India’s In Its Rise : Between Dragon and Tide

Antonio Ricardo Gamelkoorn

 

 

 

• China’s expanding military, economic and infrastructural footprint across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is challenging India’s primacy and geographical advantage by increasing pressure around crucial Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and chokepoints.

• India is responding by developing maritime infrastructure on Great Nicobar and Lakshadweep, expanding surveillance and naval reach, and placing greater emphasis on securing vulnerable chokepoints and shipping lanes.

• Because of the asymmetry between India and China, India’s strongest answer lies in strategic partnerships, regional capacity-building and stepping into the role of preferred net security provider and development assistance partner for Indian Ocean States.

The continental factors along with the shifting world order have forced India’s hand in its strategic approach. India has returned to its strategic hedging approach, but faces threats from all fronts. To navigate the fracturing world order, India seeks to increase its capacity under its threat perception through stronger collaborative chains, strategic military infrastructure, securing crucial maritime corridors and developing improved military capacity to raise its overall role in the geopolitical theatre. Currently, the biggest threat is China, by increasing pressure on multiple fronts and furthering relations with Pakistan. Historically, for most of the Sino-Indian rivalry, the map pointed north. However, New Delhi is now looking south, as Beijing’s flagship project, the Belt and Road Initiative, further enlarges China’s active development, growing influence, and increase of Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean Region. With the vast expanse of vital Sea Lines of Communication, connecting Europe, Africa, Asia, and prominent chokepoints harboured in the IOR, the security of the ocean is most crucial. This raises the question:

In what manner, and to what extent, can India grow its capacity to help secure the Indian Ocean Region while navigating China’s growing presence?

India’s Vulnerability to China’s Opportunity

In historical context, India has cause to increase its maritime capacity to repel and prevent possible pressure from the Indian Ocean. Its maritime strategic culture has been shaped by its history, as during the period of British raj, India’s loss of independence was attributed to a lack of control over the waters to its south. Consequently, India was exposed to colonial rule for nearly 200 years, from 1757 until 1947, which was accompanied by concomitant developmental constraints. However, post-independence India equally struggled to address the maritime frontiers. The recurring conflicts and unresolved territorial engagements with its continental neighbours to the north (e.g. 1962 Sino-Indian war, the 1965 war with Pakistan) left India distracted, and financially incapable to develop its maritime capacity to a much needed standard. The continental theatre proved much more dangerous and threatening, with China and Pakistan applying multifrontal pressure on India, which directed resources towards the Army and Air Force, allowing policymakers to neglect maritime development. The geopolitical environment surrounding India became relatively benign in the 1990s, with major security challenges coming in the form of terror attacks, border disputes and the dynamic nuclear escalation. However with India opening its borders to global trade, its reliance on SLOCs for trade provided necessary traction for reforms to proactively develop the Indian Navy (IN). India’s maritime diplomacy has broadened alongside its material naval expansion. As a result of the absence of strategic competition in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi was able to play a prominent role and ensure a favorable and secure Indian Ocean for its strategic interests. Yet the ever-widening strategic and capacity gap between China and India, through Beijing’s economic growth and military modernisation, allowed China to offer substantial economic projects and assistance in South Asia and the IOR. However, China’s ability to insert itself in India’s backyard was because New Delhi left vulnerabilities for China to exploit. Hence, India’s vulnerability became China’s opportunity.

“Maritime power, for India, functions less as an alternative to continental deterrence against China and more as a complementary axis of leverage in a strategic environment where land and sea pressures have become mutually reinforcing.” - Dr. Abhigya Langeh, Research Assistant, Head, Chinese and Tibetan Studies, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), HQ IDS, Ministry of Defence .

China’s growing presence sharpened India’s concern regarding its position in the IOR, combined with the historical factor, the 2015 SAGAR, ‘Security and Growth for All in the Region’ vision, was launched, and positioned India as cooperative net security provider and development partner within the IOR. The more recently announced MAHASAGAR from 2025, broadened its vision to ‘Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions’. Although MAHASAGAR was not an officially formulated strategy to oppose Chinese presence, its expansion provides an answer to the intensifying competition with Beijing for influence across the Indian Ocean and beyond.

Why is China so threatening?

India’s threat perception of China stems from the confluence of continental, maritime and economic pressures. Unresolved border disputes place Chinese military power on India’s continental fronts, while Beijing’s partnership with Pakistan expands the pressure-point to the West and across the Indian Ocean. The significant military and economic power gap between the two states restrains India’s room for manoeuvre. Hence, India’s maritime threat perception has increasingly been shaped by what analysts describe as the ‘String of Pearls’. China’s ‘String of Pearls’ refers to the growth of economic, infrastructural and potentially military access across the Indian Ocean with the emergence of its maritime network spanning across IOR. However, the term ‘String of Pearls’ is used to describe China’s strategy, but it is not an officially declared national strategy. Chinese entities have financed, constructed, operated or acquired stakes in numerous commercial ports across the IOR, several of which possess the physical characteristics to support naval vessels. The existence of Chinese dual-use facilities located directly in India’s own backyard, enhances the pressure points on both economic and military fronts. India’s naval development, formulated in 2011, was coined ‘Necklace of Diamonds’, an additional metaphor to characterise its response to China’s growing presence, but not an official government discourse.

 

 

• China’s expanding military, economic and infrastructural footprint across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is challenging India’s primacy and geographical advantage by increasing pressure around crucial Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and chokepoints.

• India is responding by developing maritime infrastructure on Great Nicobar and Lakshadweep, expanding surveillance and naval reach, and placing greater emphasis on securing vulnerable chokepoints and shipping lanes.

• Because of the asymmetry between India and China, India’s strongest answer lies in strategic partnerships, regional capacity-building and stepping into the role of preferred net security provider and development assistance partner for Indian Ocean States.

The continental factors along with the shifting world order have forced India’s hand in its strategic approach. India has returned to its strategic hedging approach, but faces threats from all fronts. To navigate the fracturing world order, India seeks to increase its capacity under its threat perception through stronger collaborative chains, strategic military infrastructure, securing crucial maritime corridors and developing improved military capacity to raise its overall role in the geopolitical theatre. Currently, the biggest threat is China, by increasing pressure on multiple fronts and furthering relations with Pakistan. Historically, for most of the Sino-Indian rivalry, the map pointed north. However, New Delhi is now looking south, as Beijing’s flagship project, the Belt and Road Initiative, further enlarges China’s active development, growing influence, and increase of Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean Region. With the vast expanse of vital Sea Lines of Communication, connecting Europe, Africa, Asia, and prominent chokepoints harboured in the IOR, the security of the ocean is most crucial. This raises the question:

In what manner, and to what extent, can India grow its capacity to help secure the Indian Ocean Region while navigating China’s growing presence?

India’s Vulnerability to China’s Opportunity

In historical context, India has cause to increase its maritime capacity to repel and prevent possible pressure from the Indian Ocean. Its maritime strategic culture has been shaped by its history, as during the period of British raj, India’s loss of independence was attributed to a lack of control over the waters to its south. Consequently, India was exposed to colonial rule for nearly 200 years, from 1757 until 1947, which was accompanied by concomitant developmental constraints. However, post-independence India equally struggled to address the maritime frontiers. The recurring conflicts and unresolved territorial engagements with its continental neighbours to the north (e.g. 1962 Sino-Indian war, the 1965 war with Pakistan) left India distracted, and financially incapable to develop its maritime capacity to a much needed standard. The continental theatre proved much more dangerous and threatening, with China and Pakistan applying multifrontal pressure on India, which directed resources towards the Army and Air Force, allowing policymakers to neglect maritime development. The geopolitical environment surrounding India became relatively benign in the 1990s, with major security challenges coming in the form of terror attacks, border disputes and the dynamic nuclear escalation. However with India opening its borders to global trade, its reliance on SLOCs for trade provided necessary traction for reforms to proactively develop the Indian Navy (IN). India’s maritime diplomacy has broadened alongside its material naval expansion. As a result of the absence of strategic competition in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi was able to play a prominent role and ensure a favorable and secure Indian Ocean for its strategic interests. Yet the ever-widening strategic and capacity gap between China and India, through Beijing’s economic growth and military modernisation, allowed China to offer substantial economic projects and assistance in South Asia and the IOR. However, China’s ability to insert itself in India’s backyard was because New Delhi left vulnerabilities for China to exploit. Hence, India’s vulnerability became China’s opportunity.

“Maritime power, for India, functions less as an alternative to continental deterrence against China and more as a complementary axis of leverage in a strategic environment where land and sea pressures have become mutually reinforcing.” - Dr. Abhigya Langeh, Research Assistant, Head, Chinese and Tibetan Studies, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), HQ IDS, Ministry of Defence .

China’s growing presence sharpened India’s concern regarding its position in the IOR, combined with the historical factor, the 2015 SAGAR, ‘Security and Growth for All in the Region’ vision, was launched, and positioned India as cooperative net security provider and development partner within the IOR. The more recently announced MAHASAGAR from 2025, broadened its vision to ‘Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions’. Although MAHASAGAR was not an officially formulated strategy to oppose Chinese presence, its expansion provides an answer to the intensifying competition with Beijing for influence across the Indian Ocean and beyond.

Why is China so threatening?

India’s threat perception of China stems from the confluence of continental, maritime and economic pressures. Unresolved border disputes place Chinese military power on India’s continental fronts, while Beijing’s partnership with Pakistan expands the pressure-point to the West and across the Indian Ocean. The significant military and economic power gap between the two states restrains India’s room for manoeuvre. Hence, India’s maritime threat perception has increasingly been shaped by what analysts describe as the ‘String of Pearls’. China’s ‘String of Pearls’ refers to the growth of economic, infrastructural and potentially military access across the Indian Ocean with the emergence of its maritime network spanning across IOR. However, the term ‘String of Pearls’ is used to describe China’s strategy, but it is not an officially declared national strategy. Chinese entities have financed, constructed, operated or acquired stakes in numerous commercial ports across the IOR, several of which possess the physical characteristics to support naval vessels. The existence of Chinese dual-use facilities located directly in India’s own backyard, enhances the pressure points on both economic and military fronts. India’s naval development, formulated in 2011, was coined ‘Necklace of Diamonds’, an additional metaphor to characterise its response to China’s growing presence, but not an official government discourse.

 

 

“a “Necklace of Diamonds” counter-network across littoral states functions as India’s own attempt to cultivate mitra relationships within the very mandala China is constructing. This has grown more urgent as the PLA Navy pushes deeper into the Indian Ocean via facilities stretching from Gwadar to Djibouti” - Dr. Abigyah Langeh

Additionally, Chinese projects and trade has grown substantially in the IOR, with critical mineral seabed-exploration contracts, infrastructure projects, arms sales and collaborative maritime exercises around India and key chokepoints as can be seen in Images 2 and 4. The primary recipient of China’s arms sales are Pakistan, Myanmar, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), while multiple other IOR coastal states are recipients of other projects. Following image 2, the majority of the most recent projects are concentrated on East Africa, where the BRI or the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ (the Maritime aspect of the Belt and Road Initiative) brings in Chinese investment to East African Ports and connectivity infrastructure, which provides Beijing with growing economic influence and logistic access to the Indian Ocean Region, Europe and the Middle East. This is especially important, since China challenges the regions India declared as areas of maritime interest, namely the East African littoral, the Horn of Africa and the western Indian Ocean.

 

 

China conducts a range of air, land and maritime exercises in collaboration with multiple partners across multiple parts of the Indian Ocean coastline, reinforcing Indian concerns of widening Chinese security presence in its maritime neighbourhood, encircling India. While the exercises are not inherently hostile, China and its PLA is learning how to operate in India’s theatre, when China’s distance and unfamiliarity were previous strengths for India. China’s exercises have expanded from the Red Sea to the Malacca strait across the Indian Ocean with consistency over the past years. In 2024 and the first quarter of 2025 the region saw six Chinese maritime exercises, each bilateral, trilateral or multilateral (not including port visits or passing exercises), as seen in image 3. Though important to note that China’s presence in the IOR does not imply the means to engage in military confrontation, or being successful in one. Indeed, China’s vast and rapid progression of presence in the region would instead indicate its interest to defend itself and safeguard its SLOCs, while relying on the partnerships in the region to assist and bear part of the load.

Using images 1, 2 and 4 when analysing the region from East to West, certain chokepoints become increasingly important. For instance, image 2 showcases Chinese activity through infrastructure projects in the IOR, which spans across the entire region. Many of these projects aim at littoral states (states with a border connected to the ocean) and cover the entire length of the crucial oil shipping lanes (image 1 & 4) through the Indian Ocean while strategically placing ports near important bottlenecks. Some ports, such as the important Doraleh port in Djibouti (accompanied by the PLA military facility), Gwadar port in Pakistan, Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, and Kyaukpyu Port in Myanmar were constructed under the Belt and Road Initiative or later incorporated into the BRI, flagging them as ‘BRI Signatory’. The expanded reach of Beijing’s projects and military capabilities substantially boosts China’s power-projection, capabilities and geopolitical standing through its economic dominance, as portrayed in the IOR. The example of Chinese presence in the IOR highlights how China’s economic endeavours enable them to establish roots in strategic locations of geopolitical and geo-economic importance , such as the (north-)eastern-side of Africa, the very south of Sri Lanka, the west-coast of Myanmar, and Pakistan.

Looking at Pakistan, which serves as an example of another threat to India, would better contrast the China threat. Pakistan alone represents a significant threat to India, with comparable security challenges to China. However, India’s significant conventional advantages make Pakistan a manageable, but nuclear-armed, regional competitor. On its own, India possesses a substantially larger conventional military, economic base and naval force than Pakistan. New Delhi has greater capacity to sustain a prolonged conflict, but Pakistan nuclear deterrence prevents India’s numerical superiority to translate into military dominance. China disrupts this balance by supplying Pakistan with major arms imports between 2021 and 2025, with 80 per cent of Pakistan’s arms being supplied by China. Chinese assistance to Pakistan is modernising its capabilities across multiple fronts, adding to its own continental pressure and providing increased leverage at sea. Pakistan’s acquisition of eight Chinese-designed Hangor-class submarines, the first of which entered into service in 2026, further indicates that while Pakistan poses a challenge, the true, looming threat is China.

Regardless of China’s rationale behind the financial support, construction of critical infrastructure and increased trade to the recipient BRI countries, the geographical position of Chinese-linked infrastructure projects, combined with increased relations also carry tactical value. By effectively placing facilities near the important SLOCs and chokepoints, Beijing inserts itself through economic influence where political and physical conditions are arranged in a manner to support extended Chinese maritime presence (e.g. Bab El-Mandeb Strait).

“China’s so-called String of Pearls, port and logistics access in Gwadar, Hambantota, and Kyaukpyu, reads, in this idiom, as an attempt to constitute exactly such a mandala around India, using commercial infrastructure as the visible face of latent military reach. Chinese investment in these ports has created what analysts describe as an encirclement scenario, with over 80% of India’s oil imports passing through Indian Ocean sea lanes that China’s growing naval presence increasingly shadows.” - Dr. Abhigya Langeh

The Battle of Strategic Dependencies (chokepoints)

As India feels China’s ‘String of Pearls’ tightening with Beijing’s growing dominance in the IOR, it has accelerated military and infrastructure upgrades as part of its own ‘Necklace of Diamonds’. Crucial projects, such as the Great Nicobar Project on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (A&N Islands) which are strategically positioned near the Malacca Strait, were prioritised with the aim to give India an arsenal to establish a strong geopolitical standing, allow it to secure the region and defend its interests. Despite its geostrategic importance, The Great Nicobar Project is not without controversy. Concerns surrounding extensive forest clearance and the potential effects of development on the Island’s indigenous Shompen community were raised.

 

 

Image 4 showcases the shipping lanes including ‘chokepoints’ in the Indian Ocean, which harbors the greatest concentration of major strategic maritime chokepoints. From east to west, first the Malacca Strait, which could serve as a tactical chokepoint for India, where 30 per cent of the global oil trade and 80 per cent of the oil imported by major Asian consumers passes through. Especially important is that 80 per cent of China’s imported crude oil travels through the Malacca Strait, meaning that with close proximity, India has capabilities to leverage its position to threaten China’s energy supply, and indirectly its economy. Indira Point, a critical geographical feature marking the absolute southernmost location of India’s territory located at the southern tip of the Great Nicobar Island (GNI), provides India better capabilities to enact their responsibility as a net security provider in the region. Mainly, the goal of India’s Great Nicobar Project is to transform the island into a maritime and economic hub and consequently enhancing strategic autonomy by limiting the dependence on foreign transshipment ports.

“The second benefit is sea-lane and chokepoint leverage [...] A navy capable of credible presence at the Malacca Strait, and of contesting Chinese logistics through the Bab-el-Mandeb and the Mozambique Channel, gives India reciprocal leverage against precisely the vulnerability China has cultivated toward India” - Dr. Abhigya Langeh

Indira Point is not only positioned in proximity to the Malacca Strait, but also near the Six Degree Channel, as highlighted in image 4. The Six Degree Channel is a major shipping lane connected to the Malacca Strait, where the transformed A&N Islands could provide significant geopolitical leverage in the IOR. The islands are amidst the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, and straddle Duncan’s Passage and the Ten Degree Channel, all of which serve as important trade routes for India. The total 572 islands, of which 38 are inhabited, comprise 30 per cent of India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Malacca Strait is crucial for access to the South China Sea and further to the Pacific Ocean, and as the A&N Islands are at its intersection, with direct access to the Six Degree and Ten Degree Channels (as showcased in Image 5), India is in possession of ‘a diamond’.

 

 

A 2015 Maritime Strategy document identified Lakshadweep (the Laccadives) as an area of primary interest. The archipelago, located in the western quadrant of the IOR, the Arabian Sea, is near the Nine-Degree Channel, a vital SLOC in the IOR. Its comparably close proximity to the Gulf, the choke points of the Mozambique Channel and Bab el-Mandeb strait, compared to the Indian mainland, increases its importance as a geopolitical asset. Historically, the archipelago was neglected and considered a liability, as India’s preoccupation with the territorial disputes to the north furthered the archipelago’s underdevelopment and underutilisation in the maritime domain. The development of the Lakshadweep benefits India’s maritime development through increased opportunities for safeguarding the SLOC, promoting and executing the fundamental vision of the Indian MAHASAGAR. The archipelago’s geographical location near the Nine Degree Channel magnifies India’s capacity to ensure the protection of the uninterrupted supply chain and trade route. The archipelago’s facilities, such as INS Dweeprakshak naval detachment, INS Jatayu on Minicoy, Androth naval detachment, and the Coastal Surveillance Network - Six Phase-I radar stations, allow for monitoring and reconnaissance capacity of all entities, including extra-regional actors in the region with access to developed Lakshadweep islands. With the Lakshadweep islands in its arsenal, India has gathered a second diamond for its necklace.

The previous Red Sea crisis and the ongoing war between the US and Iran serve as a reminder of the fragility of the chokepoints, as most of the world suffered from Red Sea Crisis, and currently, the Strait of Hormuz’s difficult passage. This indicates the need for strategic autonomy, as the sheer scale of reliance on foreign security providers for safe passage in the Hormuz Strait has got a chokehold on global trade. Hence India’s wariness of chokepoints has increased, including China’s Djibouti military facility, which could leverage its proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. India’s proactive response to these crises include more frequent energy-supply monitoring, sustained surveillance around Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, diversified the crude oil supply away from Hormuz-dependent producers, sought alternatives for gas suppliers and routes, introduced RELIEF programme supporting exporters facing war-risk insurance, and instituting real-time monitoring of Indian vessels.

 

 

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, crucial to global trade, allows most oil destined for the European market to pass through, with an alternative route adding 4750 nautical miles (nm) (around 12 extra days) via the Cape of Good Hope to the port of Rotterdam. China’s military base in Djibouti gives Beijing an instrumental presence at the ‘Gate of Tears’, allowing China to insert itself into proximity of the 29 km (18 miles) wide waterway, vital for traffic from Asia to Europe via the Suez Canal. While China does not control the chokepoint, it has permanent logistics infrastructure and military foothold beside it, with replenishing capabilities. Recent satellite imagery showed the upgrades at the PLA Djibouti base, image 6 showcases the Djibouti base. This strengthens China’s military operations far from its territory and provides improved long-range military communications and signals-intelligence. In addition, Houthi developments demonstrated the weaponisation of a chokepoint, even by a relatively small actor. Attacks and threats on traffic have disrupted regional shipping, and energy supply. This indicates that maritime chokepoints could be weaponised by smaller navies. Geographic positioning, coastal forces and a relatively inexpensive arsenal capable of disrupting traffic can lead to disproportionate economic leverage.

For New Delhi, weariness around securing chokepoints has increased significantly, after Bab el-Mandeb and the Hormuz Strait have demonstrated their capacity in disrupting global trade, functioning as instruments of geopolitical and economic leverage in the hands of controlling actors.

India’s race to relationships

Primacy is not guaranteed by geography alone in the current globalised world order, which applies to India and the Indian Ocean. Effectively operating on such a large body of water requires India to effectively collaborate and cooperate with littoral states in the region, while combining stronger naval powers to ensure security in the region. India’s strategic hedging approach, which aims to prevent the perception of India as a member of a containment strategy led by the West, has its disadvantages. The problem arises when India refuses to take sides, which could affect outside perspectives, heightening suspicions of free riding, and make establishing relations more difficult. India’s willingness to enter relations with countries on opposing sides to other partnered countries could create a wedge between some of India’s other relations. For example, India engaging with Russia has created distance in US-India relations, and benefitted China. This applies to a broader scope, where India’s multi-alignment strategy has strengthened partnerships with opposing sides of a conflict. With the initial US-Israeli strikes on Iran and the sinking of the IRIS Dena, India remained silent, while having positioned itself as a (benign) net security provider. Hence, India received criticism regarding its role as security provider, exposing the gap that India lacks a concrete strategy for managing hard power, especially when a partner acts against regional interests. Multi-alignment should, in theory, assist India in leveraging ties with all sides to reduce tensions. However, India has found itself in a more awkward position, where it also failed to utilise its chairmanship in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to convene littoral states and establish a strong regional position. Instead, the strategic hedging worked rather in national interest, by furthering bilateral relations with the US and Israel, and in one instance, ensuring safe passage for Indian-flagged vessels.

In addition, regardless of the long-standing relations with island nations, the islands’ perception of India was tainted. Their belief is that India initially ignored them, thereafter overstretching its cultural and historical ties. India failed to address the islands’ issues as they perceived them, resulting in New Delhi’s initiatives being perceived as one-sided and out of their own interest. Thus, balancing relations with the West and China offers its own set of challenges. How can you trust a country to serve as a net security provider, when it is also aligned with the countries you want to be protected from?

While China steps in with a more aggressive expansion in the regions, India’s direct priority and primary focus remains on the Indian Ocean region, as New Delhi seeks to establish its own regional partnerships through maritime cooperation, capacity-building, infrastructure projects, development assistance and multilateral security. Under MAHASAGAR, the AIKEYME (Africa-India Key Maritime Engagement), Indian Ocean Ship (IOS) SAGAR (a programme to elaborate India’s maritime cooperation efforts and vision), and the Colombo Security Conclave (a minilateral maritime-security grouping of Indian Ocean littoral states), New Delhi attempts to position itself as the net security provider, and development partner while strategically restricting China’s space to manoeuvre. Additionally, Sino-Indian rivalry has invited China’s other neighbours, which share equal tensions with Beijing, into a comprehensive partnership with India. Japan, a neighbour of China, hopes to work with India, for example through Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), which includes Australia, Japan, the US and India, to challenge China’s growing influence in crucial regions.

“Where oceans serve as the world’s only open, shared realm, free access to these oceans is essential for establishing internal prosperity, external relations and resilient strategic dependencies.” - Rajeev Lachmipersad

Crucial, but external, relationships for India, are partners like France and Japan. The shared visions, goals and security interest allow for a strong partnership, with indispensable roles in their respective regions. Japan and India’s cooperation under the ‘Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation’, aims to increase each other’s defensive capabilities and readiness, by promoting interoperability and synergy between defense forces. Their relationship formed naturally with Japan increasingly becoming important when it comes to answering China’s growing presence in the regions, and closing the gap between Beijing’s and India’s military and economic capabilities. France has presence in the region through its overseas territories, and shares similar aims with India by seeking to secure the IOR (particularly the western Indian Ocean). France mainly wishes to focus on areas covering major geostrategic issues, such as SLOCs, exposure to effects of climate change, criminal networks and diminishing influence of competitors. Hence France and India benefit from closer relations, due to their significant military strength and shared interests, further evening-out the asymmetric capabilities of China and India. Along with close ties to France, India has entered more recent, close relations with the European Union (EU).

“India is participating with the EU, and with their EU NAVFOR ATLANTA and Aspides operations, but increasingly looking to do more in terms of Naval exercises, not just with the EU, but the individual countries in the EU, such as Germany, France, including with Italy, where they’re working very well now, in the in the shared Maritime neighborhood of the Mediterranean” - Dr. Dattesh D. Prabhu-Parulekar

While the statement ‘race for relationships’ holds truth, it is not a vigorous battle. Neither China nor India is simply competing to ‘win’ a country, because many littoral states practice hedging between the two. For example, Mauritius practices ‘asymmetrical hedging’, leaning towards India for security while engaging with China for the economic factor; whereas Seychelles practices a more ‘symmetrical hedging’ strategy between China and India.

India’s collaboration spans across the IOR, with key relations with Sri Lanka, the Maldives, East African states, Oman and Indonesia. While the relations with the littoral states are necessary, some are crucial. Sri Lanka for example, is positioned directly south of India, with a major SLOC. Moreover, China has shown significant (economic) interest, funding infrastructure projects, including the Hambantota port and Colombo related projects. Sri Lanka follows a similar practice to other littoral states, accepting India while enacting its security role and turning to China for economic benefit. Maldives is of similar importance, with high-competition. Located in the central Indian Ocean, near the Lakshadweep and the major SLOC, the Nine-Degree Channel, Maldives signed a 2024 military-assistance agreement with China, while relations with India worsened. However, Maldives and India re-entered ‘safer waters’, bettering their relations and signing a Comprehensive Economic and Maritime Security Partnership agreement, resulting in defense equipment, radar surveillance support, the Ekatha harbour project at Uthuru Thila Falhu (UTF) and continued bilateral maritime training and exercises.

The previously mentioned Mauritius and Seychelles also have importance, as Indian influence there would provide India with stronger reach toward the southwest IOR, and specifically the Mozambique Channel. India provides Mauritius with (maritime) development assistance, effectively offering economic cooperation critical to Mauritius.

“India is one country that has argued that small island developing states must not see themselves as small developing states, but as large ocean states. India believes their perception of themselves should not be in terms of their physical features, but in terms of the maritime expanse that comes under their jurisdiction.” - Dr. Dattesh D. Prabhu-Parulekar

As for the east-African littoral states, Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative entrenched itself. This has led Indian action to attempt to improve strategic influence in the region, with its opportunity to build relationships with the region’s Western partners. India wishes to present itself as a counterweight to China, effectively offering an alternative. India’s normative power and supporting role aim to avoid significant ecological consequences, debt-trap diplomacy, and focus on long-term development.

India’s Asymmetric Answer

To conclude, India can grow its capacity to help secure the Indian Ocean Region, but it cannot do so by attempting to mirror China’s growth in military or economic aspects. Instead, New Delhi’s strongest option lies in converting its geopolitical and geographical position at the heart of the IOR into strategic capacity, leveraging its ‘diamonds’ to secure the region. The development of the Great Nicobar Island and Lakshadweep, stronger maritime-domain awareness, greater naval reach through increased domestic spending and improved external relations with littoral states, and the geographical position along crucial SLOCs and chokepoints allow India to exploit its advantages. India’s influence and backyard provide it leverage while China, as an extra-regional power, must spend substantially more capital and resources to entrench itself in a similar role.

Infrastructure itself does not provide a country with influence, China’s growth of network, projects and ports has not demonstrated power-projection. Instead, partnerships and relationships have demonstrated that influence on the IOR depends on it as much as military capability, allowing even extra-regional actors to exert significant pressure and have a dominant presence in the region. India must therefore accelerate its physical maritime expansion with naval augmentation, development assistance, multi-lateral exercises, regional capacity-building, and deeper, comprehensive cooperation with littoral states under its MAHASAGAR vision. Driven by the strategic hedging approach among littoral states in the IOR, India’s challenge becomes to make itself the more dependable security and development partner, rather than ‘the easier option’ or ‘merely geographically closer’.

India’s success ultimately depends on its ability to balance, overcoming historical backdrops in maritime development while preventing overextension. China’s presence does not replace India, nor does it remove India’s geographical advantages; instead Beijing serves as an alternative with its improved logistical access, regional familiarity and political influence.

Dominating the IOR should therefore not be India’s goal, remaining its central security actor does not require regional dominance. India needs to fight asymmetry with asymmetry, strengthen its islands, secure vulnerable sea lanes, expand regional partnership and use valuable external partners such as France and Japan to compensate for the capability gap. India has the opportunity to make its geography, historical- and new partnerships and regional credibility more strategically valuable than China’s extensive financial reach. Hence, because China’s budget and scale put it in a weight class above India’s, India must turn to strategic partnership, or punch above its weight.