might argue that food prices have peaked, argueing that high prices for some of these critical agricultural inputs have persisted throughout 2026.

However, the IMF estimates that it takes six to twelve months for commodity and producer price shifts to fully reach grocery store shelves, as goods move through processing, packaging, and distribution. Today’s supermarket prices reflect yesterday’s conditions rather than current production realities. By the time higher prices hit consumers, the decisions driving them were made months prior.

And precisely while that lag is playing out, tomorrow's harvests are already under threat.

According to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the Super El Niño continues to intensify steadily and is expected to dominate global climate patterns from August to October. The phenomenon is projected to drive price shocks through 2028, disrupting rainfall and temperatures in major agricultural regions and adding immense uncertainty to an already fragile planting season. Goldman Sachs analysts warn that the intensity of this weather pattern could trigger a 16% surge in global food commodity prices.

 

 


 

 Crucially, El Niño doesn’t need to cause a total global crop failure to do damage. Normally, a poor harvest in one region is balanced by surplus elsewhere—the great advantage of a globalized food market. But that flexibility relies on having a safety margin. When shipping lanes are jammed, alternative routes congested, farm inputs overpriced, and margins razor-thin, a weather shock doesn’t need to destroy an entire harvest. It only needs to strip away the system’s last remaining layer of slack.

To illustrate, the Russian experience shows how quickly this crisis turns circular. Despite a massive grain harvest exceeding 100 million tonnes, Russia struggles to export its grain due to disrupted Black Sea routes. As unsold wheat accumulates, domestic prices plummet, forcing the government to weigh expensive alternative corridors through the Baltic, Caspian, and Arctic. Consequently, some farmers are already demanding reduced winter sowing to avoid another surplus—even as officials warn this threatens long-term food security.

Ultimately, this is the great paradox at the heart of today’s food system: a country can sit on a mountain of grain and still tighten the global market. The issue is rarely total production; rather, it is the ability to connect supply with demand at the right time and a reasonable cost.

The cruelest aspect of the crisis is where the burden ultimately lands. Many of the world’s developing nations remain deeply dependent on imported staple foods, while possessing zero financial cushion to absorb sudden price spikes. 

 


 

 The underlying vulnerability is absolute: when supply chains break down, and essential operational costs surge concurrently, import-dependent nations run out of alternatives—and the means to pay for them. Because of this, the countries with the smallest buffers are facing some of the largest challenges

This is what makes the current environment so dangerous. The food system was engineered for efficiency, not for a cascade of compounding shocks hitting all at once. A blocked Black Sea corridor, a dry riverbed, an unaffordable fertilizer shortage, soaring diesel prices, or a shifting El Niño weather pattern could each be managed in isolation. When they lock together, however, they reinforce one another and rapidly strip away the very redundancy globalization was built to provide.

Much like the legendary convergence off the New England coast, the true threat is not any single force, but the fateful moment when multiple pressures collide—leaving the global pantry with nowhere left to absorb the blow.


 

 

Friday, August 28, 2026

 The New Middle East : Six Volatile Regions Raising the Global Stakes

Shifting Alliances and Conflicts are Creating Fresh Geopolitical Challenges. It’s Time to Rename an Interlinked Theatre Stretching from the Sahel to India

Simon Sebag-Montefiore 

 


 

This month three Islamic powers, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, signed a treaty that promised to change the region for ever. Its ambitions were planetary: nothing less than a Middle Eastern Nato with its own Article Five, guaranteeing mutual defence — and in case anyone missed its totemic significance, they signed it in Mecca, named it the Mecca Pact and then prayed together in Masjid al-Haram, the Great Mosque.

Whether one calls the present Middle Eastern conflict — the spasms of violence unleashed by Hamas’s attack on Israel in October 2023 — the Third Gulf war or the October 7 wars, this is not just about whether Iran has nuclear weapons or who controls the Strait of Hormuz.

Rather, this signals a dramatic and momentous new era with fresh contenders, new rules and wider boundaries in a broader tournament of power that accelerates a convergence of strategic theatres and makes the very term “Middle East” obsolete.

On paper, the Mecca Pact has potential: it musters the only Islamic nuclear power, Pakistan, which has a population of 260 million and a battle-hardened army of 600,000; Saudi Arabia, leader of the Sunni Arab world, largest state in the Middle East with vast oil reserves and the prestige of the guardianship of the Islamic holy cities; and Turkey, pivotal Eurasian power, Ottoman successor state, deployer of Nato’s second-largest army and a superb tech-military capability (including drones).

Their leaders are sophisticated players: Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi crown prince already in power for 11 years but still only 40, is a dynamic autocratic reformer capable of ruthless measures and dramatic advances in his quest for Saudi security; Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 72, Turkey’s Islamist autocrat, in power for 25 years, combines ambitions to promote a Muslim Brotherhood mission with a neo-imperial project across the provinces of the former Ottoman sultanate that ruled virtually the entire Arab world.

Third is the man who is in effect Pakistan’s ruler, Field Marshal Asim Munir, 58, who has managed (at least for now) to bypass his country’s chronic instability and give it a surprising if fragile and probably temporary role as a regional contender.

All Middle East statesmen have historically needed to handle the chief imperial powers of their day, whether it was the top potentate of the region, the Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid before the First World War, the British or French premiers Lloyd George and Clemenceau after it or Khrushchev and Kennedy, Brezhnev and Nixon in the Cold War. 

 


 

 But these three are adept at playing the most capricious of world emperors, Donald Trump. Erdogan appeals to the president’s taste for swaggering autocrats; MBS, the grandson of King Abdulaziz, conqueror of Saudi Arabia, is the quintessence of dynastic power that appeals to Trump’s neo-tsarism.

The emergence of Pakistan as regional player is the culmination of Pakistani dreams of Islamic leadership since its independence in 1947. It is surprising because the country is a hybrid of intermittent democracy, feudal dynasticism, fervent Islamism and praetorian rule, often close to bankruptcy and mayhem. 

Yet Munir and his fey frontman, premier Shehbaz Sharif, dynast of a perennial power family, have leveraged the Trumpian triptych of state, family and business to thrive in the presidential court — Trump calls Munir “my favourite field marshal” — and become mediator with Iran.

The pact is aimed at the two Middle Eastern powers who are regarded as dangerous threats — most immediately, a rampaging but wounded Iran, which is bombarding the US allies Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. The Iranians regard their Arab neighbours with imperious disdain — Ayatollah Khomeini called the Saudis “the camelgrazers of Riyadh and barbarians of Najd” — while the present leaders have long plotted to destroy the “family states” of the Gulf, “even before we get to destroy Israel”. The feeling is mutual: as soon as the Iranians were vulnerable after the fall of the Shah, Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, funded by the Saudis.

 


 

This is all recent history: the Revolutionary Guard generals who now command Iran under their hidden (possibly dead) supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei earned their spurs as twentysomething officers in that Eighties war.

Iran’s tyranny is battered, its economy shattered, the blood barely dry from its slaughter of 40,000 protesters in January, and it has lost vassals — Hamas decimated, Hezbollah weakened, Syria fallen — but has been preparing for this war for decades, which its Shia theology, apocalyptic Mahdism, murderous tyranny, mosaic strategy, geographical assets and anti-western resistance radicalism qualify it to fight.

The pact is also aimed at Israel, which, since October 7, will no longer tolerate local threats on its borders. Spectacular in tactics and technology but exhausted in strategy and war-weary, it is overstretched and struggling to bank its early gains because of the poisonous antics of extremist firestarters in its shambolic government. 

But despite diplomatic froideur in Europe, Israel has new alliances. That with the UAE through the Abraham Accords has deepened; as has the link with Greece. Israel and India are bonding over their horror at Pakistan’s new prominence. Then there is America.

The Mecca Pact is a tonic for the chronic vertigo and painful whiplash that MBS and the Gulf powers are experiencing from Trump. It is not the swagger and lucre of his neo-tsarism that they object to but the wild unpredictability and social-media rhodomontades, as well as the failure of the US to protect its allies and, alarmingly, its own bases. The US has always been feckless: “It’s dangerous to be America’s enemy but to be America’s friend is fatal,” said Henry Kissinger. 

 


 

 But after this Third Gulf war, no one will trust America again — hence the Saudis are making other security arrangements, what traders call a “hedge”, that do not exclude American alliance or even one day (if ever the Israelis open a pathway towards some definition of Palestinian statehood) the Abraham Accords.

Yet all of this is based on vulnerability. Saudi Arabia, the world’s eighth-largest arms buyer, found its American jets and brilliant pilots did not defeat the Houthis, safe in the caves of their northern stronghold Sadah, during a brutal war that started in 2015 and is still going on. The kingdom faces attacks from south and north, Houthi and Iranian. But is the pact really a new Nato? Would Pakistan and Turkey fight the Houthis, yet alone Iran? Doubtful.

Turkey is a clever player of the international system, having squeezed billions out of the EU to control its refugees, occupied zones of Syria and Iraq, not to mention Cyprus, without any penalties. But its Nato membership is a restraint as well as a boon, while its success depends in part on the prestige of the ailing but wily Erdogan, who has mismanaged its economy and resorts to brazen repression to restrain rising opposition.

If Turkey clashed with Israel or Iran, would the other two join? Pakistan brandishes the trophy of the only “Islamic bomb”, as its father-premier Ali Bhutto called it, and it hates Israel — it sent jets to fight the Israelis in the Yom Kippur War.

But if Pakistan became embroiled in the Middle East, its Indian flank would be temptingly vulnerable — and co-ordinated between Delhi and Jerusalem; its Afghan gadfly might not be able to resist its other flank; and would the Saudis and Turks really be on for fighting India? Impossible. Pakistan may really be in this for the prestige and Saudi billions. Last, the pact lacks the greatest Arab state, Egypt, restrained by its treaty with Israel.

 


 

 Amid freefalling flux and dangerous jeopardy, Middle Eastern powers are rehearsing different conjunctions in their desperate instinct to find security and stability. This is partly reaction to, and reflection of, the new multiplayer world game. Just beneath the three mega-powers (US, China and a diminished Russia) loom energetic new continental powers, unrestrained by Cold War ideology and alliances, and able to follow their own interests in a scramble for power and safety that less resembles the 19th century, more the world before the Thirty Years’ War of the 17th.

Rise of the new middle powers

These powers come in all sizes: the empire states, Iran and Turkey, sophisticated societies who combine versions of Islamism with aspirations to recapture the glories of historic empires; the dynamic, chaotic war democracy Israel; the absolute monarchy of Saudi Arabia; and what I call the boutique powers, the UAE and Qatar, who created a new template as luxury monarchies that in their cosmopolitan success have been a standing rebuke to the grim Mahdist praetorians of bleak Iran.

The civil war in Sudan, by far the greatest humanitarian tragedy in the Middle East since 2023, with 400,000 slaughtered and 12 million displaced, has become an arena for uninhibited power competition between Middle Eastern powers: Turks, Emiratis, Saudis, Iranians and Egyptians.

The Middle East is strategically essential to any world power for all sorts of reasons — geographical and geological as well as its multiethnic, multi-sectarian composition and the way its states were formed after the world wars. But behind the fray of the Third Gulf war, something else is happening. The Middle East itself is ceasing to be a distinct theatre.

 


 

Starting around the time that Britain took over direct rule of India, the expression “Middle East” was favoured by the imperial powers Britain and France since it lay between the British Raj and home metropoles. It was closely related to the “Near East”, which was linked to the Eastern Question about the future of the Ottoman Empire, from its capital Constantinople to the Middle Eastern domains it ruled for 400 years.

After the Ottoman and western empires had departed, the Soviets and Americans conducted their rivalries in convenient spheres — southeast Asia, Latin America, as well as the Middle East. Even then the local potentates — the Shah of Iran, Nasser of Egypt, Nuri al-Said of royal Iraq and Saddam of Baathist Iraq, Assad of Syria and democratic premiers of Israel, from Ben-Gurion to Rabin and Netanyahu — were experts at both playing off the superpowers and doing what they wanted anyway. At times American hegemony was an opportunity for the region — the Oslo Accords, for example, between Israel and Palestinians came close to settling that insoluble conundrum.

But 9/11 diverted America’s power into destroying Saddam’s Iraq instead of Iran. Tehran exploited US vulnerability and the removal of Iraq to forge an informal empire of what its paramilitary maestro General Soleimani called the Six Armies, including Hamas and Hezbollah, that would defend Iran with Arab blood on Arab land. 

 


 

 But Hamas’s October 7 slaughter demonstrated the perils of proxies: ultimately the proxy lights a fuse that leads straight back to the patron. The fate of Iranian power is yet to be decided but its eclipse — along with America’s mixed performance, Israel’s inconclusive semi-successes and the Russia-Ukraine war — have combined to break down the last boundaries of the traditional Middle East.

The best way to understand this is to glance at the foreign advisers or troops who are, in large or small numbers, now present in wider Arabia: there is nothing new about the American presence in Gulf bases but now there are Ukrainian advisers setting up anti-missile systems, 10,000 Pakistani troops and jets in Saudi Arabia, Iranian advisers in Yemen and Israelis with anti-missile systems in UAE.

These are striking developments: however small the Israeli contingent, there have not been Jewish warriors in Arabia since the Jewish kingdom of Himyar (Yemen) between AD390-500 and certainly not since the triumph of the Prophet Muhammad. As for Ukraine, a state that has only fully existed for 35 years is now a world military power sophisticated enough to station advisers in the region.

What we are seeing is the convergence of theatres: regions that we have long regarded as separate and distinct are increasingly interlinked and fusing. The first is the Russia-Ukraine theatre. Second is southern Europe — the Byzantine theatre — between Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, Israel.

Third are the new powers of the former Romanov tsardom, central Asia and Caucasus: Azerbaijan, the oil-rich Caspian republic ruled by the Aliev dynasty, is close to both Turkey and Israel; Uzbekistan is close to Turkey; Kazakhstan has just signed the Abraham Accords with Israel.

Fourth is south Asia, where, as we have seen, India and Pakistan are seeking Middle Eastern allies. Fifth is a conflict that is already hot and murderous: the battle of east Africa, including the genocidal conflict in Sudan in which many Middle Eastern powers have stakes. Ethiopia is allied with Israel and Somaliland, where it hopes to get a port.

It is planning to damn the Nile on which Egypt depends for its lifegiving Nilotic lushness: Egypt threatens war. Ethiopia also aspires to a port in Eritrea, which in turn is allied with Egypt and Saudi. This could become the War of the Horn.

The sixth theatre is already in flames: the Sahel — that band of coup-stricken failed states backed variously by Russia, France and the US, including Mali, Chad and Niger, who are fighting Islamic State/al-Qaeda militias that could sweep into northern Nigeria or west Africa or through the failed state of Libya in the north to menace the Levant or join the Sudanese war.

Potential merging of six theatres

These six theatres could ultimately merge into a much larger conflagration. A flashover — that moment when a housefire expands from a room to an inferno — could lead to a Third World War; but more likely it will lead to interlinked alliances and intermittent connected conflicts, particularly in Africa.

The US is suffering a crisis of both arms and credibility in Iran, but an armed blockade was always a better strategy than hot war and there are signs that a determined blockade may be starting to damage Iran, for all its defiance. Notwithstanding its follies and inconsistencies, America will remain the megapower, with the tradition, the relationships and the power to maintain a presence here.

Just listing these convergences and the potential flashovers demonstrates how desperately the world needs a judicious, measured US that will still have the authority to guard its interests and those of the open world — and prevent the worst scenarios.

Whatever its role, we need a different name for the Middle East and a different way of looking at the emerging single theatre from the Sahel to India. That is how the leaders of the region are thinking; EU and US politicians and business leaders need to catch up.

West Asia was once fashionable, but it leaves out Africa and Europe. Swana (Southwest Asia, north Africa), favoured by decolonialist activists, excludes southern Europe (Greece, the Caucasus) and east Africa and the Horn, where much of the action is taking place.

The Greater Middle East (Game) maintains the neo-imperialism of the Middle East. West Asia, south Europe, Africa (Wasef) does the job but the most sonorous is Semastia (South Europe, Middle East, Africa north and east, and west Asia).

Whatever name does or doesn’t catch on, this is perhaps the only harmless part of this potentially lethal tournament of power that marks the end of what we used to call the Middle East.

The Cauldron: The Making of the Modern Middle East by Simon Sebag Montefiore will be published by Weidenfeld & Nicolson on August 25